Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/16/q/bon-sent-II-d16-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the image considered relatively.*

Consequently the question is asked about the image considered relatively. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul.

Second, whether more principally in the man than in the woman.

Third, whether it is found more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.

### Question I. *Whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul.*

Concerning the first the matter proceeds and is asked whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul. And that it is so, seems clear.

*Arguments for the affirmative.*

1. On that text of Ezekiel chapter twenty-eight: *Thou seal of likeness,* Gregory: "The more subtle the nature, the more closely the image of divinity is suggested as imprinted in it."

2. Likewise, the wise craftsman draws a nobler picture upon a nobler tablet: if therefore the image in a creature is, as it were, a kind of picture imprinted upon a tablet, as the Master says in the text, then the image of divinity ought to be inscribed in a more perfect and noble manner in the Angel than in the soul.

3. Likewise, the rational creature is called the image of God for the reason that it is capable of God; but the angelic spirit is more capacious than the human, since it is more vigorous and more unencumbered: therefore in it the image of divinity is more eminently imprinted.

4. Likewise, the image consists in memory, intelligence, and will; but memory has its act in a more perfect manner in the Angel than in man, and likewise intelligence and will — for the Angel's memory holds without forgetting, his intelligence understands without inquiry, and his will loves without delay, the opposites of which are in the soul — therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

*For the negative side.*

1. That represents the supreme Trinity more expressly which represents it not only as to unity of substance, but also as to the distinction of persons; but man represents the distinction of persons more expressly, because in man there is a personal discretion through origin, whereas in the Angels there is not: therefore man represents the Trinity more expressly than the Angel. But that in which the representation is more express is the more express image: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that imitates another more evidently which imitates it both as to substance and mode of existing, than that which imitates it only as to some one aspect; but the soul represents the supreme Trinity both as it is in itself and as it is in things, so that it is whole in any part of the body, just as the supreme Essence is whole in creation: therefore it imitates God more expressly than the Angel. But that which imitates more expressly is more excellently distinguished by His image: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that represents God more expressly which represents Him not only in Himself, but inasmuch as He is the principle of others, than that which does so only in some single way; but man represents God not only as a being in himself, but also as being the principle of others, because "just as from one God are all things, so from one man are all men," as the Gloss has it on First Corinthians chapter eleven: therefore if what represents more expressly participates the formal character of the image more eminently, the conclusion is clear etc.

4. Likewise, that more fully represents something which represents it through a greater approach to its totality; but man represents God inasmuch as God is the exemplar both of spiritual and of corporeal things, whereas the Angel does so only in the one mode: therefore in man the image is found in a more excellent manner.

5. Likewise, the more the copy is united to its exemplar, the more it is conformed to it; and the more it is naturally apt to be united, the more it is naturally apt to be conformed; but the human nature is united to the divine in unity of person, which the angelic nature in fact does not do: therefore the image is more expressly in it than it is in the Angel.

6. Likewise, by the consideration of the Philosopher: "If the best in one genus is better than the best in another genus, it is also unqualifiedly better than that"; but Christ, who is the best among men, is more excellently distinguished by the image of God than the best Angel: therefore the image of God is found more excellently in man than in the Angel.

### *Conclusion.*

> The formal character of the image is, as to one respect, equally principally in the Angel and the soul; as to another, more principally in the Angel; as to another, less.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that some have wished to say that *a creature is more to the image of God* can be said in two ways: either *extensively,* or *intensively.* *Opinion 1.* If *extensively,* then they have said that man represents God more than the Angel, because in more respects, by reason of the body united to him — namely in spiritual things, in corporeal things, in the mode of *existing* in things, and likewise in the mode of *producing* things. — And in this way they say the reasonings proceed for the second part. For what is objected concerning Christ does not hold; for that is a singular privilege and is not of nature, but rather of grace. — But if one creature be said to be more to the image than another *intensively,* because it represents more expressly; then they say that the Angel is more to the image of God than man, as the authorities and reasonings to the contrary show. And this Gregory suggests when he says: "The more subtle the nature, the more closely the image of the Trinity is suggested as imprinted in it." And the reasonings that follow also show that just as the angelic nature is more excellent, so it has more excellent powers and a greater capacity and is distinguished by the image of God in a worthier manner. — And in this way the answer to the proposed question and to the objections is plain.

*Not entirely accepted.* But although this manner of speaking seems probable, it nevertheless has no small calumny on the side of both members of the distinction. For that the image be said to be more in man *extensively* than in the Angels does not accord with the words of Augustine, who says that the formal character of the image is in the soul precisely according to its supreme part, as is clear in the fourteenth and fifteenth books *On the Trinity*. Likewise, that it be universally said that the image of God is more expressly in the Angel than in the soul on account of the greater dignity of nature does not seem to accord with the Gloss, which says upon that text, in chapter two of Hebrews: *Him who was made a little less than the Angels;* there the Gloss says that "than the nature of the human mind, such as Christ assumed, only God is greater." And Augustine suggests this in several places; and it is piously believed and commonly held that the Virgin Mary, more than all the Angels, approaches God.

*Opinion 2.* Therefore there is another way of speaking, namely that, since the expression of the image consists in *agreement of order* and *of proportion*, the intensity of the dignity of the image consists according to the intensity of agreement as regards proportion or order. *General principle.*

But it must be noted that the agreement of the rational creature with God according to *order* is partly of the *being* of the image and partly of its *well-being. Threefold agreement of order.* Of the *being* of the image is that the creature be ordered immediately to God; of *well-being* is that the creature which is an image be set before the others, which hold the formal character of a trace, and that the others be ordered to it as to an end. — And thus there is a *threefold order* in the rational creature according to which it is conformed to God. *Threefold order.* The first is that it is naturally apt to be joined immediately to God; and this is essential to the image, and in this the Angel and the soul are equated, because for both "the mind is immediately formed by the first truth itself." — The second is that by which the creature which is an image is set before other creatures; and in this the Angels excel, because they are deputed as rulers not only of beasts but even of men, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus chapter seventeen: *Over every nation he set rulers,* the Gloss: that is, the Angels; and this is the order by which the irrational creature is ruled by God through the mediation of the rational. — The third is the order by which irrational creatures are ordered to the rational as to the end for which they were made, and through that order to the ultimate principal end; and according to this order man agrees more with God than the Angel does; for corporeal and sensible things have been made more for the sake of men than for the sake of the Angels. — And thus it is clear that the formal character of the image, insofar as it is considered in agreement of *order,* as regards what belongs to its *being,* is found *equally* in man and the Angel, because each is ordered to God immediately. *Conclusion 1.* But as regards what belongs to its *well-being,* namely as regards order with respect to *creatures,* they stand in the manner of *excelling* and *being excelled.* *Conclusion 2.* For the Angel agrees more as to order under the formal character of *ruling;* but man more as to the order which is considered in the formal character of *end.*

In a similar way we find both *equality* and *mutual excess* in the expression of the image which is considered according to agreement of *proportion; Twofold agreement of proportion.* for one is an agreement of *relation* which belongs to the *being* of the image, another to its *well-being.* That belongs to *being* which consists in comparison to intrinsic things, namely to the powers; and in this man and the Angel are *equated,* because there is just as truly *distinction* and *origin* and *equality* and *consubstantiality* in the powers of the soul — namely in memory, intelligence, and will — as there is in the powers of the Angel. *Conclusion 3.* — But that agreement of relation belongs to *well-being* which is considered in comparison of the rational creature to something *extrinsic,* such as to the body, which is inferior to it. This can be more expressive in two ways: either *privatively* *Sub-distinction.* or *positively.* If *positively;* then the soul is the more expressive image, *Conclusion 4.* in that, joined to the body in such a way that through it the soul is the principle of others and through it inhabits the whole body, it more represents God, who is the principle of all things and who is one in all. But if *privatively;* then the Angel more represents God, because God is a pure spirit, altogether unmixed and independent of every creature; and this the angelic spirit represents, since it is separated from body according to act and aptitude. And for so much it is called more subtle by Gregory, and in it the image of divinity is said to be more expressive. *Conclusion 5.* And thus it is clear that as regards the agreement of *proportion* which belongs to the *essence* of the image, between man and the Angel there can be *equality;* but as regards that which belongs to *well-being,* they stand as *excelling* and *being excelled.*

From what has been said, therefore, the answer to the proposed question is clear. For when it is asked whether the image of God is more principally or expressly in the Angel than in the soul; the answer is that in some respect it is *equally principally,* in some *more principally,* in some *less,* as has been explained. *General conclusion.* — And in this the answer to the reasonings on either side is clear, since they proceed according to diverse ways by which they can conclude something true, because they have no opposition.

**To the arguments for the affirmative:**

*To 3 and 4.* To what is objected concerning the greater capacity, however, it can be said that it does not press the point. For the Angel has a capacity for grace in comparison to what is above, in which comparison it does not exceed the nature of the human mind. But that the angelic nature is said to exceed the human is in comparison to the body, to which it does not have an inclination in the way the soul has; and therefore the greater dignity in the angelic nature with respect to the soul does not contribute to the excellence of the image or of that capacity which is in the nature of the human mind, according to which the soul is capable of God. — Likewise, nor does what follows press the point; because the greater liveliness of memory or of intelligence makes rather for the intensification of *likeness* than for greater expression of the *image.* For *likeness* consists in *natural properties,* but *image* in *origin* and *relation;* and although the powers in the Angels are more lively than in souls — and therefore are more like God — yet they have the same *order* and *relation,* as has been shown above. Whence it is more properly conceded that the Angel is more *like* to God than man, than it can be conceded that the Angel is *more an image;* and this is what the authority of Gregory means to say.

**To the arguments for the negative:**

*To the arguments on the negative side, To 5.* The reasonings on the contrary side proceed and conclude a greater expression as regards what is *accidental* to the image, except for the one which is grounded upon the union; to which it must be said that it does not press the point, since the substance which is less capable of grace by nature can be rendered more capable through some gratuitously given grace, which disposes and amplifies the capacity of nature for the reception of sanctifying grace. *Note.* Whence, granted that the angelic nature were more capable of grace than the human nature according to natural potency — as it seems reasonably to be posited, namely that the angelic nature is more excellent, and to a more excellent nature is owed a more excellent power and capacity — nevertheless, through some gift gratuitously given by God, the capacity of the soul can be elevated up to the capacity of the Angel, and in a certain way to a more ample one. For the gift of gratuitously given grace disposes to sanctifying grace; and it was so possible to have been in Christ and the blessed Virgin. And thus the objections on either side are made clear.