Dist. 14, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/14/q/bon-sent-II-d14-p2-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether from the impressions of the heavenly bodies there is caused in human beings a diversity of moral character.*

In the third place it is asked whether from the impressions of those luminaries a diversity of moral character is caused in human beings. And that it is so, is shown as follows.

***On the affirmative side.***
1. Boethius in the book *On Consolation*: "Fate is a disposition inhering in mobile things, through which providence binds each thing in its own order." But

also Augustine in the fifth book *On the City of God* says that fate is "the force of the position of the stars, the existence of which, when someone is conceived or born, makes known what sort of person he will be." From the first authority it is established that fate *truly is;* from the second it is established that fate is *the force of the stars:* therefore if the whole governance of life consists in fate, as Boethius says, and fate is the force of the stars, as Augustine says, then the governance of life and the diversity of moral character depend on the power of the stars.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book *On the Properties of the Elements* says that "kingdoms have been emptied, and lands depopulated, at the conjunction of the two great stars, namely Jupiter and Saturn": but this would not be so unless the wars and conflicts of men depended on the stars: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow from sacred Scripture, in Matthew 2: *The Magi knew the birth of the King* through the appearance of a star. And in John 2 the Lord says: *My hour has not yet come;* likewise in John 8: *No one laid hands on him, because his hour had not yet come.* If therefore Christ, as a man, was born under a constellation and awaited the hour of time in his Passion, it seems that much more all other human beings must be ruled and governed and disposed according to the power of the stars.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems established by sensible experience. For at the deaths of kings, as the astronomers say, a comet-star appears, and the astronomers and mathematicians, when consulted on many matters, predict many true things according to the judgement of astrology; this however would not be so unless the moral character and affections of human beings were disposed according to the power of the stars: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems clear by *certain reason.* It belongs to the order of the universe and to the perfection of governance that nothing happens by chance with respect to divine providence: therefore if God rules the ignoble through the noble, the lower things through the higher, and the corruptible things through the incorruptible; it seems that nothing in these lower things happens that does not proceed from the power and influence of the stars. And if this is true: therefore the diversity of moral character is caused by the diversity of constellations.

**On the contrary:**
1. *Deuteronomy* 4: *The Lord God created the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven for the service of all the peoples that are under heaven;* but what has been created for the service of man does not dominate him in governance and power; otherwise it would have been created for dominion, not for service. If therefore the stars of heaven were created for service: therefore from them the moral character of men does not principally depend.

2. Likewise, this is shown by the *authority* of Ptolemy himself, the greatest of astronomers, who says that "the wise man will rule the stars"; but this would not be the case if the moral character of men were caused from the impressions of the stars: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems clear by *demonstrative reason.* What is rightly ordered, insofar as it is such, tends only to what is right; but heaven with its stars was most rightly ordered by the first Founder: therefore it never tends except to good and right moral character: therefore either all human beings have good moral character, or the goodness of moral character is not caused by the position of the stars.

4. Likewise, this is shown by *a reasoning leading to the impossible.* For if the diversity of moral character were caused by the positions and impressions of the stars, since their motion is natural and necessary, the diversity of moral character in human beings will be naturally and necessarily so: therefore there will be no free choice, nor counsel of any avail, nor merit nor demerit, nor praise nor blame. If therefore this is a maximum impossibility, because it dishonors and disfigures the whole universe, it is a maximum impossibility that the diversity of moral character should be caused by the positions of the stars.

### Conclusion.

> *It is heretical to say that the luminaries cause the moral character and events of men necessarily and sufficiently; but it can be granted that remotely and contingently they dispose to a variety of moral character.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the causing of the moral character of human beings and the events of future things by the heavenly bodies can be understood in two ways: ***A distinction.*** either *necessarily and sufficiently,* or *dispositively and contingently.* If it is said in the first way, then it is not only false but also heretical and a diabolical fabrication, since it is repugnant ***Conclusion as to the first member of the distinction.*** to *the Christian religion,* repugnant to *the senses,* and repugnant also to *reason.*

***Reason 1.*** It is repugnant to *the Christian religion,* inasmuch as it is against *the truth of faith* and *the integrity of moral character.* For *the truth of faith* cannot be preserved in this error; for when it posits that all things come about from the stars necessarily, it takes away merit and consequently reward, it takes away also grace and consequently glory. — *The integrity of moral character,* too, suffers prejudice through this error, since the fault of the sinner is referred to the stars, and licence to do evil without reprehension is granted, and man is bent down to adore and worship the stars. And this is the end of this most evil error, that it leads to idolatry. And in this it is clear that this is a contrivance of the devil, who above all aims to draw man to this, that he may have himself adored and worshipped.

***Reason 2.*** It is repugnant also to *the senses,* because by sensible experience we see those conceived and born under the same constellation diversified in moral character and pursuits and events and natural properties; and this manifestly appears in Jacob and Esau, who were conceived and born at the same time, and yet in all these respects are diversified. It is also clear because under the same constellation a king's son and a peasant's son are born, a man and an ass are born, a woman and a male are born, who have nothing in common in moral character nor in events nor in natural properties. And this very thing Gregory proves in the *Homily on the Epiphany* thus: "Mathematicians are accustomed to confess that whoever is born under the sign of Aquarius receives in this life the office of fisherman; yet, as it is reported, Getulia has no fishermen. Who then can say that no one is born here under the star of Aquarius, where fishermen are by no means to be found? They also say that those who are born under the sign of Libra will be money-changers: but in many places under Libra many are born where money-changers are entirely unknown."

***Reason 3.*** Nevertheless it is repugnant to *right reason,* in that *it sets the lower things above the higher,* and *implicates contraries in itself.* For *it sets the lower above the higher,* when it sets the stars above man, who is the most worthy of creatures, as the Philosopher testifies and right reason that man is the end of all things that are. And therefore Gregory says: "The life of human beings is administered solely by the Founder who created them; for not for the stars was man made, but the stars for man." When therefore this error subjects the moral character of men to the stars, it sets the lower under its higher, and the more ignoble above the more noble. — Not only on this account is it repugnant to reason, but also because *it implicates opposites in itself.* For it says that, since the moral character of men depends on the stars and constellations, therefore the stars are to be venerated and the constellations observed; and this is to posit two opposites. For either it is necessary that things *happen* to a human being according to the constellations of the stars, or *not.* If *not:* therefore fates are not to be feared; if *so:* therefore the stars are not to be venerated. When therefore he posits that the fates are to be feared, and the stars to be venerated, he posits two contraries. Likewise, either it *happens* to a human being according to what his constellation at his rising required, or *not.* If *so:* therefore it is in vain that the constellations are to be observed in his acts, since by the first constellation it is necessary that good or evil happen to him. If *not* in the first constellation: therefore by parity of reason neither in the subsequent ones: therefore none are to be observed. When therefore this error posits that the constellations have an effect, and posits that the constellations are to be observed after a man's birth; it openly appears to contradict itself. And so this error is repugnant to *sense* and to *faith* and to *reason.*

***Epilogue.*** This threefold inconvenience which has been stated is gathered from the words of Damascene and Gregory and Augustine. According to this manner of speaking, then, namely, that the moral character of men and the events of future things are caused necessarily and sufficiently by the stars, falsehood is incurred and dangerous heresy.

***As to the second member of the distinction.*** But if it is said that the moral character of men is varied by the dispositions of the stars *dispositively* and *contingently,* then it can have truth, because it is repugnant neither to reason nor to faith. For it is plain that the varied disposition of the body greatly contributes to the variation of the affections and moral character of the soul. For the soul for the most part imitates the complexions of the body; whence the choleric are irascible, the sanguine are kindly, the melancholic are livid, the phlegmatic sluggish. This however is not *necessary;* for the soul has dominion over its body, especially when it is aided by grace. For we see many choleric persons gentle, and many melancholic persons kindly. Since therefore the power of the heavenly bodies works upon the mixture and quality of the complexions; hence it is that in consequence it works in a certain way upon the quality of moral character, but very much *from a distance;* ***Note well.***

for the power of lower nature contributes more to the quality of the complexion than the power of the star. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the City of God*, in the solution of a certain question about two brothers who were taken ill and recovered at the same time, as to whence this came about, commends more the reply of Hippocrates the physician than that of the astronomer. For Hippocrates replied that this was because of the likeness of the complexion, and the astronomer replied that it was because of the identity of the constellation. The physician answered better, because he assigned a cause more proper and more proximate. — If therefore it should be asked in this way, whether the impressions of the stars in any way dispose to a variety of moral character; it would have to be answered that they do, yet not by a *necessary* and *proximate* and *sufficient disposition,* but by a *remote* and *contingent disposition.* But if it is asked whether they are a *sufficient* cause; it must be answered simply that they are not, since to say the contrary is heretical, as was shown before. ***Conclusion 2.***

***Solution of the opposing arguments.***
1. To that, then, which is objected concerning fate, it must be said that Boethius speaks of fate in one way, and Augustine in another. ***Fate according to Boethius.*** For Boethius speaks of fate insofar as it is something according to *truth;* and so he names fate *the order in mobile things,* referred to divine providence: an order, I say, not only according to nature and according to necessary cause, but also according to the freedom of the will and contingency. For he says thus in the book *On Consolation*: "*Providence* embraces all things together, however diverse, however infinite; but *fate* directs single things, distributed in motion, places, forms, and times. And this unfolding of temporal order, gathered together in the contemplation of the divine mind, is *providence;* but the very same unification, when arranged and unfolded in times, is called *fate.*" And so it is clear that Boethius takes fate generally for the going-forth and unfolding of all things, whether voluntary, or natural, or necessary, or contingent. — ***Fate according to Augustine.*** But Augustine in the fifth book *On the City of God* takes fate according to the *estimation* of the philosophers, who call fate the force of the position of the stars and constellations, according to which all things happen necessarily in these lower things; and so fate is nothing; and he himself shows that it is nothing. — And thus Boethius and Augustine take fate *equivocally,* and on this account no assumption is made under a middle term, but rather a deception of equivocation; for the removal of which Augustine says in the fifth book *On the City of God* that if anyone calls fate *the order of causes which God established,* since this is true, let him hold the opinion and correct his speech, since according to common usage it is taken in the way that the mathematicians have been accustomed to take it.

2. To that which is objected, that wars are caused by the position of the stars; it must be said that that saying of the Philosopher does not attribute anything else to the stars than a certain disposition to such affects, from which wars are generated. For from the disturbance of some humor an affect can be excited in the soul, which however need not be admitted as necessary, since the soul can repress it. But because many are pursuers of the passions, and subject themselves to those whom they are able to dominate, ***Note well.*** they subject themselves; hence it is that many subject themselves to the impressions of the stars. And therefore astrologers frequently predict true things, especially concerning men who live in an animal way; but concerning those who live spiritually wise, who dominate the passions, they can predict few true things; rather, as the great astronomer Ptolemy says: "The wise man will rule the stars."

3. To that which is objected, that the Lord was born under a constellation; it must be said that this is false; for no star appeared under whose *governance* he might be born, nor in suffering did he await a fated hour; but at his nativity the star appeared as a *sign,* and in his Passion he awaited the time predefined to him by God and prefigured by the legal figures. — ***Incidental question.*** And if you ask whence it is, that the Magi by that star knew the King; it must be said that this was not by human ingenuity alone, but by the attention of their own mind and by divine revelation. Moreover, that star was not created with the other stars, but was produced at the nativity of the Lord, nor did it have the motion of the other stars, as Chrysostom says, nor is it believed to have been in the orbits of the other stars, but far below, so that it appeared directly over the house.

4. To that which is objected, that they predict many true things, and that this is most apparent in the comet-star which appears at the death of kings; it must be said that in those things ***Note well.*** which are considered concerning *the motion of the heavenly bodies,* they can predict true things infallibly and by art, as in the case of an eclipse of the sun and moon. But in those things which are considered concerning *the effects of the lower things* which are subject to them, they can predict true things probably and by art, yet not always, as in the case of storms and clear weather and the like. But in those things which are subject to *free choice,* they often speak as much falsehood as truth; and if they sometimes seem to speak the truth, this is either by chance, or by diabolical instinct. For the devil, as Augustine says, willingly mixes himself into divinations of this sort. — Nor is what is objected about the comet-star of any force, since, insofar as it signifies the death of a king, it does not come about by nature, but by divine command, as Damascene says. For if it comes about naturally, there does not seem to be greater reason why it should appear

at the death of a prince than at the death of a peasant; unless perhaps you say, as certain astrologers wish to say, that some star presides over a prince, which at his death by divine command draws to itself the celestial parts that were in his body; which, having been drawn from the body, a dissolution is generated in what remains; and while they are drawn upward and the stars approach, they make a coma. — ***Reason not proven.*** But then a question remains: why does the same not happen with the peasant? And therefore it can more safely be said that the comet either does not signify the death of a prince, but only this happens, that he should die at its appearance; or, if it does signify, this comes about by divine command, who rather foretells his death, both because he is a public person, and because from this there can frequently arise a disturbance of the kingdom, in whose guard the Angels are more solicitous, since they prefer the common good to the special good.

5. To that which is objected, that it belongs to the perfection of order that what is ruled be perfectly subjected to the ruler; it must be said that this is true where the ruler rules something through the mode of one *dominating,* not through the mode of one *ministering.* Whence, because human acts are ruled by divine providence as by one *dominating,* nothing can happen apart from the intention and cognition of providence itself, and thus nothing by chance. But because by the stars they are directed only through the mode of *ministry;* therefore it is not necessary that they be subjected to them in all things, nor does the perfection of the universe require this.