Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/16/q/bon-sent-II-d16-a1-q1
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### Article I. *In what way man is the image [of God] considered absolutely.*
### Question I. *Whether man is truly the image of God.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus and it is shown that man is truly the image of God.

1. *Fundamenta.* Genesis 1: *Let us make man to our image* etc.; this is none other than the word of the Trinity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 17: *God created man of the earth, and made him after his own image*; if therefore man was made according to the image of God, man is the image of God.

3. Likewise, that which is in the highest degree apt to be united to another is in the highest degree apt to be configured and conformed to it — for love, since it unites, is said to transform the lover into the beloved, as Hugh says — but the rational creature, such as man, is in the highest degree apt to be united to God and to tend toward him

through love: therefore he is in the highest degree apt to be configured and assimilated to him. If therefore "image" denotes an expressed likeness, the conclusion is clear etc.

4. Likewise, that which truly represents something according to its noble act and according to distinction and order, is truly its image; but man truly represents God according to his most noble act, which is to understand — for he represents God not only inasmuch as he is being and living, but also inasmuch as he is intelligent — and again, he represents the distinction and order which is in the [divine] persons, with respect to memory, intelligence, and will: therefore man is truly the image of God.

**On the contrary:**

1. *To the opposite.* That to which something is made is not the thing itself, since nothing is made unto itself; but man was made unto the image of God, as is said in Genesis 1; therefore man is not the image [of God].

2. Likewise, wherever there is an image, there is *likeness*; wherever there is *likeness*, there is some *identity*; and wherever there is *identity*, there is *agreement* in some third thing: if therefore God and the creature do not agree in any third thing, the creature cannot be the likeness of God, and so neither the image.

3. Likewise, not every *likeness* is an image, but [only] an *expressed likeness*; but no *expressed likeness* of anything can have more that is dissimilar than what agrees: since therefore every creature is more unlike than like to God, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 15, therefore no [creature] can be an expressed likeness of God: therefore none can be an image.

4. Likewise, wherever there is an image, there is configuration, for an image is considered with respect to figure; but the divine essence is in no way capable of being figured: therefore in no way can it be represented by any image: therefore no creature is the image of God.

5. Likewise, the image differs from the vestige, since the vestige represents according to a part, but the image according to the whole; but nothing finite can represent the infinite according to the whole: since therefore God is infinite, and every creature finite, no creature can be the image of God.

6. Likewise, every creature is distant from God infinitely; for God excels every [creature] infinitely: therefore if an infinite distance cannot be greater, one creature is not more distant than another; likewise, neither does one approach more nearly than another: therefore either *every* creature is an image, or *none*. But *not every* one is an image: therefore *none*.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Man is truly the image of God, because he is His expressed likeness.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that "image" signifies an expressed likeness. Now it is necessary that every creature in some way be assimilated to God; it is also necessary that some [creature], for the completion of the universe, be assimilated to God *expressly*: and therefore every creature has the character of a vestige, but some [creature] has the character of an image — namely, that which is assimilated *expressly*. And this is the rational creature, namely man; and therefore it must be conceded that man is the image of God, because he is His expressed likeness.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that — *A fourfold likeness.* — there is a certain likeness through *agreement entirely in nature*, and in this way one person in the Trinity is like the other; and another through *participation in some universal nature*, as a man and an ass are assimilated in [the genus] *animal*; and another according to *proportionality*, as a sailor and a charioteer agree according to the comparison with the things which they govern; and another is a likeness through *agreement in order*, as the thing exemplified is assimilated to the exemplar. — *Application to God.* In the first two modes no creature can be assimilated to God; in the second two modes every creature is assimilated; but that which is assimilated more *from afar* has the character of a vestige, while that which is assimilated *more closely* has the character of an image; and such is the rational creature, namely man.

*Conclusion.* And this is shown thus. *Proof: First, from the agreement of order.* For God wrought all things on account of Himself, so that, since He is highest *power* and *majesty*, He made all things for His own *praise*; since He is highest *light*, He made all things for His own *manifestation*; since He is highest *goodness*, He made all things for His own *communication*. But there is no perfect *praise* unless there be one who approves; nor perfect *manifestation* unless there be one who understands; nor perfect *communication of goods* unless there be one who is able to use them. And since *to approve praise, to know truth, [and] to receive gifts into use* belongs only to the rational creature; therefore the irrational creatures themselves are not ordered to God immediately, but through the mediation of the rational creature. But the rational creature itself, since it is naturally able both *to praise* and *to know* and to receive other things into *the power of the will*, is naturally ordered to God immediately.

And since the more immediately something is ordered to something, the more it agrees with it in *agreement of order*; and the rational soul and every rational creature, in that "it is *capable of God* and able to be partaker of Him," is immediately ordered to Him; it agrees with Him in the highest degree in *agreement of order*. And since, the greater the agreement, the more expressed is the *likeness*; hence it is that, with respect to this kind of likeness, the rational creature is an expressed likeness, and therefore is an image. — *It is confirmed.* And this is what Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 14, that "the soul is the image of God in this, that it is capable of Him and able to be partaker [of Him]." For since it is immediately ordered to Him, therefore it is *capable* of Him, or conversely; and because it is *capable*, it is naturally apt to be *configured* to Him; and on account of this it bears in itself from its origin *the light of the divine countenance*. And therefore, as regards the likeness which is considered with respect to *agreement of order*, [the rational creature] is perfectly called the image of God, because in this it is assimilated to Him *expressly*.

*Second proof.* Likewise, with respect to the likeness which is considered in the *agreement of proportionality* or *proportion*, the rational creature is expressly assimilated to God, and therefore according to it is rightly called an image. This is shown thus. For the agreement of *proportion* is considered according to *being-disposed-similarly*. *Distinction.* Now *being-disposed-similarly* can be twofold: either in comparison to *extrinsic* things, or in comparison to *intrinsic* things. And the likeness is *expressed* when there is a similar mode of being disposed not only in comparison to *extrinsic*, but in comparison to *intrinsic* things. Now one can compare the divine *essence* to the creature; one can also compare *person* to person. But every creature has a certain comparison, according to which it is in some way conformed to God, inasmuch as He is the *cause* of the creature, as is the comparison which [the creature] has to the *effect produced*. For as God produces His effect, so does the created agent, although not in every respect. But the rational creature agrees [with God] not only in this way, but also as regards the origin, order, and distinction of its *intrinsic powers*, in which it is assimilated to that distinction and order which is in the divine persons intrinsic to the divine nature. — *It is confirmed.* And in this Augustine in the book *On the Trinity* shows man to be the image of God; and this was explained in the first book, where it was shown that in the rational soul there is unity of essence with a trinity of powers ordered to one another and disposed in an almost consimilar way, as the persons in the divine [nature] are disposed. And therefore there is there an expressed likeness of proportion; and on account of this the rational creature, which is man, is the image of God.

These things being seen, the answer to the proposed question and also to the objections is clear. For it must be conceded that man is truly the image of God, as the reasons adduced for this show.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*Solution of the opposites.*

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that man is *unto the image*: therefore etc.; it must be said that it does not follow, because, when one says *made unto the image*, "image" is taken abstractly; when one says *the image of God*, "image" is taken concretely, because [man] is marked with the image of God; just as a tablet on which an image is painted, both can be called "image" and "unto the image". So also in the matter at hand.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that there is no identity of God to the creature, therefore neither likeness; it must be said that the likeness which is in the image is *Note.* not considered through *identity*, or through *participation of the same nature*, but through *agreement in order and proportion*; and this likeness does not require communication in a third thing, because in agreement of *order* one [thing] is the likeness of the other; in agreement of *proportion* the likeness is not in one [thing], but in two comparisons.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the image is an expressed likeness; the answer is already clear, because, although there is great dissimilitude in the *absolute properties*, yet very great is the likeness in the *immediacy of order* and the *comparison of proportion*, from which and in which two [things] consists the expression of likeness which constitutes the image.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning configuration; it must be said that a bodily image requires bodily configuration, but a spiritual image is content with spiritual configuration and effigy. And this consists not in quantity of mass, but in quantity of power, namely in the [soul's] potencies, so that, just as a triangular figure has three terminals and three lines, so also in the spiritual image the potencies are in the manner of terminals, and the procession of one from another as regards its act has the manner of a line joining [them].

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the image represents according to the whole; it must be said that that is true of that image which has every-mode perfection; and in this way the Son of God alone is the image of the Father. Of the other [image] it is not true that it represents according to the whole *simply*, but it represents according to a certain *totality*. For since "the rational creature and the intellect is in some way all things," and

all things are naturally apt to be inscribed there, and likenesses of all things to be imprinted and depicted [there]; therefore, just as the whole universe represents God in a certain *sensible totality*, so the *rational* creature represents Him in a certain *spiritual totality*; but every other irrational creature represents Him only in *part*, because [it represents Him] only according to itself, since it is not naturally apt to contain others in itself spiritually, in such a way that there be nothing which it is not apt to know. *Note.* I say this on account of the sensible soul, which, even if it knows some things, is nevertheless not naturally apt to know all things.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that every creature is distant infinitely; it must be said that this is true of that distance which is opposed to *participation* and *Note.* *adequation*. For since God is infinite, nothing can be *adequated* to Him; since He is *simple*, He cannot share any third nature with any creature. And it is not according to these [kinds of] likenesses in any way that the character of image in man is considered, but according to another twofold [likeness], namely of *order* and of *similar habitude*, according to which the rational creature is not distant infinitely from the Creator, but very nearly approaches Him, as has been shown above.

### Scholion.

**I.** In this whole distinction, which is of great moment, the created image is discussed, of which many things have already been said in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 2. and dub. 4; and concerning the difference between *vestige* and *image*, ibid. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. The uncreated image was treated in I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. and dub. 4. 5, where in the scholion to q. 1. several things were noted concerning the very character of the image. — On the character of image and likeness see also below a. 2. q. 3. at the beginning of the body. On the image in particular the Holy Doctor (I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.) says: "The image is considered according to expressed conformity to that which is imaged"; or (here in the body): "The image signifies an expressed likeness"; and below (a. 2. q. 3.): "The image consists in agreement according to configuration, and configuration is considered in origin, habitude, and distinction of powers." That this definition may be understood, it must be noted that by the term *expressed* a twofold relation which the image has to its prototype is insinuated. The first relation is that the image be *expressed from another* by some mode of production, at least according to the character of exemplary cause. Whence the Holy Doctor says (I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.): "Just as *exemplar* according to the propriety of the word signifies expression through the manner of the *active* — whence the *exemplar* is said to be that to whose imitation something is made — so on the contrary the *image* [signifies expression] through the manner of the *passive*; and *image* is said of that which expresses and imitates another." Whence on account of the defect of this condition the egg is not called an image of [another] egg, although it be most like it (S. Thomas, S. I q. 93. a. 1.). The second relation is the relation of the *likeness* itself between image and prototype, and not of any likeness whatsoever, but of an *expressed* one, i.e. "which is an expressed likeness in a certain configuration and imitation" (below a. 2. q. 3. arg. 4. ad oppos.), or through agreement in some *distinctive* and *notable* property. We said *distinctive*; "for if the likeness be only according to *genus*, or according to some common accident, on this account it is not said that something is unto the image of another" (S. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 2.). Much more does this hold of the *transcendental* properties of unity, goodness, and truth, in which general conditions every creature is like to God according to the character of the *vestige*. We said *in a notable property*, because, as Petrus a Tarantasia well observes (here q. unica, a. 2.), the likeness *in the foot* is not properly called an image, but [the likeness] *in the face*. — Now since that agreement in some property can be in many modes, several species of image are also distinguished. "*Image* is taken in two ways, according as expression is twofold, namely either in *unity* of nature, or in *diversity* of nature: in community or unity of nature, as the son of the emperor is called the image of his father; in *diversity* of nature, as the image of the emperor is on a coin" (I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). And unity of *nature* can be taken either as *numerical* unity (identity), such as is between the divine persons, or as *specific* unity, such as is between a human father and his son. — These things being supposed, the distinction in the next question between the *connatural*, *natural*, and *artificial* image is easily understood. For in one way the son is the natural image of his father, namely in specific unity of nature; in another way [man is] the natural image of God, namely "in diversity of nature" (loc. cit.); yet he is the image of God through his natural form, which has agreement with its divine exemplar both in the intellectuality of the nature, and in the origin, habitude, and distinction of his powers, by which the trinity of the divine persons is adumbrated. And this second agreement is especially urged by the Seraphic [Doctor] here and below a. 2. q. 1. — On the bodily and spiritual image see here ad 4. and I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

**II.** The other commentators most often treat of this matter diffusely, but under other titles, in I Sent. d. 3, especially Dionysius Carthusianus, where many things are found treated in the following questions. — Alexander of Hales inquires into this and many of the following questions in S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 1-7. and also q. 55. m. 4. — Likewise Scotus, in both Scripta, here q. unica and I Sent. d. 3. q. 9.

This and the following question others (except Petrus a Tarantasia and Aegidius Romanus) settle in one question; S. Thomas, here q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 93. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1: (on this and the following qq.) S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 71. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica n. 1. 7. — Richardus a Mediavilla, II. Sent. here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. and dub. lat. 2. — Durandus, I Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 3. q. 10.

**III.** On the third question of this article they treat under other titles: S. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 93. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2.

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