Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/15/q/bon-sent-II-d15-a1-q1
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### Article I.
*Whether sensible things, that is, animals, have been made.*

### Question I.
*Whether the souls of irrational animals were produced from something.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the souls of sensible, that is, of irrational [animals] were produced from something:

*Fundamenta.* 1. *First,* by the *text of Scripture*, which says: *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature of a living soul* etc.; and a little after: *Let the earth bring forth a living soul.* For if that which is created is from God alone, and the earth together with the water received the power of producing the creeping thing of a living soul, it does not seem that an animal, with respect to some principle of itself, is from nothing.

2. Likewise, by the *authority of the Philosopher* in the sixteenth book of the *Animals*: «The intellect alone enters from without»: but if the souls of brutes had been produced from nothing, then they would be from God alone and would enter from without.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems by *reason,* because a thing is produced from that into which it is resolved; but there is nothing which by natural resolution is resolved into nothing: therefore the souls of brute animals are not resolved into nothing when certain animals have been corrupted: therefore they were not produced from nothing.

4. Likewise, from the same source is the soul of this brute, which now is, and of the first brute, *by conformity;* but the soul of this brute generated by nature is not from nothing, since then it could not be produced by nature, and so it would follow that nature could not make a louse. Which, since it does not seem probable, and it is plain, as has appeared from what precedes, that nature cannot produce anything from nothing: it remains therefore that the first souls of brute animals were not produced from nothing.

5. Likewise, the rational soul, because it is brought forth into *being* by creation, is immortal and incorruptible — for its production does not depend on the body, but on its effective principle — but the souls of brutes are by nature corruptible: therefore they were not produced from nothing.

6. Likewise, the work of *adornment* presupposes the work of *distinction,* and the work of *distinction* presupposes the work of *creation:* if therefore in the *distinction* of bodies there was no new creation but a production from something, much more does it seem [the same is true] in the *adornment.* Therefore if the bodies of animals and their souls pertain to the adornment, it seems that they were not produced from nothing, but from something.

*To the opposite.* **On the contrary:** 1. If from something the souls of the sensible [animals] were produced in the primordium, I ask concerning that from which they were produced, whether that [thing] was produced from something or from nothing. And if from something, I shall ask likewise concerning that, and thus either there will be a regress to infinity, or it will be necessary to posit that that from which the sensible soul was produced was from the beginning produced from nothing. But by the same reason by which that thing was produced from nothing, by the same reason also the sensible soul: therefore it seems etc.

2. Likewise, if those souls were produced from something, that [something] was either *spiritual* or *corporeal.* If *corporeal; on the contrary:* spirit can never be made from body, as Augustine says *on Genesis according to the letter*. If *spiritual;* then it is asked concerning it: did it *live,* or did it not *live,* and what use did it have? And again, if *spiritual;* why could the rational soul not have been made from it? If, therefore, it is not possible to answer reasonably on this point, as Augustine intimates on Genesis according to the letter, reducing it to these absurdities, it follows from this that the first souls of sensible [animals] were produced from nothing.

3. Likewise, if they had been produced from something, since such a manner of producing belongs to natural power, it then seems, since there were already supercelestial bodies acting and moving and operating toward mixture, that animals could have been produced by the power of nature: therefore the primary works would not be proper to the divine power, which is unfitting, since He alone is the founder and perfector of the universe.

4. Likewise, we see now that certain ignoble animals are generated by putrefaction; I ask therefore by what their soul is brought forth; and it seems that it cannot be by *nature,* since «nature is a *power* implanted in things, procreating like from like»: it also seems that it cannot be by the power of a *heavenly body,* because the less noble cannot bring forth the more noble: «but spiritual substance, as Augustine says, is more noble than every body»: therefore it is necessary that it be brought forth immediately by the Creator. But what is so brought forth must be brought forth from nothing: therefore the souls of those animals which are generated by putrefaction are created: therefore much more so [the souls] of the animals first made.

5. Likewise, we see in segmented animals that upon the division of the body the soul remains in the diverse parts; but that [soul] cannot be the *first* soul, because there was one alone, nor was it *produced by nature,* since it is at once in every part, while the operation of nature is with succession: therefore it seems that those parts are animated by the Creator, therefore much more so the sensible things in the primary production.

6. Likewise, when a brute generates a brute, it either *pours over* the soul, or *not.* If it *pours over;* since the soul is not divisible, it will give over its whole soul: therefore in generation it will die. If it *does not pour over;* since its operation ceases at the deposit of the seed, it is necessary to posit another agent through which the soul is brought forth. But this cannot be the female, since she is more a passive than an active principle, as the Philosopher holds, nor any other created active principle: therefore it is immediately produced by God, and so from nothing: therefore much more does it seem that they were produced in this way in the primordium.

### Conclusion.

> *The sensible souls were produced in the primordium from something, not indeed materially, but seminally, just as now they come to be from the active potency of matter, which is aroused by the agent.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, concerning the production of the souls of brute animals, different [thinkers] have held different opinions.

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that the souls of brutes were produced *from nothing,* because [they came] neither *from something materially* nor *from something seminally.* Not *from something materially,* because they are pure forms; not *from something seminally,* because they had nothing pre-existing. And therefore they say that in the first production they were simply created; but thereafter in propagation they say they are not *created,* but rather *transmitted,* not by a cutting off and separation of part of the soul, but by multiplication. For just as a candle, once it has been kindled, can multiply itself without diminution of its own light, so, indeed much more, they say spiritual substance can [multiply itself].

*Opinion 2.* The second position is directly opposed to this, that the souls of brutes were produced from something *materially* and *seminally. Materially,* I say, because they are *this something*, since each of them is a sufficient mover, and therefore they say that they are constituted of matter and form; and that matter they say is spiritual, inseparably joined to corporeal nature; whence just as from corporeal nature the bodies of animals are produced, so from spiritual matter joined to it, as they say, the production of souls comes about. And so God made [them] from the primordium, and so nature also does now. For that matter, since it pre-exists the form, is its *seedbed;* and so they say that those souls are produced not only *materially,* but also *seminally,* since spiritual matter pre-exists for them and has in itself some active potency by which the soul comes to be from it, just as corporeal nature [has the potency] for bodies to come to be from it.

*Opinion 3.* The third position is that the souls of brutes were produced from something *materially,* but not *seminally. Materially,* I say, because they consist of matter and form; not however *seminally,* because that matter does not pre-exist the form as a *seed* of that which is to be produced from it, but is concreated with it and destroyed with it. And these say that all sensible souls, not only from the primordium but even now, are from the Creator; nevertheless not incorruptible, because the Creator Himself gives to each one a duration according to what befits its nature.

*Not approved.* But since all these positions assert something improbable — for the first says that the soul multiplies itself and pours itself over, yet so that the soul has nothing from which it comes to be; and this is to posit that a natural form can produce another similar form from nothing, which is improbable and was disproved above in the seventh distinction. The second opinion posits that some spiritual matter pre-exists the soul, from which the soul is brought forth by the power of nature; and this is hardly intelligible, how there could be some spiritual matter which neither lives nor has a use; how also there could be some spiritual matter, and yet the rational soul cannot be made from it. And *again,* where is that spiritual matter? for it does not seem to be *in itself;* if however it is with *corporeal matter,* then it seems that matter is brought forth from matter; which seems to be nothing said. Likewise the third position posits that the matter of the sensible soul is concreated with it and that it is destroyed together with it; but to posit this is contrary to the authority of the Philosopher and to reason, namely that the matter of any creature should pass altogether into nothing. For if corporeal matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, much more does it seem that spiritual [matter] is, since it is worthier and nobler, in accordance with its being under such *being.*

*Opinion 4.* And therefore there is a fourth way of speaking, namely that the souls which are purely sensible were produced from something *seminally,* but not *materially. Seminally,* I say, because forms are generable and corruptible by nature; and therefore, just as other natural forms are not produced from nothing, but there is some active potency in matter from which they come to be as from a seedbed; so also it must be understood in the case of sensible souls, which are forms only, of which kind are those in brute animals. And therefore *Conclusion.* it must be conceded that the sensible souls, that is, the souls of brutes, are from something, not, I say, *materially,* but *seminally;* because, since the sensible soul is a form, it does not have matter as a part of itself, but is made only from the *active* potency of matter which is aroused by the agent; and so it advances until it becomes the soul, just as the bud by advancing becomes the rose.

*Corollary 1.* Yet they are now produced from that seedbed *otherwise* than in the *primordium,* because now they are produced from a pre-existing seedbed according to *sufficient actuality;* in the primordium, however, they were produced together with that seedbed; or if that seedbed in some way pre-existed before the fifth day, on which the production of animals was made, on the fifth day it was brought to its complete formal character, so that there was given the *active power* of nature, that it might thereafter propagate and multiply animals as to body and as to soul.

*Corollary 2.* — And because some animals are of greater perfection and organization, and some of less; therefore the divine disposition most rightly arranged that some animals would be produced from their *seminal principle* according to a greater actuality, such as those which are generated by propagation, so that like is from like, and these are the more perfect animals; while others [are produced] according to a lesser [actuality], such as those which are generated by putrefaction; for because they are more imperfect, they need less help and power to be brought forth into *being.*

*Argument from Augustine and the Philosopher.* This position, moreover, is more reasonable and more firm, because both Augustine and the Philosopher agree in this. For Augustine to Orosius says thus: «Just as the seed of any tree has a certain power that, when it has been broken open in the earth, [the tree] rises up, and a shoot is produced, then is spread out, packed in with branches and leaves, then adorned with the same flowers bears fruit; so there is in the body, so to speak, a certain *seedbed,* whence in its time, by the providence of God taking care, certain kinds of animals arise». And the same is found in *Genesis according to the letter,* in the third book plainly and at length. — The Philosopher also wills this in the sixteenth [book] of the *Animals,* where he shows that the vegetative and the sensitive are first in the seed in potency before they are brought forth into *being;* and there he seems to intimate that that which forms the members is nothing other than the soul itself; and that soul he calls an *active potency,* intrinsic to the seed itself, which, when the body has been produced from the seed and organized so that it can be perfected by the same [soul], comes forth into act and is made the *perfection of an organic physical body.* Or certainly that which forms the members is rather the power of the soul of the father and the mother, by whose operation in brute animals the soul of the offspring is brought forth into *being;* but otherwise it is in human beings, as will be seen below. And the Philosopher proves this in the same place by many conjectures and arguments, and in the same place he says that corporeal things are full of the power of soul: and this much agrees with the words of Augustine, who says: «The earth is pregnant with seeds, not only in respect of trees, but also in respect of animals». — Holding therefore this position, *Conclusion 2.* it must be said that the souls of sensible animals in the primordium were not created from nothing, as the arguments adduced for this show; for they had a seminal principle from which they were produced and now are produced.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected, that if the souls of sensible [animals] were produced from some other thing, that thing likewise was produced from yet another; it must be said that this is not necessary. *Note.* For the *seminal ratio* or *active potency* of matter itself is *concreated* with the matter, not produced from something; but those things which arise from that seed ought not properly to be said to be created.

2. To that which is asked, *if it is from something, that thing is either spiritual or corporeal;* it must be said *Note.* that it is neither *spiritual matter* nor *corporeal matter,* but is a certain *spiritual potency,* placed by the Creator into corporeal matter and resting on it and depending on it. And for this reason the sensible soul in brutes is generated and corrupted through the transmutation of corporeal nature. And if you object that the sensible soul is a sufficient mover, and thus is *this something* and has matter and form; it must be said that the sensible soul is not called a *sufficient mover* because it itself first moves the body which it perfects; but because the whole body, which it has is *this something* and, by virtue of the soul, which is its form, it moves a part, and by moving its part it moves the whole, as is plain in things that walk. And that this is true is apparent, because if a sensible soul were placed in a body which had no movable part except by the motion of the whole, as in a stone, it would never move it.

*Another solution.* Or it can be said otherwise that for something to be a *sufficient mover* it is not necessary that it be distinct from the movable, in such a way that it be another substance differing through matter and form; but it suffices that it be a form in the genus of substance, lacking extension *per se* and *per accidens.* And this form is in one part wholly in such a way that it is wholly in another; and therefore it is so united with this part which it moves, that it is also distant from it. And this distance suffices that it can move it, nor is it required that it have another matter. And so it is with the sensitive soul in those animals which have organs apt for this operation.

3. To that which is objected, that nature can bring it forth; *Note.* it must be said that this is false, because, before the Lord commanded the waters and said: *Let the waters bring forth* etc., either that seedbed of the sensible souls to be produced was not yet, or if it was, it was not in such power that it could come to perfection; for the creature can do nothing except according to the appointment and command given to it by the Creator. Whence, when there had previously been [only] *that whence it could come to be,* afterwards it was made by the divine decree that there should be *that whence it might come to be.*

4. To that which is objected concerning animals which are generated by putrefaction; it must be said, *On equivocal generation.* that although there are various ways of resolving [this], because some say that it is from the *mover of the heaven,* some that it is from the *Creator*; nevertheless according to the physical position it can be plainly answered that just as moisture becomes seed through the generative potency, and afterwards becomes an organic body in the womb, so that that sensible soul which was in potency is brought forth to act by the power of the particular agent and by the help of the heavenly body; so also in the present case it must be understood that when there was in that earth that *seedbed,* with the elements somehow concurring, and with the heavenly body helping, so that a vivifying heat is generated, a certain seed comes to be, so that that *active* potency, which previously lay hidden, aided by the action of the heavenly body, advances and comes to perfection and completion, so that neither the heaven nor the mover of the heaven gives it its ultimate form, but only helps and arouses it, so that that potency, advancing, may arrive at a complete species. And in this manner it must also be understood with regard to other things growing from the earth.

*The objection is solved.* And if you object that the soul, which is in potency, does not have species nor complete act *from itself,* nor can it have it *from something* which is not as noble as itself, and no such corporeal thing exists; it must be said *Note.* that the *essence* of such a *species* is in matter, but in *potency;* and that *essence* is so determined to producing the form of such a species that no other [form] can be brought forth from that essence or seminal *ratio,* and when it has been brought forth into act, it has *being* and has *such a being.* That it is *in act,* this it has from an extrinsic agent which was a being *in act,* and to this extent it is more noble than [the soul] itself, which was *in potency.* That it is *of such a species,* this it has from him who first placed the essence of this form into matter; otherwise nature would never bring it forth to *being,* unless God had placed it in matter, as was shown above in the eighth distinction. And therefore it is not necessary that the agent bringing forth that form into act be more noble than the form brought forth. And of this many examples can be set forth, as in minerals and in many things growing from the earth.

5. And by this is plain the answer to the two following [arguments]. For what is objected concerning the division of a segmented body is already apparent; because, since a segmented body is of modest organization and as it were of like character in the parts and in the whole, therefore in any part of it the soul is in proximate disposition to being in act; and therefore, when the division has been made, by the power of the prior form and the help of the heavenly body, the form is suddenly induced.

*The solution of others is not approved.* But there are several other ways of speaking about this. Some say that the soul is multiplied, since it is spiritual, just as a point at the division of a line, and a species at the division of a mirror; nevertheless in neither of these must it be understood that that same thing which was one becomes many; and therefore the preceding way is more plain.

6. To the last [argument] the answer is likewise plain, because, when an animal is generated from an animal by propagation, although the soul is not cut off from the soul as the body is cut off from the body — since the soul is not divisible like the body — nevertheless together with the body itself there are cut off spirits and heats and even the animal power which aids together with the power of the containing womb, so that that active potency, which was in the seminal moisture, may come to complete act. And from this it does not follow that the soul produces another soul *from nothing,* nor that it produces from *matter,* nor even that it produces from *itself.*