Dist. 17, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/17/q/bon-sent-II-d17-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions about the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says in the text: *The will of the Creator is necessity. For that necessarily will come to be which he wills and foreknows.* If this is true, since God wills all future goods, no future good comes about contingently: therefore freedom of choice perishes. — Furthermore, it seems that he says something false in what he adds: *Many things are future according to inferior causes, but in the foreknowledge of God they are not future;* for what is future will be; what is not future in the foreknowledge of God will not be: therefore the same thing at once *will be* and *will not be*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the first statement is to be understood of the necessity not of the *consequent*, but of the *consequence*, because the very *thing willed* necessarily follows upon God's *willing it to be* or *to be future*. The second statement is to be understood in this way: that by the participle *future* is signified the order of an effect to its causes, not the event itself; so that the sense is: many things are future according to inferior causes, that is, ordered to come to be, which nonetheless are not future according to truth or foreknowledge, because they will not come about.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *man was created outside paradise, and afterwards placed in paradise.* For since paradise was the place of habitation owed to man in the state of innocence, and a place fit for habitation is fit for generation and production, it seems that man ought to have been produced in paradise. — Likewise, since the whole earth was then fruitful and the air tranquil, it seems that the whole was fit to be inhabited by man: therefore if man was produced outside paradise, it seems that outside paradise he ought to have been left to dwell. — Likewise, if the whole earth was produced for man's sake, then it seems that, if man had stood, the other part of the earth beyond paradise would have been superfluous. — On account of this *Connected question.* there is a question here, what is here called *paradise*, in which man was placed.

**I respond:** *Reply to the connected question.* For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as the Master says, there were three opinions about paradise.

*Opinion 1.* For some said that the paradise in which man was placed was a *bodily place*, which on account of its pleasantness was called *paradise*, and that there is no other paradise except a bodily one.

*Opinion 2.* Others, attending to the fact that man's beatification is in paradise, and that this consists in the enjoyment of God, not in bodily pleasantness, said that this paradise was not a bodily place but a *spiritual* one; and that all the things said in Genesis about paradise were said metaphorically. Hence in his formation man is said to have been placed in paradise, not because he was moved locally, but because he was placed in spiritual pleasantness and delights from the love and knowledge and enjoyment of God. In confirmation of this opinion they adduce what is said of the thief, Luke twenty-three: *Today you will be with me in paradise;*

and what is said of Lucifer, Ezekiel twenty-eight: *You were in the delights of God's paradise.*

*Opinion 3, with a distinction.* The third position is that there is a *spiritual* paradise and a *bodily* paradise. Spiritual paradise denotes a state of quiet and the pleasantness of spiritual delights; and this can be according to a twofold state, namely of the Church triumphant and of the Church militant. *Subdistinction.* Hence spiritual paradise is twofold or said in two ways: one is in the Church militant, the other in the Church triumphant. Hence the things said in Genesis about that spiritual paradise can be expounded metaphorically. — But bodily paradise is a place of delights and pleasantness; and this likewise *Further subdistinction.* is twofold according to a twofold state, namely perfect and imperfect. According to the perfect state, paradise is the empyrean. According to the imperfect state, paradise is a certain *pleasant* place in the regions of the East, of which Damascene says: « The divine paradise was planted by God's hands in Eden, a storehouse of joy and exultation of every kind ».

*Reasons of fittingness.* In this place it was fitting for man to be *placed*, that he might easily reach his fatherland, and that God might show man his benevolence, for whom he had prepared the most pleasant place for habitation, and so that the pleasantness of the outer dwelling might correspond to the inner delights such as the soul has, which is the temple of God, and such as the soul of the first man had. — But outside this place man had to be *produced*, that he might better recognize God's gift, while he saw himself as it were brought from elsewhere; and also that by this it might be shown that man was not made there to dwell eternally, but to journey temporally. And because God foreknew man's fall, he willed to place him in paradise, so that by his expulsion from the place of pleasure he might sensibly recognize how great spiritual goods he had lost through his fault; and might none the less recognize how great a difference there is between him who humbly obeys the Lord and him who proudly despises him.

*Reply to the objections.* And by this the reply to the objections is clear. For the place of paradise was fittingly made for man as instituted; and the rest of the earth was fittingly made for man, whom God had foreseen would fall; and because he had at once seen both man and sin, he took him from that earth to which he was afterwards to return. — Nor however, if man had stood, would the other part of the world have been superfluous, because it would have provided a dwelling for the beasts that serve man, and would have shown forth the dwelling of man as excelling by its very inferiority and would have adorned it by its great extent, just as a great courtyard adorns a palace, and as a hall adorns a chamber.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *The place of paradise as set on high, reaching up to the lunar circle.* This seems false: first, because between the lunar circle and the air there is a sphere of fire, which would not allow a man to live there. — Likewise, the air in its upper region is of such subtlety that birds cannot live there, as Augustine says: therefore if the place of paradise were so elevated, a man having an animal body could not live there. — Furthermore, if that place were so elevated, since it would come closest to the sun, it would therefore be hottest and most intemperate. It would also follow from this that earth would be above water and above air.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the doctors say, the site of the *bodily* paradise is very prominent and high and near the equator in the East, somewhat tending toward the South. It is moreover of such height that the vapors raised in the air do not ascend thither, but the air there is clean and pure, fit for the state of perpetuity; and on account of the purity of the air there is there a temperance of heat, and because it is near the equator there is there a great moderation of season. — When therefore it is said to reach up to the lunar circle, this is said not according to *site*, but according to a certain *property*, either because it is conformed in rarity and luminosity and tranquility,

or because the vapors over which the moon presides do not reach thither. And so the matter is clear.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *In paradise there were trees of diverse kinds* etc.; why does he name only two of those trees, and not more? — Likewise, since the tree concerning which the prohibition was made was not a tree of the *knowledge of good and evil* except on account of Adam's transgression, it does not seem that it ought to have been so named from its beginning. — Likewise, since the tree of life did not have that effect of vivifying, it seems that either it was in vain, or it ought not to have been named from that effect.

**I respond:** It must be said that *Threefold differentiation of trees.* the entire body of trees is comprehended under three differences, according as they could be ordered to the threefold utility of man: either with respect to the *body*, or with respect to the *soul*, or with respect to the *composite*. If with respect to the *body*, thus there were fruit-bearing trees, which furnished him nourishment for the sustenance of the body. If with respect to the *soul*, thus there was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was ordered to the testing of man's obedience. If with respect to the *composite*, thus there was the tree of life, which made for the perpetuation of human life. And of these trees only two are named on account of special effects, on account of which the Lord also placed those two trees in the middle of paradise, and set one beside the other, so that from the one man might conceive an affection of love, and from the other an affection of fear — and that as opposites placed beside each other they might shine forth — and that by abstaining from the one he might merit to have sufficient refreshment from the other. And this is what Augustine says in the *City of God*, speaking of our first parents: « The state of immortality was shown forth to them by the tree of life, which was in the middle of paradise together with the forbidden tree, by the wonderful grace of God; nevertheless they took other foods also, besides the one tree which had been forbidden ». — And so it is clear why those two trees are specially named. And the one, namely the tree of life, is named from an *effect*, not which it produced, but to which it was ordered; the other, namely the tree of knowledge, from an *event*; and each is fitting enough, because both that effect and that event were very notable. Now although the tree of life did not have its first effect in *act*, it nonetheless had it in *habit*; nor was it in vain, because, although the first man did not receive refreshment from it, his posterity nonetheless receive instruction, when through that tree they understand Christ.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Man was forbidden from a tree which was not evil.* For it seems that God acted unfittingly; first, because, just as to forbid evil is good, so to forbid good is evil: therefore it seems that God did wrong in forbidding the use of that tree. — Likewise, God well knew that they would not keep his prohibition: therefore if salvation could be had without that prohibition, it seems that he did nothing other than cast a snare upon them by forbidding. — Likewise, if all things were made for man, then that tree was man's; but nothing ought to be taken away from anyone without fault: therefore it seems that God did injury to man and punished him by forbidding what was his own, in which moreover no fault had preceded.

**I respond:** It must be said that *Twofold end.* God forbade that tree to man for the sake of acquiring *the merit of obedience* on man's part, and for the sake of showing forth the *dominion of his jurisdiction* which he had over man. Because he forbade it for the sake of the merit of obedience: that that merit might be pure and full, he forbade something from which one ought not to cease except out of regard for obedience alone, and therefore something good. — Likewise, because he forbade it to show forth the *dominion of his jurisdiction*: therefore he ought to have forbidden something from which man ought not to withdraw his hand except on account of God's sole command, and this indeed was a good thing. And therefore that commandment is said to be a *Precept of discipline*, because to this man was not bound from himself or from any dictate of natural reason, but solely from divine precept; although another reason can also be given why that divine commandment was given, namely that through it he might learn to which God he ought to be subject, and how great a difference there is between him who obeys God and him who despises his command. — No injury therefore was done to man from this,

but rather a utility was done to him, since it was commanded for his instruction and for the amplification of merit. And if the contrary happened, this was from his own fault, by which he turned good into evil for himself, just as for the impious and for sinners goods are turned into evils. Nevertheless on account of the foresight of this event God ought not to have failed to give such a commandment, because the order and beauty that is to be regarded in God's works according to the rule of divine wisdom ought not to be omitted on account of the disadvantage of some particular creature. Furthermore, from that evil that followed God could and knew how to draw out a much greater good.

And by this the reply to the objections is clear, except for the first, because it is not similar. For to forbid evil is good, because no one can perpetrate evil without fault; but to forbid good is not equally evil, because a man can abstain without fault; for to abstain from a good of *advantage* falls under the genus of the good of *the honourable*. The other points are sufficiently clear from what has already been said.

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