Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/16/q/bon-sent-II-d16-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the motive or affective. And that it is more principally in the cognitive, it seems:

*Foundations.*
1. From what Augustine says: "*Image* is in the power of knowing, and *likeness* in the power of loving"; but this is not said because it is wholly in the power of knowing: therefore it is said because it is more principally there.

2. Likewise, image befits primarily and principally the eternal Word itself: therefore that which corresponds to that eternal Word befits it more principally; but this is the intelligence itself, which is in the cognitive power itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, image consists in memory, intelligence, and will: but two of these powers, namely memory and intelligence, are held on the side of the cognitive: therefore the image too is held more on the side of the cognitive than of the affective.

4. Likewise, image bespeaks a certain configuration and distinction; but it belongs to the affective to *unite*, and to the cognitive to *distinguish*: therefore the image resides more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.

*On the opposite side.*
1. The image of reformation corresponds to the image of creation; but the image of reformation, which indeed is grace, is more principally in the affective than in the cognitive: therefore the image of creation also.

2. Likewise, a thing principally consists in that wherein its completion consists; but the image is completed in the will, and the will is held on the side of the affective: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the image is the noblest thing in the soul, therefore it consists in that which is noblest in the soul; but free choice or will is the noblest thing that is in the soul: therefore the image consists principally in the liberty of choice or the will; but this principally regards the affective: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *likeness* is in more than *image*; for not every likeness is an image, but a likeness expressed in a certain configuration and imitation: therefore wherever there is image, there is also likeness: therefore where image is principally, likeness is also principally. But likeness is not principally on the side of cognition, but on the side of affection, since likeness is in gratuitous things, which most regard the affective power: therefore by equal reasoning the image as well.

*Incidental question 1.* Alongside this it is asked, what is the difference between image and likeness. For since likeness is in more than image, as Augustine shows in the book *Of Eighty-three Questions*, and the higher ought not to be numbered together with its inferior, it seems that man is wrongly said to have been made *to the image and likeness*.

*Incidental question 2.* Likewise, since there are two powers on the side of *affection*, namely the irascible and the concupiscible, just as there are two on the side of *cognition*, namely memory and intelligence; the question is, why in the account of the image two powers are taken on the side of the *cognitive*, and one on the side of the *affective*. For it seems that it ought rather to be the converse, since the three theological virtues, which reform the image of the soul, are so placed in it that two are on the side of the *affective*, namely hope and charity, of which one is in the irascible and the other in the concupiscible, and one is on the side of the *cognitive*, namely faith, which is commonly placed in the rational.

### Conclusion.

> *The image more principally regards the cognitive than the affective.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *image and likeness differ from the very first imposition of the name.* For image names a conformity in *quantity*, but likeness names an agreement in *quality*. For image names a certain configuration, and so it imports figure, which is quantity in quality, or quality in quantity; but likeness is called the same quality of different things.

*Threefold mode of distinguishing them in species.*

*First.* From this primary difference a threefold mode of distinguishing has been customarily assigned between image and likeness, when it is said: *Let us make man to our image and likeness.* — The first is the one Hugh says, that "likeness regards *nature*, and image regards *figure*"; because likeness bespeaks agreement in natural quality, but image agreement in figural distinction, after the manner of a certain triangle, in which there are three terms and three lines; for there are three *powers*, each of which has a relation to each, and likewise three *persons*; and the power or person holds the place of a term, but the relation or emanation holds the place of a line.

*Second.* The second mode of distinguishing is that image is in *natural things*, and likeness in *gratuitous things*, which likewise has its origin from that first difference. For since image bespeaks *configuration*, and that is attended to on the side of the soul's natural powers, namely of memory, intelligence, and will: hence it is that image is in natural things. But since likeness bespeaks agreement, which takes its origin from *quality*, and the quality in which the soul is likened to God is grace: therefore likeness is said to be in gratuitous things.

*Third.* The third mode of distinguishing is that image is in the power of knowing, and likeness in the power of loving: and this mode likewise takes its origin from the first difference. For since image consists in agreement according to configuration, and configuration is attended to in origin, relation, and the distinction of powers: and this origin and relation principally *Conclusion 1.* resides on the side of the cognitive: therefore image is more principally placed in the cognitive. But likeness bespeaks agreement in quality; and since the quality in which the soul is principally likened to God is in the will or *Conclusion 2.* in affection: hence it is that likeness is placed principally in the affective power.

*To the 2nd incidental question.* And hence it is that in the image of *creation* two powers are on the side of the cognitive, namely memory and intelligence, and one on the side of the affective, namely the will. But, on the contrary, in the image of *recreation*, which indeed consists in grace, two virtues are on the side of the affective, namely hope and charity, and one on the side of the cognitive, namely faith. For the image principally regards *origin* and *relation*; but relation and origin are attended to between memory and intelligence after the manner of parent and offspring, and between these two and the will according to the mode of derivation or procession. But between the irascible and the concupiscible there is neither such order nor origin, since the motion of the irascible can be without the concupiscible, and conversely; but the motion of the will cannot be without a preceding motion of intelligence, nor likewise an act of intelligence without an act of memory, in those things, I say, which pertain to the account of the image. Therefore in the assigning of the image two members are taken on the side of the *cognitive*, and one on the side of the *affective*. For *order* and *origin* and *distinction* demand this, and on that account the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the affective. — But likeness principally consists in the union of the soul to God, which is through grace. And since union and grace principally regard the *affective*; hence it is that in the image of *recreation*, which indeed is in gratuitous things, there are two virtues that regard the affective, namely hope and charity, in the two powers, namely the irascible and the concupiscible; but one which regards the *cognitive*, namely faith, which regards the rational, although hope also, reforming the irascible, consequently reforms the memory, since they agree in the act, which is *to hold fast*.

According to this, then, it is plain how to respond both to the question and to the objections. For it must be conceded outright that the image principally regards the cognitive; the reasonings that prove this must also be conceded.

*Solution of the opposites.*
1. As to what is objected concerning the image of reformation: it must be said that it is not valid, because the image of reformation is rather a certain *likeness* than an image. For if it were properly an image, it would be capable of God and would be immortal; but it is not so now. And therefore, since the image of recreation is rather *likeness* than image, it regards the affective power more principally than the cognitive, although it reforms both the cognitive and the affective.

2. As to what is objected, that the completion of the image is in the will; it must be said that although the will is *last* in the image, nevertheless it does not stand

after the manner of *completion* in the account of the image. For the image bespeaks *order* and *origin* in the powers, as it is in the persons; and just as the third person is not placed as completing the others nor as completing the others, but rather as receiving from them; so the will, insofar as it is part of the image, is rather considered in the account of *one going forth* than in the account of *one completing*. And since the first account of origin is by the mode of nature, which indeed consists in the rising of intelligence from memory; hence it is that the image more principally regards the cognitive than the affective.

3. As to what is objected, that the image consists in the noblest thing in the soul; it must be said that the nobler in the soul can be taken in two ways: either according to the *distinction of powers*, namely affective and cognitive, or according to the *condition of states*, namely of the superior portion and the inferior. When therefore it is said that the image consists in the noblest thing, this is understood with regard to the *state* in the superior part, not with regard to the *powers*, since the image embraces both the affective and the cognitive, since each is born immediately to be borne to God.

4. As to what is objected, that likeness is in more than image; it must be said that likeness, if it be taken in its *generality*, is in more; *Note.* but if it be taken *properly*, as it is taken in the present case, it is not in more, but rather is distinguished from image, so that, although each regards both the affective and the cognitive, image nevertheless more principally regards the cognitive, and likeness the affective; and the reason has already been stated. — And by this is made plain the response to those two things that were asked.