Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/16/q/bon-sent-II-d16-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether to be an image properly befits man, so that it befits no other.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether to be an image properly befits man, so that it befits no other. And that it does, it seems.

*On the affirmative side.*

1. *Foundations.* In the condition of man alone it was said: *Let us make man to our image* etc.; but this is the noblest condition, which, if it were given to others, ought in no way to be passed over: therefore it seems that to no other than man did God grant *to be made to his image*. But if he passed it over in regard to others and not in regard to man, then the question arises: why did Scripture do so?

2. Likewise, Augustine in his sermon *On the Image*: « To his image and likeness God created him — he is speaking of man — which he gave to no other creature ».

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason, because « what is said by way of superabundance befits one only »; but *image* signifies the *most expressed* likeness in the genus of creatures: therefore it must befit either one species only, or one individual only.

4. Likewise, by the very fact that man is the image of God, he immediately tends toward God; if therefore the universe is ordered according to every one of its parts, it is impossible that some creatures of different species be ordered to God equally and immediately: therefore either man and the Angel will be of the same species, or to be an image befits man alone.

5. Likewise, man, by the very fact that he is the image of God, is the end of all the others; but this cannot befit many things differing in species, and it is plain that it does not befit the Angel: therefore it seems that to be an image befits man alone.

6. Likewise, because man is the image of God, he was unitable to the divine nature; but this is proper to him: therefore it is proper to man to be the image of God.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Foundations.* Dionysius in *On the Divine Names* says that « the Angel is the image of God, a manifestation of the hidden light » etc.

2. Likewise, « the soul is the image of God by the very fact that it is capable of God and can be a partaker [of him] »; but this befits the Angel as well as the soul: therefore to be an image does not befit man alone.

3. Likewise, this is the noblest of all natural conditions, namely to be an image: therefore the noblest of all creatures ought not to be deprived of such a property; if therefore the angelic creature is such, the rest is clear.

4. Likewise, the image is in the soul according to its higher part, as was shown in the first book; but in that part man and the Angel share a likeness: therefore it seems likewise that they share in the dignity of the image: therefore to be an image is not proper to man alone.

> **Conclusion.** To be the image of God properly befits man with respect to the brutes, not however with respect to the Angels, with whom this is common to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that *proper* is spoken of in two ways. For there is *proper simply* and *proper to something*. *Proper simply* is that which befits all and only [of a kind]; *proper to something* is that which befits everyone contained under that species, in such a way that it befits certain others and certain others not at all; just as being two-footed properly befits man with respect to four-footed creatures, not with respect to flying creatures. — It must therefore be said that, just as being rational or intellectual is not proper to man *simply*, since in this he shares with the Angel, but is proper [to him] with respect to corporeal things; so to be an image properly befits man with respect to the brutes, not however with respect to the Angels, but rather befits men and Angels in common, as the reasons adduced for this show.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

*To 1.* To that which is objected first to the contrary, that Scripture does not express it; it must be said that Scripture does not determine the condition of the Angel expressly; therefore it is no wonder if it does not determine its manner nor say that he was made to the image. But if you ask why it does not determine [this], that has been determined above, in the thirteenth distinction.

*To 2.* To that of Augustine it must be said that Augustine does not exclude spiritual creatures, but corporeal and visible creatures, when he says that he gave it to no other creature. Also, he says this on account of a certain property of representation which God gave to man, not to another spiritual or corporeal creature — not on account of the principal account of *image*, which follows upon every rational nature.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is the most expressed likeness; it must be said that the *superlative* can be expounded in two ways: in one way through its *positive* with the adverb *very*, as *whitest*, that is, very white; and so it is understood when it is said *to the image*; and it is not necessary that the Angel himself be set above. Sometimes the superlative is understood *relatively*, and then it indicates excess with respect to all to which it is compared; and in this way it cannot befit many; and so it is not taken in the present case. *Twofold sense of the superlative.*

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that by the very fact that [man] is the image, he is the end; it must be said that this is not the whole account; rather, because [man] is so the image in the soul, that on the side of the body he has a certain agreement with all corporeal things; and therefore man alone is called *every creature*, and all things are said in a certain manner to *be made* for his sake, and also to be *referred* to him.

*To 5–6.* To that which is objected concerning union, it must be said that even if the account of image is a disposition to union, nevertheless it is not a disposition sufficient of itself, unless this be joined to a *personal property* and to a *culpable infirmity*; and this is to be found in man, not in the Angel, as will appear better below in the third [book]. *Note.* For the present, however, let it suffice that whatever may be the case concerning unitability, image nevertheless universally follows upon a rational creature, in such a way that every rational creature is the image of God truly and naturally. And the reason for this is the expression of likeness as regards the agreement of order, which was explained above at the beginning of the question.

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