Dist. 15, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/15/q/bon-sent-II-d15-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the order in which the animals were produced.*

Consequently it is asked, in what order the animals were produced. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First, the question is asked about the order of production from the side of the end. Second, from the side of time. Third, about the order of production and of rest.

### Question I. *Whether all sensible things were made for the sake of man.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked, whether all sensible things were made for the sake of man. And that they were, seems so:

*Foundations.*

1. First, through Scripture, Genesis 1: *Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the heavens*, etc. And after, Genesis 9: *All the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand, and everything that moves and lives*: therefore all things have been made for the use of man.

2. Likewise, the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3: *All things are yours*; this he says to just men: therefore for the sake of just men all things whatsoever were made, were produced: therefore also the sensible animals.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher: «Man is in a certain way the end of all things which are»: therefore also of sensible things.

4. Likewise, all things desire the good — not any good whatever, but the highest — as Dionysius and the Philosopher hold; but among inferior creatures man alone is born to reach immediately to God: therefore the other creatures are ordered to the end through man as mediator. But that which is ordered to an end through another, is on account of that other: therefore all sensible things were made for the sake of man.

*To the opposite.*

**On the contrary:** 1. It is of as great dignity to be the end of things as to be the beginning; but of the sensible animals God alone was the beginning, in such a way that man was not: therefore the end of the same is not man, but God.

2. Likewise, there are certain animals which serve man only for food, certain that serve only for clothing; but man, if he had stood [in innocence], would not have needed these: therefore animals of this kind either would have been made in vain, or were not made for the sake of man. If you say that God made them because he foresaw that man would fall; then it seems that it would lie in the will of man and in his sin, whether those animals would have been made in vain — which is false.

3. Likewise, if the animals were made for the sake of man, then none ought to have been made *against* man; but the beasts are harmful: therefore they ought not to have come to be in the original constitution of things, or else they were made in vain. If you say that the beasts could not harm if man had not sinned, then it seems that after man's sin a new power was given to them.

4. Likewise, if the animals were made to adorn the dwelling of man, since in the state of innocence his dwelling ought not to have been defiled, it seems that corruptible animals ought not to have been made, which by their corruptions and exhalations would infect the air. If you say that they would not have been corrupted, this is against Augustine on Genesis according to the letter, book III, who says that even then the living animals were made for prey. For he says thus: «Some seek the refreshment of their own body from the bodies of others», where he speaks of beasts.

5. Likewise, whatever is the case about this — whether they die or do not die — it seems that animals which devour others dishonor man's dwelling, since they destroy those things which serve for his beauty and adornment.

### Conclusion.

> All sensible things were made for the sake of man, yet differently in the state of innocence and differently in the state of fallen nature.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that *the end* to which things are ordered is twofold (*The end is twofold.*). For one is the *principal* and *ultimate end*, another is the *end under an end*. If we speak of the end in the first way, thus the end of all creatures, both rational and irrational, is God (*Conclusion 1.*), because the Most High created all things for himself; for he made all things for the praise of his goodness.

But if we speak of the *non-principal* end, which is end in a certain way and end-under-an-end (*Conclusion 2.*), then all sensible animals were made for the sake of man.

And this the Philosopher suggests when he says (*Reasons.*): «We are in some way the end of all things which are». Scripture suggests it also much more excellently, when it says: *Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him be set over the fishes of the sea*, etc. For because man is capable of reason, therefore he has freedom of choice and is born to rule the fishes; and because by his likeness he is born to tend immediately to God, therefore all irrational creatures are ordered to him, so that through him as mediator they may be led to the ultimate end. — And so the reasons showing that the animals were made for the sake of man are to be conceded.

But for the resolution of the reasons brought to the contrary, it must be noted (*Conclusion 3.*) that animals are ordered to man one way in the state of *innocence*, another way in the state of *fallen nature*. — In the state of *innocence* they are ordered to man according to a fourfold reason (*In the state of innocence in a fourfold way.*). The first reason is for *manifesting his rule*, which they would manifest by obeying him in all things. Second, for *adorning man's dwelling*; for it was most beautiful that the dwelling of man be adorned by a multitude of animals, not only of trees. Third, for *arousing* *man's sense*, so that in the diverse natures of the animals themselves man might see the multiform wisdom of the Creator. Fourth, for *moving his affection*, so that, while man saw the animals run according to the rectitude of their nature and love that to which they were naturally made, he might from this be stirred up to love God. — *Corollary.* And on account of these reasons God made not only the beasts of burden, but also the wild beasts and the cattle; for all serve man's use according to the said reasons.

In the state of *fallen nature* these animals are ordered to the use of man; but (*Likewise in the state of fallen nature, with distinction.*) wild beasts in one way, beasts of burden and cattle in another. For the beasts of burden and the cattle are ordered to relieve man's need with respect to *food* and with respect to *clothing* and with respect to *service*, such as horses and asses etc., and with respect to *solace*, such as certain birds and puppies and the like: and thus they were made for the sake of man under a fourfold reason. — Similarly (*Concerning the beasts.*) the wild or harmful beasts are ordered to man according to a fourfold reason and use, which Augustine sets out in *On Genesis according to the letter*, book III. For he says that «either they harm by way of penalty, or they exercise wholesomely, or they prove usefully, or they teach unwittingly».

And thus it is plain that both beasts and reptiles and beasts of burden (*Epilogue.*) were made for the sake of man, whether in the state of innocence or in the state of fallen nature. And by this also is made plain that which is objected to the contrary.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. To that which is objected, that to be an end is of great dignity, it must be said that this is true of the *principal* end, which is the end lacking a [further] end; it is not however true of the end which is end in a certain way.

2. To that which is objected concerning animals not serving except for food and clothing, it can be answered that God made them because he foresaw man would fall; suppose, however, that he had not fallen, they would not on that account have been made in vain; for they would have, beyond the relief of need, a fourfold utility, as has been determined above.

3. To that which is objected concerning the beasts which are against man; it must be said that, man standing [in innocence] (*Note.*), no animals would have offended him, but all would have been tame to him, just as sometimes by divine command the most cruel beasts have been made tame to the Saints of God, as the lions to Daniel. But that they harm or offend, this is on account of man's sin — not on account of a new power given to them, but on account of the dignity of pre-eminence which man has lost. Whence, just as a healthy eye is not injured by the sun, but when it becomes bleary, it is at once offended — not on account of a change made in the sun, but in the eye — so it can be understood in the matter at hand.

4. 5. To that which is objected, that with man standing, mortal animals ought not to have been made, it must be said that, just as animals by their life adorn and embellish man's dwelling, so also by their death, through succession, they make for the adornment of the universe. And just as animals helping one another (*iuvantia*) are a reason for thinking on wisdom, so also animals offending one another and taking nourishment from the flesh of other animals; because that corruption would not have infected man's air so as to offend his smell, but rather by a certain succession and order, while the animals succeeded one another, they would have adorned the universe as a most beautiful song, in which one syllable succeeds another. — Likewise, when a beast killed another animal by eating it, it would not have made discord in man's dwelling, but rather would have furnished man with an occasion of instruction. And this is what Augustine says in [book] three on Genesis according to the letter: «Surely some

beasts are food for others; nor can we rightly say that there would not have been others on which others might feed; for all things, so long as they exist, have their own measures, numbers, and orders, which when duly considered are all praised, nor without a hidden moderation suitable to its own kind of temporal beauty are they changed, passing from one into another; and certainly by all such motions of the inferior creature wholesome admonitions are offered to man». Then he sets it out more plainly by example. — From these things the response to the objections is plain.