Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/17/q/bon-sent-II-d17-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether the soul of Adam was produced from matter.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the soul of Adam was produced from matter. And that it was not, it seems:

*To the opposite.*

1. First, through the Philosopher, who says that «form is something belonging to composition, consisting in a simple essence». If therefore the rational soul is truly form, then it is simple: therefore it is not composed of matter and form.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the beginning of *De Anima* III says that «the intellect is unmixed and impassible»; but everything which has matter has passive potency: therefore the intellective substance does not have matter.

3. Likewise, the Master in the text: «The substance of the soul, in which it might live, God created not from any corporeal or spiritual matter, but from nothing».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. The intellective substance knows nothing unless it is abstracted from matter; but in the act of knowing there is an assimilation of the knower to the knowable, and conversely: therefore if, for something to be understood, it is necessary that it be abstracted from matter, then for some substance to understand, it is necessary that it be by nature separated from matter. But the soul of Adam was of this kind: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the nobler a form, the simpler it is; but the soul is the noblest among all forms: therefore the simplest. But the other forms are not composed of matter and form: therefore much more so the rational soul.

6. Likewise, everything which has matter and form as constitutive parts is *something this* and *complete*; but nothing which is *something this* and *complete* in itself comes to the constitution of a third; but the rational soul comes to the constitution of a third, so that from soul and body there is made one thing through essence: therefore the soul is not *something this*: therefore it is either *matter* or *pure form*; not *matter*: therefore *form*.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. In *De Anima* III the Philosopher says that «just as in every nature there is matter and an efficient cause, so in the soul there is the intellect by which it is all things in becoming, and the intellect by which it is all things in making». If therefore passive potency is from matter, and this is in the soul, it is plain etc.

2. Likewise, in the ninth book of First Philosophy the Philosopher says that «just as matter is the subject of substantial forms, so the composite is the subject of accident»; but the rational soul is the subject of sciences and virtues, even considered in itself: therefore it is composed of matter and form.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VIII: «An operating and generating agent does no other thing except on account of matter»: therefore if God makes a soul, which is

other than himself, it is necessary that matter either be *in God,* or be *in the soul;* but it is not *in God,* therefore it is *in the soul*.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by *reason*. Every created thing to which a proper operation is owed has these two distinct things, namely *that which acts* and *that by which it acts*; but to the soul considered in itself a proper operation is owed: therefore it seems that it is not *only* form, because, if it were pure form, then it would act of itself: therefore it has something of matter.

5. Likewise, every thing which, according to its mutation, is receptive of contraries, is *something this* and a substance existing per se in a genus, and every such thing is composed of matter and form; but the soul, according to its mutation, is receptive of joy and sadness: therefore the rational soul is composed of matter and form.

6. Likewise, the rational soul not only gives life to the body, but is itself alive; therefore either it is *its own life,* or *not*. If so: then in it the *living* and *that by which it lives* do not differ. And further, if it is its own life, it does not live by participation, but by essence; which two things are against Boethius and Augustine: therefore one must posit in the soul, considered in itself, something which *gives* life and something which *receives* it. And if this, then it is composed of matter and form. — And to this can be brought the reasons which were brought above to show that an Angel is composed of matter and form.

> **CONCLUSION.** The rational soul, but not the brute soul, has matter, which is called spiritual.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that on this matter different men have held different opinions.

*Opinion 1.* For some have said that no soul, neither rational nor brute, has matter, because spirits are simple; yet they said that the rational soul has a composition out of *that by which it is* and *that which it is,* because it itself is *something this* and is fit to subsist per se and in itself. — *It is not proved.* But since it is plain that the rational soul can suffer and act and be changed from one property to another and subsist in itself; it does not seem that it suffices to say that in it there is only a composition out of *that by which it is* and *that which it is,* unless one add that there is in it a composition of matter and form.

*Opinion 2.* Therefore there were also others who said that not only the rational soul, but also the brute soul, is composed of matter and form, since each is a sufficient mover of the body. — *It is not proved.* But because the brute soul does not have its proper operation nor is it fit to subsist per se, it does not seem that it has matter within itself.

*Opinion 3.* And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, holding the middle between both, namely that the rational soul, since it is *something this* and is fit per se to subsist and to act and suffer, to move and be moved, has

within itself the *foundation* of its existence and a *material principle,* from which it has *existing,* and a *formal* one, from which it has *being*. *Conclusion 1.* Concerning the brute soul, however, it is not necessary to say this, since it is itself founded in the body. Since therefore the principle from which there is a *fixed existence* of a creature in itself, *Conclusion 2.* is a material principle: it must be conceded that the human soul has matter. But that matter is raised above *the being of extension,* and above *the being* *Conclusion 3.* *of privation* and *of corruption,* and therefore it is called spiritual matter. — *Corollary.* And on this account those who spoke of a material principle as far as *the being of extension* is concerned, and inasmuch as it has *being* under privation, said that the rational soul does not have matter, not meaning matter in its generality, but inasmuch as physical resolution stops at it, just as has been said about the simplicity of the Angel. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be granted.

**Solution of the opposed arguments.**

1. To that which is objected, that every form is simple; it must be said that that author, in defining form, is speaking of that form which is *form alone,* not of that which is form and *something this;* hence either he is defining there *accidental* form, or he is defining *universal* form.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is impassible and unmixed; it must be said that the Philosopher removes from the intellect matter insofar as it is considered under *privation* and under *potency* for change according to *being;* he does not remove matter *universally,* indeed he posits it, when he says that in the intellect there is a nature by which it *makes* and by which it *becomes*.

3. To that which the Master says in the text, it must be said that the Master does not mean to say that the soul does not have matter, but that it does not have *pre-existent* matter; the reason for this will be had below, namely, why the soul is not produced nor is it produced from pre-existent matter.

4. To that which is objected, that the intellective substance knows nothing except what is abstracted from matter; it must be said that this is not so *Notable reason 1.* on account of the fact that it is altogether immaterial, but on account of the fact that the thing cannot be united to it according to *reality*. Therefore it must be united to it according to *likeness,* *Another reason.* which the soul abstracts from the thing. — There is also another reason, because the intellect, through the likeness by which it understands, must be made into act in understanding; but that which makes a thing be in act is *species* and *form*. Therefore the soul does not know a thing unless it impresses upon itself its species and form; and this cannot be unless that is abstracted from matter. Nor does it follow from this that the soul lacks matter; for a thing abstracted from its proper matter can well come to be in another thing which has its own proper matter and form, just as the likeness of a color in a mirror.

5. To that which is objected, that the nobler a form, the simpler it is; it must be said that this holds in those which are *pure* forms; but the soul is not only form, indeed it is also *something this;* and therefore, if the form of the soul be compared to other forms, without doubt it will be simpler than the other forms. But the soul itself, since it is rational, since it is per se existing, has some composition which other forms are not naturally able to have per se, since they are not naturally able per se to *exist;* nevertheless the soul itself can be called simpler than other forms.

*Manifold simplicity.* — For there is a manifold kind of simplicity, according as there is also a manifold kind of composition and parts. For there are *substantial* parts and there are *quantitative* parts, and there is composition out of *substantial* parts and composition out of *quantitative* parts. And so *simple* is said in two ways: either as lacking *constitutive* parts, or as lacking *quantitative* parts. Although therefore the soul is not simpler than other forms as regards *constitutive* parts, since to have such parts pertains to completion and perfection; for this is what makes a thing be *per se;* nevertheless it is simpler as regards the privation of *quantitative* parts. *Note.* For it has neither extension *per se* nor extension *per accidens,* neither as regards substance nor as regards its proper act. But other forms *per accidens* can have extension and divisibility, either according to what they *are,* or according to what they *operate*. And therefore as regards this the soul, and especially the rational soul, is a nobler form.

6. To that which is objected, that what is composed of matter and form is a complete being, and so does not come to the constitution of a third; it must be said that *Note.* this is not true generally, but only when matter terminates every appetite of form, and form every appetite of matter; then there is no appetite for anything outside, and so neither is there possibility for composi-

tion, which pre-requires in the components an appetite and an inclination. Although, however, the rational soul has a composition out of matter and form, yet it has an appetite for perfecting corporeal nature; just as an organic body is composed of matter and form, and yet has an appetite for receiving the soul.