Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/12/q/bon-sent-II-d12-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the quantity of matter itself.*

Consequently the question is asked concerning the second article, namely concerning the quantity of matter itself, about which a threefold inquiry is conducted.

First, as regards number.
Second, as regards time.
Third, as regards place.

### Question I. *Whether the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is one as regards being.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks whether the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is one as regards being; for above the question was asked concerning the unity of matter as regards essence. And that it is one, seems [to be the case].

*Argument for the affirmative.*

1. According to expositors, by the name *earth*, when it is said: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, is commonly understood the matter of all visible things this side of the empyrean heaven: therefore if that [matter] was one and had some form, as was seen above, therefore it seems that celestial and terrestrial things were produced from one matter as regards being.

2. Likewise, that matter from which the bodies were formed had neither celestial form nor elemental form nor any form consequent upon these: therefore if it had some form, it had a form common and indifferent to these: therefore it seems that, as regards some formal being, one must hold that the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is common.

3. Likewise, extension follows upon matter not according to its essence, but according to some being, since it is an accident: therefore if extension is commonly found in superior and inferior bodies, therefore it seems that there is one common matter as regards being in celestial and terrestrial things.

4. Likewise, light is a common nature, found in all bodies, both celestial and terrestrial, whether it be a substance or an accident: therefore if that corporeal form is not in matter except according to some being, it seems the same as before.

5. Likewise, transparency is a nature similarly found in all bodies, both superior and inferior, according to more and less; but transparency follows not only upon matter, but also upon form and the being of matter, not only upon essence: therefore it seems that in all bodies, whether celestial or earthly, one must posit one matter according to being.

6. Likewise, one matter is posited as regards being for the rare and the dense; therefore by parity of reasoning, for the luminous and the opaque; and if this, therefore for the heaven and the element.

*For the negative.*

**On the contrary:**

1. «Of corruptible and incorruptible things there is not one matter», as the Philosopher holds; but the superior bodies are incorruptible, and the inferior corruptible: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, things which have the same matter are mutually transmutable; but celestial and terrestrial bodies are not mutually transmutable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, matter subject to privation and [matter] which is not subject to privation differ as regards being; but in celestial things matter is not subject to privation, whereas in terrestrial things it is subject [to it]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a celestial body and an elemental body differ not only in form and quality, but also in discontinuity: if therefore continuity comes from the unity of matter as regards being, since these are mutually discontinuous — which is clear, because one moves while the other rests — it seems that as regards being there cannot be one matter of celestial and terrestrial things.

### Conclusion.

> *Of celestial and terrestrial bodies there was one matter according to the incomplete being which matter had before production; but after production and according to complete being, their matter differs.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, when one asks whether celestial and terrestrial bodies are from the same matter as regards being, this can be understood in two ways: either as regards the being which matter had *before* production, or as regards the being which matter has *after* production.

*Conclusion 1.* If as regards the being which matter had before production, thus without doubt the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies was one, because it was one mass, having one *incomplete* form.

*Conclusion 2.* If as regards the being which matter has after production, which is indeed complete being, thus beyond doubt the matter of celestial and terrestrial things differs as regards being, both because under the one form it is corruptible, under the other incorruptible, and because under the one form it is subject to privation, under the other not. And this produces diversity in matter as regards being not only with respect to *act*, but also with respect to *potency ordered to act*; which diversity is not in matter insofar as it is subject to elemental forms. For although matter subject to fire and to air has one and another *actual being*, nevertheless, because in both cases it is subject to transmutation and privation and is capable of both, therefore they are said to have one matter as regards being; in celestial bodies and elemental ones, however, it does not happen that this is found.

And from these things the objections to either side are plain.

*To the arguments for the affirmative.*

For the first reasons, which show that celestial bodies and elemental bodies share in matter as regards being, speak of matter as regards that being which it had before production, and as regards the properties which follow upon that being, such as extension and the participation of transparency.

6. The last reason, however, does not conclude, which proceeds by likeness from the rare and the dense to the celestial and the elemental. For there is no likeness, because the rare and the dense are mutually transmutable, but not so celestial and elemental bodies; and I am speaking of the power of transmuting according to nature, not according to divine power.

*To the arguments for the negative.*

The reasons to the contrary, however, conclude that matter is not the same as regards being in celestial and terrestrial things *after* their production, as is plain by running through them one by one.

*Another way of distinguishing.*

It could be put otherwise, and almost amounts to the same thing, since unity in matter can be understood and exist in a fourfold way: either as regards essence, or as regards *incomplete* being and being *remote* from completion, or as regards *incomplete* being *proximate* to completion, or as regards *simply complete* being. And accordingly matter is distinguished thus: that some is subject to substantial form alone, some to substantial form and extension or quantity, some to substantial form and quantity and contrariety, some to substantial form and quantity, not to contrariety, and to uniformity in all its parts. —

*Conclusions.*

In the first way, the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is said to be the same, as was shown above; in the second way, of celestial and terrestrial things, or of corruptible and incorruptible bodies; in the third way, of elemental bodies, mutually transmutable; in the fourth way, of bodies similar in species and nature. Therefore in the first and second way, the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is the same, as the first reasons show; in the third and fourth way, not, as the reasons brought forward to the contrary conclude.