Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/16/q/bon-sent-II-d16-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether man is the image of God naturally.*

Secondly it is asked whether man is the image of God naturally. And that he is, seems [the case].

1. *Fundamenta.* What belongs to something from its first origin belongs to it naturally; but to be the image of God belongs to man from his first condition: therefore it is natural to him.

2. Likewise, what belongs to all in common and

inseparably belongs naturally; but to be image belongs to man universally and inseparably: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, what belongs to something according to its natural properties belongs to it naturally; but to be image belongs to man according to his intrinsic and natural potencies: therefore it belongs to him naturally.

4. Likewise, *to be the image of God* is not accidental to man, but rather substantial, as *to be a vestige* is not accidental to any creature: if therefore man is not the natural image of God, then he is not a natural thing, but artificial. If therefore this is plainly false — namely that man is artificial — therefore he is not an artificial image, but natural.

5. Likewise, an artificial ass is not a true ass; therefore an artificial image is not a true image; but man is a true image: therefore he is not an artificial image; and [it] is either artificial or natural: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Ad oppositum.* Hilary in the book *On the Synod*, defining a natural image, says: «*The image is of that thing to which it is imaged, an undifferentiated species*»; but man is not an undifferentiated species of God himself: therefore he is not a natural image.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On the Ten Strings*: «*Just as the image of the emperor differs in his son and in a coin, so the image differs in the Son of God and in man*»: if therefore the image in the emperor's son is natural, and in a coin is artificial, it seems that the Son of God alone is the natural image, while man is only artificial.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *reason*. Just as it is proper to the person of the Son to be a son, so it is proper [to him] to be image; but the person of the Son alone is the natural son, and not man: therefore by parallel reasoning the person of the Son alone is the natural image, and not man.

4. Likewise, what is from will is not from nature; but the production of man is from the will of God: therefore it is not from nature. But from him from whom he has *to be produced*, from him he has *to be image*: if therefore the soul of man is not produced by God according to nature, but according to will, he will not be the natural image of God, but a voluntary one.

5. Likewise, *image* says imitation and likeness: therefore if something is the image of something natural, it is assimilated to it in nature; but man cannot be assimilated to God in nature: therefore he cannot be his natural image.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Man is the image of God neither artificial nor connatural, but natural.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since image is named from the act of representing — for the *image is referred to the prototype*, as Damascene says — and representation can belong to something in two ways, namely either through a natural form or through an artificial form; *Twofold image.* the image is twofold, namely natural and artificial. And since man does not represent through an artificial form, but through his own natural form and the potencies naturally implanted in him; *Conclusion 1.* man is not an artificial image, but a natural one.

*The third species of Image.* It is one thing, however, to say "natural image" and another to say "connatural." For an image is *natural*, which represents through that which it has from nature, whether it agree in nature with that which it represents or not. But an image is called *connatural*, which imitates and is referred not only through that which it *has from nature*, but through *agreement in the same nature*. *Conclusion 2.* Therefore, even though to be image belongs to man, yet to be a connatural image does not belong to man, but to the Son of God alone.

The reasons showing that man is not an artificial image but a natural one are therefore to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].* 1. To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that Hilary is defining the connatural image, not the natural one.

2. To that which is objected from Augustine, it must be said that he does not intend to set down a likeness with respect to the natural and the artificial, but with respect to agreement and discrepancy in nature. For just as a coin does not agree with the emperor in nature, but his son does agree; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To the other [objection] which is brought, that the person of the Son alone is the natural son; it must be said that there is no parallel. *Note.* For *natural* is taken otherwise as it stands beside the Son, and otherwise as it stands beside image; for it does not differ to say of the Son *natural* and *connatural*, as it differs with respect to image. — *Reason.* And the reason for this is the following: that the Son says [the mode of] *that from which*, with respect to its principal sense; image says [the mode of] *that to which*. Therefore *natural*, said of the Son, signifies that the Son's procession is through the mode of *nature*, and so that he agrees with the Father in nature; but when one says

*natural* image, it is signified that that representation is from a natural principle or property; and on account of this it is not given to understand that there is, between the image and that of which it is the image, an agreement of nature.

4. To that which is objected, that what is from will is not from nature; it must be said that this is true on the side from which it is from will; whence, since the creature is produced by God voluntarily, *Note.* it is not said to *go forth naturally* from him, but *voluntarily*; from this, however, it does not follow that it represents voluntarily, indeed the [voluntary mode] is there [as an] *accident*. For although God voluntarily produced man, yet man has natural operations, because the divine will fabricated and made nature itself; it is not so, however, with the will of a created artisan, who cannot produce a natural form.

5. *Note.* To that which is objected, that *image* says likeness in nature; it must be said that this determination *naturally*, added to some term which neither says a relationship as *that from which* nor as *that to which*, renders the locution ambiguous, because it can say a relationship either in the manner of *cause* or in the manner of *form*. Whence this [statement] is twofold: *this is naturally assimilated to that*: either as understood *causally*, because it is assimilated in that which it *has from nature*; or as understood *formally*, because it is assimilated in *the very nature*. Taken in the first mode, this is true: *man is naturally assimilated to God*; in the second mode, false; and in the first mode there follows on this: *man is naturally the image of God*: but not in the other mode.

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