Dist. 16, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/16/q/bon-sent-II-d16-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are doubts concerning the letter, and the first inquiry is about the reason which the Master gives, when he says: *In that he says,* Let us make, *one operation of the three persons is shown.* For since the works of the Trinity are undivided, and the three persons have worked together all other things, just as they made man; in the way that in the production of man it is said, *Let us make,* so it should also be said in the production of other things. — Likewise, it is asked why in the production of man the lawgiver uses the verb of the first person, namely *let us make,* but in the production of other things uses the verb of the third person, namely *he said* and *he made.* — In line with this, there is also the question, why he distinguishes between the production of man and of the beasts, since on the same day they were produced for the adornment of the same element?

**I respond:** It must be said that in the production of man there was not only a manifestation of the Trinity in *vestige,* but also according to *image;* and therefore the production of man is attributed in the plural to the three persons in order to show that in man the Trinity is represented *expressly,* whereas in other things the Trinity is intimated in some way, although not so explicitly. — And because the account of image does not befit anything except a person, who can *speak by himself*; therefore in his production he uses the verb of the first person. — *And again,* because this creature surpasses the others in rank and dignity, therefore he distinguishes the production of man from the production of beasts, although they agree in adorning the earth in the work of one day. And thus the response to the queries is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *The image of God and of the Angels is not one and the same.* Against this is: that, since the Angel is the image of God, what is conformed to the Angel is consequently conformed to God: therefore what is the image of the Angel is the image of God. — Likewise, one work can be of God and of an Angel: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the same is the image.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because *image* signifies an ordering to that of which it is the image, as to an end and an *immediate* ordering; since it is impossible for God and an Angel to be the immediate and ultimate end of the same thing: it is impossible for the same *image* to be of an Angel and of God. — But because God cooperates with the Angel, and everything which is from the Angel is from God; therefore it is possible for one *work* simultaneously to be of an Angel and of God. — Nor does the objection avail, which urges that if someone represents an Angel, he consequently represents God. For although it may be inferred that a creature which represents an Angel represents God *mediately,* yet it cannot be inferred that it represents him *immediately*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *There were some, who so distinguished, that in this place they understood by* image *the Son,* whom he consequently rebukes. For it seems that they had spoken fittingly, on account of what is said in Romans 8: *Whom he predestined, to be conformed to the image of his Son.* — Likewise, that it must be so understood seems clear. For either *image* there stands for the *created* thing, or for the *uncreated* thing. If for the created: then it is the same to say, *Let us make man to the image*, as: let us make man to himself. If for the uncreated; but that is none other than the Son: therefore it seems that this exposition is correct. — On account of this, an *incidental question:* it is asked, which of these expositions, which the Master assigns in the letter, is to be held.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold *Twofold exposition.* manner of expounding this authority: *Let us make man* etc.: one understanding it of the *uncreated* image, the other understanding it of the *created* image. — *The first* mode is threefold. One way is that *image* and *similitude* be referred to the same thing, namely to the *essence* in three persons. The second mode is that *image* and *similitude* be referred to the same thing, namely to the *person of the Son.* The third mode of exposition is that *image* be referred to the Son, and *similitude* to the Holy Spirit. So all these modes the Master sets forth, which however he does not approve, although they can be sustained. For the first he refutes on the ground of *impropriety,* because the divine essence is not properly an image. The second on the ground of *falsity,* because the Son is not *our* image; and also concerning what he says, that man is not image, but *to the image.* The third he refutes on the ground of *uncertainty,* because he has no authority for it from Scripture.

Another mode of exposition is of the *created The second mode* image, and this is threefold. — One, who so expounds *likewise threefold.* that *image* precedes *similitude;* and says that *image* is in natural things, and *similitude* in gratuitous things. A second, who so expounds that *similitude* accompanies *image;* and this one holds that *image* is in the power of knowing, *similitude* in the power of loving. A third mode, who so expounds that *image* follows *similitude* according to the thing; and this one says that *similitude* is in nature, and *image* in form.

All these modes the Master approves and *To the incidental* sustains; and it seems probable enough that Scripture *question.* understands [the text] of the *created* image, although it can also be understood of the *uncreated.* For it is true that man is predestined to be conformed to the image of the Son of God; nor does the Master refute that position on the ground that this is not true, but because that image cannot properly be called *ours;* or also, because not only the *Son* is image, but also *man,* the contrary of which was being said in that mode of exposition.

To that, however, which is objected, that *image* cannot stand for the *created* image; it must be said that, on the contrary, *image* is taken in abstraction; and so *Note.* it can be said that man comes to be *to the image,* just as a tablet is said to come to be to the image, when the image of Hercules is impressed upon it. Hence it is that man is not only image, but also *to the image,* because not according to everything which he is is he image, indeed he differs from the image; whereas the Son according to everything which he is, is the image of the Father, and therefore he alone is *image,* not *to the image.*

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *That image was not made altogether equal, as not born from him, but created by him.* For what is created is not by *nature,* but by *art;* but what is by art is not univocated with what is by nature, indeed it is equivocated: therefore *image* is said equivocally of the Son of God and of man.

**I respond:** It must be said that *image,* concerning the Son of God and concerning man, is neither said *equivocally,* nor said *Note.* *univocally,* but *analogically* according to prior and posterior. — To what therefore is objected, that that which is created is from *art;* it must be said that there is a certain art whose operation follows *nature;* and the work of that art is *artificial* in such a way that it is not *natural;* and therefore the work of that art together with the work of nature in the same name produce an equivocation, as a *painted* man and a *true* man. There is a certain art which is the *foundation* of nature, and the work of that art is indeed *natural,* because it fabricates nature itself, and such is the art whose work is *to create*; and therefore there will not need to be an equivocation. — *Another solution.* Or it must be said that the reason there is an equivocation, when it is said *painted* man and *true* man, is because this name *man* is primarily and principally imposed upon the *true* man; and therefore, when it is said of the *painted* man, the acceptation is different and the signification is different. Not so is *image* primarily and principally imposed upon the Son of God, but upon everything which expressly represents another.

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