Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/14/q/bon-sent-II-d14-p1-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the heavens in comparison to the influence of the mover.*

Consequently, it is asked in the third place concerning the heavens in comparison to the influence of the mover. And concerning this two things are asked.

First, it is asked whether the first mobile is moved by God immediately only, or by means of some created power.

The second is, whether it is moved by an Intelligence, or by its own proper form.

### Question I. *Whether the heaven is moved immediately by God.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the heaven is moved immediately by God:

*On the opposite side.* 1. First through the Philosopher, who in the second [book] *On the Heavens and the World* says: "The first cause moves the first caused"; but the first cause is none other than God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius *On Consolation*, speaking to the Lord:

> *And, remaining stable, you grant all things to be moved:*

therefore it seems that he most of all moves that which is the first mobile; but this is the heaven: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. The mover of the first mobile must be the first; but "the first mover is altogether immobile," because there is never rest except in the immobile; but nothing is altogether first and immobile save God alone: therefore God alone is the principle of the motion of the first mobile.

4. Likewise, from the motion and influence of the celestial body comes the conservation of all living bodies: therefore from its mover will come the conservation of all life-giving spirits, because, as the mobile relates to the mobile, so the mover relates to the mover; but God alone is he who is the conserver and vivifier of spirits: therefore he alone moves the first heaven.

**On the contrary:** 1. *Foundations.* The immensity of his power and wisdom and goodness requires this, that God communicate to created power the act which that [power] is suited by nature to receive; but the act, which is to move whatsoever body according to place, is suited by nature to befit a created power: therefore it seems that God moves no body without the power of some creature.

2. Likewise, the power of the mover must be proportioned to the mobile; but the power of the heaven is finite, whereas the power of God is infinite: therefore in order that the due proportion may be preserved in the world, it seems that between God moving and the heaven moved some created and finite power must be posited.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that if such-and-such a power moves in such-and-such a time, and a greater [power] in less [time], and the greatest in the least, and an infinite [power] in a now: therefore if God is of infinite power, and he himself immediately moves the heaven, it seems that in an instant he would revolve it from east to west, which is manifestly false. If you should say that God in moving does not exercise the full effect of his power, because, since he is a voluntary mover, he can move both quickly and slowly; then the first objection returns, because, since this act, namely to move successively, is of finite power, it will be suited by nature to befit a creature.

4. Likewise, those things which are immediately from divine power proceed into being according to a miraculous course, as is evident in creation and in justification and in the working of miracles: therefore if the heaven is moved immediately by God, its motion is miraculous, not natural; but if it is natural, then it is not from God immediately.

> ### Conclusion.
> *God moves the first mobile by means of some created power, with which he immediately cooperates.*

**I respond:** *Preliminaries.* For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that in every operation God operates intimately and immediately, "since the will of God, as Augustine says, and as was held in the first book, is the first and highest cause of all species and motions." In some things, however, he operates in such a way that he himself is the whole cause; in some things he operates and moves in such a way that he communicates to the creature the power of acting and moving. And the first indeed are called miraculous, the second natural, or voluntary as to their issuing forth.

*The sense of the question.* When therefore it is asked whether the motion of the first mobile is immediately from God, the question is not whether the divine power operates intimately and immediately for exercising that change, because in this sense nothing is moved unless he himself moves and cooperates with the motive power; but the question is whether the motion of the first mobile is from God as from the whole cause, or whether together with the divine power moving some created power [also] moves. — *Conclusion.* And to this question one can quite plainly respond, that since that motion is suited by nature to befit a finite power on account of its successiveness, and the divine goodness for its own manifestation communicates to the creature that which it is naturally suited to receive, God moves the first mobile by means of some created power, just as also the other mobiles. — And the reasons adduced for this are to be granted, although some do not necessarily compel.

**To the arguments on the affirmative side:**

*To 1. Solution of the opposing [arguments].* To that indeed which is objected from the Philosopher, it can be said probably enough that the Philosopher did not understand that the mover of the first orb was God by way of efficient [cause]. For he himself posits that the power of the mover is so proportioned to the mobile that if even the smallest or least body were added to a body, the power of the mover would be wearied in moving, as he says in the book *On the Heavens and the World*. *To be noted.* But he posits that God moves the first caused metaphorically, as end and as that which is desired; or if he posits that he moves by way of efficient [cause], he does not posit that he alone moves, but with the mobile's proportioned power cooperating. Hence his statement can be understood to have been said by a certain appropriation and by [reference to] the primary reception of his influence.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from Boethius, that God moves all things; it must be said that from that authority it is not concluded that God alone moves, but that they are not moved without the influence of the divine power. For no power of any mover can operate even a little without the benefit and aid of him who is wholly immobile, as was shown in the first book and as will be shown in what follows, when it is asked whether every action is from God.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the mover of the first mobile is first and immobile; it must be said that it is not necessary that the mover of the first mobile be in every way first, or in every way immobile; but it suffices that it be first in respect of the other movers or moving powers, and that it be immobile according to that mode by which it moves. For it is not necessary that there be rest in the mover of the first mobile absolutely, but [only] in the genus of creatures. But all creatures are defective and are led back to God himself, who is the principle and end of all, beyond whom there is neither perfect rest nor perfect stay.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that as the influence of the mobile conserves mobiles, so the influence of the mover [conserves] other movers; it must be said that this does not follow, because the proportion is not similar, for this reason: that order is in the bodies of the world according to such great predominance and excellence that one can simply influence another. But rational spirits, who are vivifiers and movers of bodies, have a grade and order in such a way that nevertheless according to their highest [part] they are perfected and formed by God immediately; and this is on account of the character of image, by which they are immediately capable of God himself.

### Scholion.

**I.** While more recent astronomers and physicists have accurately explored very many things concerning the motions of the celestial bodies and concerning the proportions which are in these motions according to the law of gravitation or attraction; St. Bonaventure here disputes concerning the motive power itself considered in itself, by which those motions and the laws of motion are caused; which question certainly cannot be solved by the mere observation of motions, or of the proportions according to which that motive cause acts. — As to each of the two questions of this article four opinions have arisen, of which the first two are commonly rejected by the Scholastics. The first contends that the first mobile is moved immediately by God himself as the total cause; which is rejected by the Holy Doctor in Question I, according to the principles already posited in I *Sent.* d. 45. a. 2. and II *Sent.* d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — The second opinion (q. 2.) attributes to the celestial bodies a soul which is the immediate cause of motion; and this opinion is ascribed by many not only to the Arab philosophers, but also to Plato and Aristotle, especially to Blessed Albert and Richard. Scotus, however, asserts that Aristotle speaks of animation not in the formal sense, but according to motive power. Likewise St. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 70. a. 3. in corp.) says: "Hence between those who posit them to be animate, and those who posit them to be inanimate, little or no difference is found in the matter, but only in word." Of this animation, however, St. Augustine himself was in doubt, who, as Scotus observes (here q. 1. n. 5.), in his very Retractation, which St. Bonaventure recalls (q. 2. in corp.), does not reprove it as utterly false. See the very words of Augustine below at p. II. dub. 3. But the Scholastics judge more severely of the same, if it is properly understood of soul as form. — The third and fourth opinions are clearly explained in the second question, and both are approved by St. Bonaventure, provided that to the third opinion is added that "if anything is wanting to it for the sufficiency of moving, let it be supplied by the divine power itself." The fourth opinion, which holds that some created intellect is the proximate mover of the heaven, is commonly maintained by the Scholastics as the more probable.

**II.** Each of the two questions of this article other commentators usually settle in a single question. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 52. m. 2. a. 4. *quaest. incid.* and q. 18. m. 4. — Scot., in each *Scriptum* here q. 1. — St. Thom., here q. unica a. 3; *S.* I. q. 70. a. 3; *S. c. Gent.* II. 69, III. c. 23. — B. Albert., here a. 6; *S.* p. II. tr. II. q. 53. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 6, and a. 3. q. 4. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 3. and q. 3. a. 4. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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