Dist. 15, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/15/q/bon-sent-II-d15-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section doubts arise concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says: *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life.* Reptiles and swimming things are of different species: therefore, since what is produced from the waters are swimming things, they ought not to be called *reptiles.* — Likewise, since reptiles pertain to the adornment of the earth, it does not seem that they should pertain to the adornment of the water. — *Incidental question.* Likewise, there seems to be a redundancy here when he says *creeping creature having life;* for every soul, by the very fact that it is a soul, is alive.

**I respond:** It must be said that in animals the motion of *creeping* differs from the motion of *walking.* *Three species of motion in animals.* For the motion of creeping is reckoned according to traction; for an animal that creeps, by stretching some part forward and grasping something with it, draws its whole body after itself, as is evident in worms; but the motion of *walking* is by impulsion. Since therefore those things that swim contract themselves and stretch forward, and by extending themselves forward, as it were holding themselves to the solidity or to the thickness of the water, they draw their whole body, as is evident in swimming creatures; hence it is that all swimming creatures are called *reptiles,* even though it sometimes happens that they *walk,* as is the case in crocodiles and certain others, which live in waters and on land. They are nevertheless named from the motion which is more natural to them, namely that which belongs to them according to their habitation in the waters. — Flying creatures, however, are not called *reptiles,* although they seem to bear themselves through the air, as fish through the waters. For the manner of moving is different, because they move more by *impulse* than by *traction.* *Notandum.* For when a bird flies, the air is enclosed in the hollow of its wings; and when the wings are applied to the body, the air is violently driven out from behind the wings, and from that thrust the bird's body advances forward. And therefore flying creatures are not comprehended under the name of *reptiles,* nor even under the genus of *walking creatures,* because they are not moved by the power of feet, but by the power of wings. — Hence the division of animals with respect to motion can be taken thus: that an animal either moves itself forward by drawing, and so is a *reptile,* whether it be in the waters or on the land; or by impelling, and this in two ways: either by feet, and so it is a *walking creature;* or by wings, and so it is a *flying creature.* — And thus it is evident in what sense fish are called *reptiles,* and that what was first proposed is false — namely, that *reptile* is distinguished against *aquatile* — rather it is broader in extent.

To that which is objected, that reptiles pertain to the adornment of the earth: it must be said that *reptile* is said in four ways. *Four ways in which reptiles are spoken of.* In one way, that which drags itself by the force of its *mouth,* as worms; in another way, that which drags itself by the force of its *ribs,* as serpents; in a third way, that which drags itself by the force of its *little fins,* as fish; in a fourth way, *reptile* is said broadly of that which in its motion applies a great part of its body to the earth, although it has feet, as lizards and stellions. And thus according to the diverse acceptations, *reptile* can pertain to the adornment of diverse elements.

To that which is asked, why he says *of the living soul:* *To the incidental question.* it must be said that life is manifested most of all through sense and motion; therefore that is called *living soul* which lives with manifest life; and this is that which gives motion and sense to the body. Such, however, is not found in plants, but in animals; and therefore, to distinguish from plants, he says: *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having a living soul,* as if in plants there were a *growing soul* (*anima virens*), and in animals a *living soul* (*anima vivens*); because these are moved and have sense, but those not at all.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Let the earth bring forth jumenta and beasts and reptiles.* For there seems to be a superfluity here, because every brute animal is a *beast.* If you say that *beast* is the name of a brute animal that does harm, then it is superfluous to say *reptiles.* Likewise, in the Psalms there are enumerated not only *jumenta* and *beasts* and *reptiles,* but also *cattle:* therefore there seems to be a diminution here.

It is asked therefore about the *Question 1.* difference and sufficiency of these three. — It is also asked, since all the animate creatures which are in the sea are contained under one difference of animal, which is *reptile,* and likewise all the animate creatures of the air, which is *flying creature,* why are not all the animate creatures of the earth similarly contained under one difference? *Question 2.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, because the earth among the other elements is less adorned, *Question 2.* therefore it needed more to be adorned. *Likewise,* because it most of all furnishes pasturage to the animals among the other elements, hence it is that more differences of animals are found *Question 1.* in it. — Now all those differences are reduced to these three differences, the number and sufficiency of which can be taken in two ways: either from the side of the *motion* of the animals themselves, or from the side of their *end.* From the side of *Difference 1.* the motion of the animals themselves thus: for every animal which is moved either is moved by *traction,* and so is a *reptile;* or by *impulse,* and so is a *walking creature.* And this in two ways: either an animal is born to *rage,* or to *be tamed.* In the first way it is called *beast,* in the second way it is called *jumentum,* and under *jumenta* are comprehended *cattle.* — From the side of the *end* thus: for the animals *Difference 2.* are born for the sake of man; either therefore they are ordered to the *help* of man, and so they are *jumenta,* as it were *helps* (*iuvamenta*); or they are ordered to man's exercise, and this can be in two ways: because either they exercise by *harming manifestly,* and so they are *beasts* (*bestiae*), as if *destroyers* (*vastiae*); or *secretly,* and so they are *reptiles,* which secretly harm and lie in wait at the heel. Even if they did not have these ends in *act,* if man had not sinned, they would nevertheless have them in *aptitude;* and from that very aptitude man in the state of innocence would then have been better instructed than he is now instructed from the *act* in the state of fault. — And thus the difference and sufficiency of these three is evident, and the response to the objections is evident.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In the distinction of things the catholic doctors are found to dissent.* For since *God is not the God of dissension, but of peace*, and the Scriptures are expounded in the same Spirit in which they were composed, as Gregory says, it seems that they cannot dissent in any way. — Likewise, true is not opposed to true: therefore if catholic doctors dissent, one says what is true, and the other says what is false; but the understanding of Scripture cannot but be true: therefore, when they dissent, it must be that one of them corrupts Scripture, and so he will not be a catholic doctor but rather a heretic.

**I respond:** It must be said that force must be put upon that which the Master says: *they seem to dissent.* *Notandum.* For sometimes that *is* seems, and sometimes that *is not* seems; and according to this twofold mode the word of the Master can be understood, namely that the catholic doctors in something seem to dissent and do dissent, and in something seem to dissent but yet do not dissent. For they say some things *assertively,* and some things by way of *opining.* As to that which they say *assertively,* in this they do not disagree, because what they assert they say by the revelation of the Holy Spirit, who is not contrary to himself.

But in that wherein they *opine,* they can dissent and sometimes do dissent, because opinion sometimes comes from probable conjecture of reason, in which man is frequently deceived, with a deception which is rather a punishment than a fault, from which scarcely any catholic doctor has been immune. And therefore such dissension is not reprehensible. For although their judgments disagree in some manner, their desires nevertheless agree: for all catholic doctors wish to speak the truth. And thus the response to that which is objected is evident.

*Another solution.* It could be said otherwise, as was touched on above, that, even if they seem to dissent, they do not nevertheless dissent; because they do not say what was *in the thing,* but what *could have been congruous;* nor do they say what the legislator, namely Moses, understood in that word, but rather what the Holy Spirit intended, who illumined him. And since diverse modes of producing, whether simultaneously or successively, can be congruous to the divine power, and the Holy Spirit understands many things at the same time in the same Scripture and makes the expositors understand them; therefore, even if discord seems to appear among the holy doctors according to the outward face of the letter, there is nevertheless no discord according to truth. And therefore he says pointedly: *they seem to dissent, they do not dissent.* Hence Augustine in his books in many places held to the path of other Saints, from which it is evident that he was not contrary to them.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *He ceased to make a new creature.* For the contrary is said in Jeremiah 31: *The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth.* — Likewise, to the Galatians 6: *For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision is anything nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *new* is said in two ways. *Distinction.* In one way *new* is said against the antiquity of the course of nature and the custom of the rational creature; and thus God did not cease in the six days to make a new creature; nay rather, he does many things miraculously and wonderfully against the accustomed course of nature and of human custom, and these can be called *new.* *In another way* *new* is said of that of which no likeness preceded, nor even any created principle that should be its seminary; and so the Master says in the present passage that he ceased to make a new creature; and it is also said in Ecclesiastes 1: *There is nothing new under the sun.* For God produced nothing of which he did not in some manner make a *like,* or of which he did not produce the *seminal principle* in the works of the six days. And so it is evident that there is no contradiction. — *Otherwise.* It could also be said otherwise that he rested from making a new creature which should be of the necessity of the perfection of the universe; the production of Christ, however, exceeds the completion of the universe, and therefore is of pure grace, and God is said to *have made a new thing,* when *a woman compassed a man*.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *That day he is said to have blessed and sanctified* etc. For since time, so far as it is in itself, is indifferent, and *day* signifies time, the seventh day ought not to be blessed more than the second. — Likewise, since sanctification respects the rational creature, what is it that is said, that he sanctified the *day?* — Likewise, since to work well is of equal or greater dignity than to rest, it seems that he ought rather to have blessed the sixth day, on which he worked, than the seventh day, on which he rested.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as a *day* is said to be evil, not by reason of itself, but because it is the measure *Notandum.* of an evil action, as the Apostle says to the Ephesians 5: *Redeeming the time, because the days are evil;* so a *day* is said to be *blessed* and *holy,* because it is the measure of some operation in which there is blessing and sanctification. And to *bless and sanctify a day* is nothing other than to allot the day to such an action as its measure. — Since therefore God made all things for the instruction of man, that he might instruct man not only by word but also by work; just as he had wrought for six days, so for six days he gave man permission to work and to attend to lower things; and just as on the seventh day he ceased from work, so he willed that on the seventh day man should cease from every work and cleave to him by contemplation and, by cleaving, rest. And because in this cleaving man obtains from God an enlargement of blessing and sanctity; therefore the seventh day is called by the Lord *blessed* and *sanctified,* not by reason of itself, but by reason of that which the Lord allotted to be done in it. — And thus the response to the objections is evident; it is also evident how much it pleases God that man should attend to him alone and rest in him, since he *blessed* and *sanctified* such a vacation or repose; for which reason in the Law he most frequently repeats, among all the commandments, that of the observance of the sabbath.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In numbering the days we proceed up to the seventh.* For since there ought not to be a stopping-point except in some perfection, and the number six rather signifies perfection than seven, or even ten; it seems that we ought either to stop within seven, or to proceed beyond. — *Question.* It is also asked why the gentiles, who do not receive sacred Scripture, in the reckoning of days proceed up to seven. If you say that this is on account of the sevenfold number of the planets, then the order does not seem right, because Mars does not immediately follow the Moon: therefore the day of Mars (Tuesday) ought not to follow the day of the Moon (Monday).

**I respond:** It must be said that the number of days is appointed according to the diversity of the things measured to which the measure itself is appropriated. Since therefore the day is not now appropriated to any special effect, but only in the primary establishment of things, in which a distinction according to *seven* is found; therefore the number of days is always terminated according to that number, not on account of the perfection of the number or of the time which is enclosed in the septenary, but on account of the perfection of the divine work and rest is the number so taken.

*To the question.* The gentiles, however, take the number of days from the dominion of the seven planets, according to which time must be ruled and disposed; and because Saturn is the first among the planets, they say that he dominates in the first hour of the day, and the next planet in the next, and so on up to seven hours; afterwards there is a return to the beginning, and so proceeding; and afterwards that planet which dominates in the twenty-fifth hour, that is the beginning of the next day, and from it that day is named, and thus successively proceeding they name the seven days from the seven planets. And this is evident to one considering the order of the planets, which order being preserved in enumeration, when Saturn dominates in the first hour of the day, the Sun dominates in the first hour of the next, and the Moon in the first hour of the third, and so on. This manner of naming the days we neither wholly retain — lest we should seem *to serve the elements of the world* — nor do we wholly relinquish, on account of custom; whence we call the Lord's day from ourselves, the sabbath from the Jews; on the other days we keep the customary practice of the gentility. The Church, however, in place of those names places: *second feria, third feria,* and so on. And thus the response to the objections is evident.

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