Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/12/q/bon-sent-II-d12-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the matter of bodily things was created under some diversity of forms.*

Third, it is asked whether that matter of bodily things was created under some diversity of forms. And that it was, seems thus:

*To the opposite.*

1. By the text: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*: therefore it seems that in the beginning of its founding it had both a heavenly form and an elemental form. If you say that *heaven* here stands for the empyrean heaven, and *earth* for the matter of bodily things; the objection is raised by the following text: *Let the waters be gathered into one place, and let the dry land appear*: therefore it seems that on the third day the *earth* was only made manifest, not produced: therefore in the chaos itself the elements seemed already to be present.

2. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor: «By the name *earth* here I judge the element of earth to be signified»: if therefore the element of *earth* was there, by parity of reasoning the other elements as well. If you say that he there calls it the element of *earth* not because it then was, but because it was to be; the objection is raised by what is added: «And this earthen element was settled in the middle and in one place, the rest being mixed in confusion together». If therefore the mixture is not of the same but of diverse things, it seems that diverse elemental forms were already there.

3. Likewise, this is seen *by reason*. The first forms which are present in matter are the elemental forms, as is clear, because beyond them there is no resolution except into first matter: therefore if that matter had any bodily form, it seems that it had an elemental form. But the elemental forms are equally primary: therefore it seems that it had them all at once.

4. Likewise, it is constant according to the position of the Saints that that light made night and day; but it could not make day unless there were a transparent and illuminable body, nor could it make night unless there were an opaque body which would cast a shadow: therefore it seems that in its primary founding the matter was in some part of itself transparent and in some part opaque, and thus that it had diverse forms in itself.

5. Likewise, «nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it»: therefore if that matter was something bodily, it was therefore some body: therefore either simple or mixed; but it was not a simple body, since neither heavenly nor elemental; therefore mixed, therefore it had in itself a diversity of forms.

6. Likewise, that matter, since it was imperfect, had some appetite; either therefore for one form or for many. If for one: then it seems, since God fulfilled its appetite, that he ought to have given one sole bodily form; if for many: then since the multiformity of appetites comes from the multiformity of dispositions, and the multiformity of dispositions from the multiformity of forms, it seems that that matter was founded under a diversity of forms.

*Foundations.*

**On the contrary:** 1. In Genesis 1: *And the earth was empty and void*; but if there were a diversity of forms in matter, it would not be empty and void: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, another translation: *The earth was invisible and incomposite*; but if there were a heavenly and elemental form there, the matter would already be in some way both visible and composed.

3. Likewise, if there were many forms there, then either they were *mixed* or *distinct*. If *distinct*: then that matter was not unformed; if *mixed*: then it seems that it would have the form of mixture, and so it was not unformed, but rather more formed than if it had only elemental form.

4. Likewise, things-to-be-mixed precede the mixture: therefore if *mixed* forms were there, by nature the elements are prior to that matter which was first founded: therefore the order seems preposterous, when God afterwards on the following days made the elements from that matter.

5. Likewise, if *mixed* forms were there, then that matter approximated more closely to a perfectly-mixed mixture than the element approximates: therefore it approximated more closely to the work of the fifth and sixth days than to the distinction of the elements: therefore it seems that the production of that matter ought not to have been settled in the primordial of things.

6. Likewise, if there was a diversity of forms there, then it seems that there was action and passion there, and so generation and corruption and alteration: and so the matter ought not to have been called *unformed*, since in such a state there were operations which belong to distinct forms.

### Conclusio

> *The matter of bodily things was not created under a complete diversity of forms, but the form which the so-called unformed matter had did not give complete being but was rather a disposition toward further forms.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that diverse [authors] have understood the *unformedness* of that bodily matter in diverse ways.

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that that matter was called *chaos* on account of the multitude and contrariety of forms which was in the parts of matter, in such a way that those parts were not distinguished from one another in determinate places, nor were they joined together in such proportion that any *complete mixture* should result from them. And therefore there was there a kind of mixture, not of proportion but of confusion; and just as there was no proportional mixture there, so neither was there regular action there, but rather the confusion of a kind of strife, such that hot things fought with cold, and moist with dry; and so that matter could rightly be called *chaos*. — But this manner of positing is poetic rather than philosophical, because it follows the fiction of imagination rather than reason, since on this position the elements would naturally precede that matter so produced; which is consonant neither with reason nor with Sacred Scripture.

*Opinion 2.* And therefore there is another, more reasonable, manner of speaking: that that matter was produced under some form, but that form was not a *complete form* nor one giving matter *complete being*; and therefore it did not so form it that matter would not still be called *unformed*, nor did it so terminate matter's appetite that matter would not still desire other forms; *Conclusio 1.* and therefore there was a *disposition* toward further forms, not complete perfection. And since unformed matter had appetite and inclination toward many forms, therefore, although that form did not have in itself *diverse natures*, *Conclusio 2.* nevertheless matter in its diverse parts had a certain *imperfect diversity*, not from diverse complete acts, but rather from appetites toward diverse things; and therefore it is called *mixed* and *confused*. — *An example.* Just as the example is given of an embryo, which has in act one form and a certain shape of a mass of flesh, yet this is a disposition toward the diverse shapings of members. *The example falls short.* This however is not wholly similar, because that form was not of such great actuality as is the form of an embryo, nor in such proximity to the eduction of subsequent forms as is the form of the embryo to the eduction of the members. For the form of the embryo is visible and by the power of nature is able to be brought through to perfect completion; but that matter under such a form was incomposite and invisible, and to subsequent forms could be brought through only by divine virtue and operation. And therefore on account of the imperfection of the form, that matter is called *unformed*; and on account of the indeterminate appetite for many forms, it is called *confused* and *mixed*.

*A verdict on this opinion.* And this position seems sufficiently intelligible and probable. And according to this position it must be granted that matter was not created under a diversity of forms, as the reasons adduced to this effect show.

*Solution of the opposites.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary from the text, it must be said that *heaven* there stands for the empyrean. And if it is objected that Scripture consequently says that the *earth appeared*, not that it was *formed*; it must be said that just as a craftsman makes an effect to appear by producing it, not only by showing it; so it must be understood that God made the *earth appear* not only by separating the elements from one another, but also by producing them, so that the production was with distinction, and the distinction with production.

2. To that, however, which is objected that Hugh says that by *earth* the *element of earth* is understood; it must be said that he says this not on account of the *form of earth* which would already be in that matter, but on account of a certain *incomplete aptitude* which was in that part of matter, that it might afterwards be perfected by the form of earth, in the manner according to which something is wont to be called by the name of that to which it is ordered. *Note.* For that matter could only be described in a kind of stammering way, because there was not yet that which speech could perfectly explain, and even the intellect fails in imagination. Hence what he subjoins about *mixture* is not said because there was there a true conjunction of opposite forms, but because there was not there a perfect distinction of forms.

3. *Note.* To that which is objected that the elemental forms are first in bodily matter; it must be said that this is true of the forms which give matter *complete being*; but that form which unformed matter had did not give it *complete being*, and therefore it preceded, or could precede, both simple and composite forms which confer *complete being*.

4. To that which is objected that there was there an opaque and transparent body;

it must be said that there was neither perfect opacity nor perfect transparency there; yet there was in diverse parts of matter, according as the Creator had ordered to produce diverse forms from them, some diverse mode of *disposition*, which did not posit a diversity of *forms*. Just as if it were understood that some body in one part be rarer and in another more compact, the unity of form being preserved; so it must be understood in that matter, which had a form maximally open to many possibilities.

5. *Note.* To that which is objected that nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it; it must be said that this is true of what is in a genus as a *complete being*; but that matter was not so bodily that it was *complete* in the genus of bodies, but it so had *extension* and *bodiliness* that it did not have perfect actuality of form, as was said before.

6. *Note.* To that, however, which is objected concerning the diversity of appetites, it must be said that *appetite* does not always follow *complete form*, but is also attended according to the *indigence of the one desiring* and some *half-full disposition*; unless perhaps it be such an appetite as follows a disposition which is *necessity*; but such was not in that unformed matter, but, according to a certain greater subtlety and rarity in the parts of matter, there was a remote disposition toward various other forms.