Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/18/q/bon-sent-II-d18-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason.*

Secondly it is asked whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason. And that she was, it seems:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. *First* by the text: *God completed on the sixth day all his work.* If therefore the formation of the woman was after the sixth day, as Scripture suggests, then in some way she was constituted in those works of the six days; but she was not [present] except in the rib: therefore in the rib was that from which the woman would be made. But what is in something in this way is said to be in it according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the sixth book *On Genesis to the Letter*: « All those things which were to be unfolded in later times, God created together at first, when he made the world; *consummated*, indeed, because they have nothing in their proper natures, by which the courses of their times act, which was not causally made in those [first works]; *inchoate*, however, because certain things were seeds of future things. » Therefore if the woman was afterwards to be produced, the seed of the woman pre-existed; but only in the rib: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the man is said to be the image of God, because from him are all men, as all things are from God; but no creature is from God materially: therefore if the assimilation is correct, it is necessary that the man with respect to the woman should have not only the relation of a *material* principle, but also of an *active* one. But what is from something as from a material and active principle is according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the man was produced from the slime, and the woman from the man; either then *there is a greater relation* and more fitting one of the rib to the woman than of the man to the slime, or *not*. If *not*, then the woman does not pertain to the man more than the man to the slime. If *yes*, then beyond the account of the possible there was there in some way an account of the active. If therefore this is a seminal reason, it appears that according to a seminal reason from the rib was formed the body of the woman.

5. Likewise, since God produced the body of the woman from the rib, either this was according to nature, or against. If according to nature; since nature, whatever it does, does according to seminal reasons, it seems that seminally the woman was produced from the rib. If against nature; on the contrary: « The Founder of nature, as Augustine says, does not act against nature »; and the same author *On Genesis to the Letter*: « So far does God not act against the causes which he established as good, as he does not act against his own will. » Therefore if the formation of Eve could not have been against nature, it was therefore according to nature; and if this, it was therefore according to a seminal reason.

6. Likewise, if that production was against nature, then the formation of the woman was a miracle; but Augustine *On Genesis to the Letter* says that God in the founding of things does not use things for a miracle of his power, but according to what properly befits the nature of those very things: therefore if he was not working a miracle, but operating according to what nature required; it seems that he produced the woman according to a seminal reason, if he produced her according to the requirement of nature.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. The Master says in the text, and it is the authority of Augustine: « Those things which happen according to a *seminal cause* are said to happen *naturally*, because thus the course of nature has become known to men »: if therefore the production of the woman from the rib is not according to the course of nature, then it will not be according to a seminal reason.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text: « The body of the woman is said to have been made from the rib by that same miracle by which from five loaves five thousand men were satisfied »; but that was not according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems by *reason*. Seed denotes an active and intrinsic principle, whence not just any humor of a man is called seed, but that which has been separated from the paternal loins; but in the rib there was no active force for the production of the woman: therefore neither a seminal reason.

4. Likewise, seed has in itself the account of the *whole* and of the *parts* of that thing which is produced from it. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On Genesis to the Letter*: « In the seed all things have been produced and were first not in the mass of magnitude, but in causal potency. » But in that rib there was no power for forming the individual members: therefore the woman was not there according to a seminal reason.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that anything should grow by a created power except by rarefaction, or by addition; but the body of the woman was produced from that rib, which body was greater than the rib itself, not by a rarefaction of the rib nor by the addition of extrinsic matter, as the Master says in the text: therefore that production from the rib was not according to the power of a creature, but only of the creative essence. But a seminal reason denotes a created power; for things are not said to be in God seminally: therefore this production of the woman from the rib was not according to seminal reasons.

6. Likewise, propagation and generation of things are reckoned according to seminal reasons; but according to the leading-out of a body from the rib there is no propagation in the human species: therefore the production of any human body from the rib is not according to a seminal reason.

*Incidental question.*

On account of this there is a question: since the Master says that some things happen according to *causal* reasons, others according to *seminal* reasons, what the difference is between these two. *If you say* that those things happen according to *causal* reasons which happen according to immutable or eternal reasons; those according to *seminal* reasons which happen according to the requirement and power of the potencies given to the creatures themselves; *it is objected* against this through Augustine. For Augustine says in the sixth book *On Genesis to the Letter*: « Things have nothing in their proper natures which was not causally made in the first days. » And again: « Those causal reasons which he put into the world, when he first created all things together, how they were instituted, can rightly be asked. » And a little later: « In those first causes of things which the Creator first inserted into the world, he placed not only that he was going to form man from the slime, but how he was going to produce him. » Therefore *causal* reasons do not denote something *uncreated*, but something *created.* — Likewise, Augustine himself distinguishes *causal* reasons, which he says were given to the first things, against immutable reasons, both in the fifth book *On Genesis to the Letter*, and in the sixth.

It is also asked what the difference is between *seminal* and *natural* reasons; and it seems that there is none, because Augustine says that when a tree sprouts from a seed, daily there is propagation according to a seminal reason, at the end of the fifth book *On Genesis to the Letter*; but this same thing is according to a natural reason. — Likewise, an operation which is from a seminal power is either natural, or voluntary. For since it is not from a cause by accident and is from a created cause, it is necessary that it be from *nature*, or from *intellect*. But it is not from intellect: therefore from nature: therefore everything that happens seminally happens naturally. By like reasoning, since nature is a propagative force, and propagation happens by means of seed; everything that happens *naturally* seems to happen *seminally*.

> ### Conclusion.
>
> The body of the woman was not in Adam's rib according to seminal reasons, unless these be understood broadly; and absolutely it was not thence made according to the same.

**I respond:**

*Praenotandum.*

For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since concerning these seminal reasons the eminent doctor Augustine in the fifth and sixth books *On Genesis to the Letter* speaks ambiguously, and from him chiefly we have the usage of these names; it is not easy to distinguish rightly among such terms. For he himself sometimes says that *causal reasons* were *inserted into things*, and sometimes says that, as to some things, they were *kept in the divine will*. We can nevertheless, as far as the force of the term goes, assign a difference in this way.

*General notions.*

For *cause* is common to *intrinsic* and *extrinsic principle*; likewise also *causal reason*, as far as the force of the name goes; but *seed* denotes an *intrinsic principle.* And thus *causal reason* extends to reasons *created* and *uncreated*; *seminal reason* only to reasons *created.* As far therefore as the force of the name goes, the one is common with respect to the other; but insofar as they are distinguished and counted among each other, thus *cause* and *causal reason* are taken with respect to the *uncreated principle*, while *seed* and *seminal reason* refer to the *created principle.* — But *cause* and *causal reason* differ, because *cause* denotes a *productive principle*, while *causal reason* denotes the *rule directing* that principle in its operation. Similarly, in this way *seed* and *seminal reason* differ. But the rule of the *uncreated* agent is the exemplar or ideal form, whereas the rule of the *created* agent is the natural form: and thus *causal reasons* are *ideal* or *exemplar* forms, while *seminal reasons* are *natural* forms.

*Difference of primordial and causal reasons.*

And according to this it is clear that *causal* and *primordial* reasons are the same in reality, differing only in account. For they are called *primordial* by privation of a prior, but *causal* by positing of a posterior; and *primordial* insofar as they regard God as *first principle*, *causal* insofar as they regard God as *ultimate end*, who is the cause of causes. — Similarly, *natural* and *seminal* reasons are the same in reality, but differ in account. *Likewise of natural and seminal reasons.* For since *seed* denotes the *as-from-which*, and *nature* denotes the *as-by-which*, a *seminal reason* is reckoned insofar as it directs the power of nature so that *from something* there comes to be *something*; whereas a *natural* [reason], so that *by something* there comes to be *something.* — *Otherwise.* Or a *seminal reason* regards the *inception* and the *intrinsic power* which moves and operates toward the production of the effect; whereas a *natural* [reason] concerns the assimilation of the producer to the produced and the customariness of the mode of acting. Whence speaking appropriately, when the magi made serpents from rods, this was according to *seminal reasons;* but when serpents, as they are wont, generate serpents, this happens according to *natural reasons*, although both can fittingly be called both natural and seminal.

*Application.*

When therefore it is asked whether some effect happens according to *causal* or *seminal* reasons; the answer is that either that effect is so from God that the creature does not have in it *any* potency, or, if it has, it has only the potency of *obedience*; as when the world is made from nothing, where there is no potency of the creature; or when many loaves are multiplied from one loaf, where there is only the potency of *obedience;* and these things happen according to *causal reasons*, which God has kept in his will, because they do not happen according to the requirement of the creature, but according to the requirement of the eternal disposition. — But if an effect is so produced that it is in the potency of nature, not only *obedient*, but also *able* to lead it through to act; thus it is said to come about according to *seminal reasons;* as is clear when a man is generated from a man, or a tree from a tree.

*Proximate and remote potency are distinguished.*

But it must be observed that this *potency of nature* toward such effects is either *proximate* and *sufficient*, as it is in the seed separated from the loins for the generation of a human body; and thus it is properly said to have in itself a seminal reason; or it is *remote* and *insufficient*, as it is in bread or in food, that from it a man may be made; and thus less properly is a seminal reason said to be there. For a seminal reason is not said to be in bread with respect to a man to be produced, unless it be taken very broadly. — *Application.* But what is thus in a *remote* disposition with respect to the effect is either led to that effect *by means of* those things to which it had an immediate ordering, or *immediately.* If mediately, then it can be said that that effect is according to a seminal reason, as if bread is eaten and digested and turned into humor, and afterwards in the loins is turned into seed, then into man. But if *immediately* it is led to the effect, as if from bread a human body were straightway formed; so in no way is it said to be made according to *seminal reasons*, but according to *causal reasons.* For although there might be there some *active potency* toward this, that thence a body should come about through many intermediates; nevertheless, that it should come about immediately, this it had only in the potency of *obedience.*

*Conclusion 1.* *In the members.*

When therefore it is asked whether the body of the woman *was* in the rib seminally: it must be said that, if a seminal reason is taken *properly*, *no*; but if it is taken *broadly* for any active potency existing in matter, thus it can be said that a seminal reason was in the rib. *Conclusion 2.* Again, if it is asked whether the woman *was made* from the rib according to seminal reasons; the answer is that *no*; because the rib with respect to such a mode of producing and with respect to so great a body to be formed from it without addition had only the potency of *obedience.* Hence the arguments adduced for this must be granted.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. 2. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that God did nothing new beyond the sixth day; it must be said that that argument fails in two ways. *First*, because, even if the formation of the woman is narrated after the sixth day, it is not to be believed that the formation of the man preceded by so long a time, but that on the sixth day she was produced from the side of the man. But that which is added is to be understood by recapitulation: for Scripture recapitulates, so as to add. It also fails in this, that God is not said to *do something new*, not only because all things were produced in *a seminal reason*, but because they were produced in *their own likeness*; and this it is necessary to say on account of the creation of the soul, which does not come into being according to a seminal reason. — And through this is clear the response to what follows, because the formation of the woman was not among the things consequent upon the works of the six days; or if it was, it is said to have been made *causally*, because there preceded a potency of obedience in the rib, or even some *remote seminal reason*, although the woman was not formed according to it, but according to divine power.

3. To that which is objected, that the man is the image of God because he is the principle of all men; it must be said that the likeness is not in every way. For God is the sufficient principle with respect to all things; but the man is not of himself a sufficient principle with respect to men; in some way, however, he holds the account of a principle; and this contributes to a greater expression of the image, for the amplifying of whose expression in some way not only a perfect assimilation contributes, but even a slight assimilation.

4. To that which is objected, that there was a greater fittingness of the rib to the woman than of the slime to the man; it must be said that the rib can be considered in two ways: either *in itself*, or *insofar as it was part of the man.* *In itself*, it was as far removed from the formation of the body of the woman as the slime from the formation of the body of the man. But if it is considered *insofar* as it is *part of the man*; thus, because the man and the woman are persons in whom affinity and connection can exist, such a formation made a certain greater bond of connection to be between the man and the woman; which indeed could not be between the man and the element of earth.

5. To that which is objected, that the production of the woman from the rib was not against nature; it must be said, *Nature is taken in two ways; likewise the locution against nature.* that nature is said in two ways. In one way, that is called nature which befits a thing from its natural origin; and in this sense it befits the creature that from it should be produced whatever God wills. For a work, with respect to its artificer, has in itself the potency of perfect obedience, since in all things it lies subject to his will; on account of which it is said that *the spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters;* and *against* this nature God never acts, but rather whatever he does of a creature, he does according to this nature. And according to this mode of taking *nature*, the woman was not formed from the rib *against nature.* — In another way, nature is properly called the *force implanted in things*, according to which natural things carry out their accustomed courses and motions; and in this sense of nature, sometimes God acts *against nature*, sometimes *above nature.* — *Against nature and above nature are distinguished.* Then he acts *against nature* when he does something whose like is wont to be produced *in* nature and *by* nature, yet in an altogether different way; as is clear in this, that nature

gives sight to someone, and successively in primary generation gives life as well; yet it never brings back a blind man to sight nor a dead man to life. If therefore God by his power does this, that he restore sight to a blind man and life to a dead man, then he is said to act *against nature*, that is, *against the accustomed course of nature*, and then it is called a miracle. — But when God does something whose like nature cannot do, and to which nature has no ordering according to its own power, as when God was made man, or when a mortal body becomes glorious; then he acts *above nature*, and that work is properly called *marvelous*, not *a miracle*. *What is marvelous, what is a miracle.* Since therefore in the works of the six days the natures of things were not yet founded, nor their courses determined; therefore both in the production of the woman from the rib of the man, and in the production of other things, he was operating *above nature*, not *against;* and therefore those works ought to have been called *marvels*, not *miracles*.

6. And by this is clear the response to the last objection; because it was not properly *against nature*, nor is it to be called a *miracle*.