Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/17/q/bon-sent-II-d17-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the production of the human being with respect to the body.*

It is next asked concerning the production of the first human with respect to the body. And concerning this three things are asked.

*First* it is asked whether the body of the first human ought to have been produced purely from a celestial nature.

*Second* it is asked whether it was produced purely from an elementary nature.

*Third* it is asked whether it was constituted in an equal complexion, or in an unequal one.

### Question I. *Whether the body of Adam ought to have been produced from a purely celestial nature.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the body of Adam ought to have been produced purely from a celestial nature, thus.

*To the opposite [view].*

1. To the most noble form ought to be given the most noble matter; but the most noble among forms is the rational soul, innocent and without sin, such as was the soul of Adam; but the most noble among corporeal natures is the celestial nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there ought to be a proportion of mover to movable; but the rational soul is an incorruptible mover: therefore there ought to be given to it an impassible body.

3. Likewise, the end imposes necessity on those things which are ordered to the end; but the whole of Adam was made for the reception of beatitude, and the place of spiritual beatitude is God himself, the corporeal [place] is heaven: therefore just as the spirit of Adam does not rest except in God, so there ought to have been given to him a body which does not rest except in heaven; but this is a body of celestial nature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the rational spirit, inasmuch as it was constituted without fault, was supremely able and fit for acting, was perfect with the light of cognition, and fit for knowing, was free in will and rectitude, and therefore prone to tending toward its own optimum: therefore there ought to have been given to it a body to which it maximally pertains to act and to dispose for cognition, and which has the least retardation; but this is light and the celestial nature: therefore the body of Adam ought to have been produced purely from a celestial body.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations.*

1. «The rational soul is in some manner all things.» If therefore the body ought to be proportioned to the soul, its body ought to have agreement with all things; but it would not have this, if it were purely of celestial nature and did not communicate with the elements: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the rational soul, although it is simple in essence, is nevertheless manifold in effect: therefore if the body ought to correspond to it, it is necessary that its body have variety in the composition and organization of its parts; but it would not have this, if it were a purely celestial body: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the vegetative and the sensitive [powers] dispose for the rational, and approach more closely to it than the nature of any [particular] body, nor is the rational power united to any body without the vegetative and the sensitive: therefore no body is fit for the act of rational life, unless it is first fit for the act of vegetative life; but such is a body capable of nourishment, and a body of this kind cannot be a purely celestial body: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, to a simple body there is owed but one motion only, whether that body be celestial or elementary; but to a body which is moved by the soul there is owed motion in every difference, since the soul is a sufficient mover: therefore the body of Adam could not be wholly of the nature of a simple body, and therefore neither purely of celestial nature.

> **Conclusion.** The body of Adam was not formed nor ought to have been formed from a purely celestial nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that the body of Adam was not formed purely from a celestial nature, as the text of Genesis indicates, which says he was formed *from the slime of the earth*. *Conclusion 1.*

Nor ought it to have been formed purely from a celestial nature, but rather from an elementary nature, this being demanded by the congruence of order, which in all his works divine Wisdom always preserves. *Conclusion 2.* For this was required by the order of the human being, whether *in himself*, or to the *inferior creature*, or to the *equal creature*, or to *God as end*. *Fourfold order.*

*Order of the human being in himself.* The order of the human being in himself required this. For since the human being was constituted as one born to know many things, not only by intellective cognition, but also by sensitive [cognition]; therefore there had to be given to him a *multiform* body, that diverse organs might serve the diversity of senses for the knowing of diverse objects. And since he was constituted in the vertibility of free choice, as able to live in justice and to die through fault; there had to be given also a body which would not only be fit for living, but also one which could be made *fit for corrupting* or dying. And thus the order of the human being himself in himself required that there be given to him a body *multiform* and *capable of corruption*, and therefore not celestial, but elementary.

*To the inferior creature.* The order of the human being to the *inferior creature* also required this. For since the inferior corporeal natures were made that they might *serve* the rational creature, as was shown above; they were also made so that, by its mediation, they might in some manner be *led to their end*: hence it is that the rational creature had to be made composed in such a way, that the service of the inferior creatures should be *useful* to him, and that, by the mediation of that creature, the inferior natures should in some manner be *led to beatitude*. And therefore, that the inferior natures might be able to *serve* the human being and in some manner to be *glorified* in him, the human being had to be constituted not so much from the nature of the superior bodies as from the nature of the elements.

*To the equal creature.* The order to the *equal creature*, that is to the Angel, also required this. For just as one rational creature was made near God and in the *supreme* place, as in the empyrean; so another rational creature had to be made in the *lowest* place, namely the earth. And therefore his body had to be constituted from a nature suitable to such a habitation, and therefore rather from elementary nature than from celestial.

*To God as end.* The order to the *end* also required this. For the human being had to be subjected, so that by the humility of subjection he might ascend whence the angel had fallen through the sublimity of pride; and therefore there had to be given to him a body constituted of an inferior nature, so that, accounting himself dust, he might in all things lie subject to God. Whence Scripture also preferred to say him produced *from the slime of the earth*, that hereby the human being might profit and ascend by the merit of humility. — And therefore the reasons which were adduced for this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary concerning the nobility of the form, it must be said that the nobility of matter comes from its ordination to the form. Since therefore the body was more ordainable to the soul, which was constituted from a variety of nature, than a body which would be purely celestial; hence it is that even if the latter is nobler in itself, nevertheless in relation to the form a body composed of diverse elements is more noble.

2. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a proportion of mover to movable; it must be said that, although the soul is immortal with the death of *nature*, yet when it was created, it could die with the death of *fault*. And since the body was given to it not only for vivifying, but also for meriting; therefore there had not only to be given a body apt for its *immortality*, but also apt for its *vertibility*, and therefore not only necessary for perpetuity, but also possible to mortality.

3. To that which is objected, that the human being was made for the reception of beatitude; it must be said that, although he was made for beatitude, yet so that he should arrive there through merits and good works, and so that he should first be a *wayfarer* before a *comprehensor*; and since it was first fitting for him to pass through the *way* before he came to the *fatherland*: therefore in his primary condition there had to be given to him a body suitable according to the state of the *way*. *To be noted.* And since the place deputed to him for meriting was the inferior place, namely the terrestrial paradise; hence it is that it was fitting that his body be assumed from a terrestrial nature, not principally from a celestial one. But when it shall be assumed into glory, then the disposition of his body shall be varied, as is clear in the fourth [book], where there is treated the dowries of the glorified bodies.

4. To that which is objected, that that soul was able to act and to know and to tend toward God; it must be said that although it was able for *action*, yet it was not so perfectly able, that it was not capable of *defection*. And therefore it does not follow that there ought to be given to it, for the fulfillment of these things, a celestial body, which is incorruptible, but rather an elementary one, which from a good disposition and an equal complexion would be fit for acting, and nevertheless, if the human being should sin, would be capable of suffering.