Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/18/q/bon-sent-II-d18-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the seminal reason is a universal form, or a singular one.*

Third, it is asked what the seminal reason is according to essence; and since it is settled that it is a form, the question is whether it is a *universal* form or a *singular* one. And that it is a *universal* form, it seems:

*To the opposite.*

1. *First*, through the Philosopher in the sixteenth book *On Animals*, where he says that "animal is prior to man": therefore nature produces the form of the species through the form of the genus; but the latter is the seminal reason, by means of which nature reaches the ultimate completion: therefore the seminal reason is nothing other than a universal form.

2. Likewise, by how much something is simpler, by so much it is prior; but a form, by how much it is more universal, by so much it is simpler: therefore by so much it is prior. But in an ordered process one comes to that which is posterior through that which is prior: therefore nature, in proceeding to the generation of the singular form, reaches it through the universal. But the seminal reason is that through which it reaches the complete effect: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the intellect, if it is true, understands a thing just as it is in reality; otherwise, if it does not correspond in reality just as it understands, it is false and vain; but both the rational philosopher and likewise the metaphysician say that differences are drawn out *from the potency of the genus*: therefore it must be the case in reality that less universal forms emerge into *being* from more universal forms; or the consideration of the logician and the philosopher is altogether vain. Since this is unfitting, it remains that universal forms are those through which singulars are led out into *being*; but the seminal reasons are of this sort: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the particular form expresses being in complete act, since no further addition can be made to it; matter, however, expresses being wholly in potency; but between being wholly in act and being wholly in potency there falls a middle being, which is partly in act and partly in potency; of this sort, however, is the universal form, which with respect to matter is being in act, and with respect to a further form is being in potency: therefore, if one does not pass from extreme to extreme except through a middle, matter is not brought to complete act except through universal forms. But the seminal reasons are those through which one comes to complete act: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, from a man a man is generated, not an ass; but this is only on account of some agreement which is between man and man, and not between man and ass: now this agreement is only in a universal form: therefore the reason why a man generates a man is a universal form. But that is the seminal reason: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, this is seen by *reduction to the impossible*. Generation begins from that into which corruption terminates, and vice versa; if therefore nature produces nothing from nothing, by natural corruption no natural form passes into nothing. Since therefore from air there comes fire, the form of air is not corrupted into nothing, nor into matter, since matter was not part of the essence of that form: it is therefore corrupted into some *form*. Therefore that form is either *universal* or *singular*; if *singular*: either it is the form of *fire* or some *form other than fire*. Not *other than fire*, because in the fire generated there are not two singular forms, but only one. If it is the form of *fire*: then the form of air and the form of fire are one form in number; which is impossible. It remains then, since it cannot be a *singular* form, that it is a *universal* form. If therefore generation must begin from that into which corruption terminates, the generation of each natural thing begins from a universal form; but that from which generation begins is the seminal reason: therefore the seminal reason is nothing other than a universal form.

*Foundations.*

**On the contrary:** 1. The Philosopher in the book *On the Soul*: "The universal either is nothing, or is posterior"; but the seminal reason is always prior: therefore the seminal reason cannot be a universal form.

2. Likewise, "the universal is always and everywhere"; but the seminal reason regards this matter, in which it is determinately founded: therefore the seminal reason cannot be a universal form.

3. Likewise, the seminal reason is not predicated of that of which it is the seminal reason — for it cannot be said that a man is seed, or that the body of a man is an embryo — but the universal is predicated of the singular: therefore the seminal reason cannot be a universal form.

4. Likewise, every operation of nature terminates at *some this* and is about *some this*; *some this*, however, expresses form together with matter, but the universal expresses form only: therefore the universal form, *as such*, is neither the principle of operation nor the terminus of operation per se; but the seminal reason expresses a principle of operation: therefore the seminal reason cannot be a universal form.

5. Likewise, if the seminal reason expresses a universal form, then either the form of the *genus* or the form of the *species*. If the form of the *genus*: then in a man there is the seminal reason with respect to an ass; if the form of the *species*: then humanity is the seminal reason of this man. But that is the seminal reason of something which pre-exists in the matter before the thing is complete in act: therefore the form of humanity will be in the matter before the thing is complete. But this is false and unintelligible, that the form of humanity should be in something, and that something not be a complete thing: therefore it is not to be held that the universal form expresses the seminal reason.

6. Likewise, if a universal form with respect to a particular were a seminal reason; since then *this whiteness* expresses a singular form, and *whiteness* expresses the form of a species, and *color* the form of a genus, and *sensible quality* a still higher generic form, and *corporeal quality* a yet more universal form, and *quality* a wholly universal form; then nature in the production of this whiteness would arrive through all these mediations: therefore it would first produce quality before corporeal quality, and corporeal quality before sensible quality, and sensible quality before color, which is not intelligible.

### Conclusion.

> *The seminal reason is not a universal form in the proper sense; but in a broader sense it can be so called.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since it is sufficiently established that the seminal reason is an *active potency* implanted in matter; *Preliminary note.* and that this active potency is established to be the essence of the form, since from it the form comes to be through the operation of nature, which produces nothing from nothing: it is set down with sufficient reason that the seminal reason is the essence of the form to be produced, differing from it according to complete and incomplete being, or according to being in potency and being in act. — But whether that form, or active potency, which we call the seminal reason, is a *universal* form, this is not so plain. For there are diverse modes of speaking according to the diverse positions which different men hold concerning *universal form*.

*Opinion 1.* Certain men have wished to say that, since universals are not fictions, they are really and according to truth not only in the soul, but also *in nature*; and since whatever is in nature must be founded in matter, both universal and singular forms have *being* in matter. And thus universal and singular form do not differ by *abstraction* from matter and *concretion* in matter, but they differ by *addition* of one to the other, and by more complete and less complete. The sign of this is that in the coordination of genera and species the form of the *species* is most complete and most composite. The form of the *genus*, on the other hand, with respect to the species is *being in potency*, and becomes more *in act* through the difference superadded to it. And thus, since the seminal reason expresses a form by an incomplete account, they said that the seminal reason is nothing other than a universal form.

*Judgment on opinion 1.* This position, however, is not to be despised; for it belongs to great men and seems concordant both with *authority*, with *reason*, and with *sense*. With *authority*, since the Commentator himself in *Metaphysics* in the chapter *"Now in the foundation"* says that matter receives singular forms through universal forms. — With *reason* it also agrees, since, since the *singular* expresses being in act, and *matter* being in potency, and the *universal form* in one way expresses being in act and in another way in potency; it seems right and fitting that matter should be led to a complete form through universal forms. — With *sense* also it agrees, since, as the Philosopher in the beginning of the *Physics* says, the progress of our cognition is likened to the progress of nature in its operation; but the way innate to us is from the more universal to the less universal: therefore so it will be in nature. — If, however, anyone wishes to sustain this position, he can decline the reasons brought to the opposite, saying that they speak of the universal according as it has *abstract being* in the soul; and thus they do not oppose the said position.

*Opinion 2.* The position of others is that the universal is a form, but not every form is properly universal; for there is the *form of the part* and the *form of the whole*; and the universal is not the form of the part, but the form of the whole. For the soul is not said to be a universal with respect to one man, but rather man is. Now they call that the *form of the whole* which indeed gives *being* to the whole, and this is called the essence of the thing, because it embraces the whole *being*; and the metaphysician considers this form. But the *form of the part*, which has *being* in a genus only by reduction, is not properly to be called universal; nevertheless it can in some way be called universal *by rootage*, since it is indifferent to the many things which can come from it; as a cause is called universal because it extends to many things. And so that active potency which is in matter, which was called the seminal reason, can be called universal, not *properly*, according as the universal is considered by the metaphysician, but *broadly*, so that it expresses a certain indifference of principle, which the physicist also considers.

*The more approved.* And this position belongs to great and many men, and the common way more approves it; and not without reason, since it agrees with *reason*, with *authority*, and with *sense*. — *Reason 1.* With *reason* indeed, because universal forms must be posited on account of *cognition* and the *univocation* of predication. If therefore there is no whole cognition unless the whole being of a thing be known; and there is no cognition except through a form: it is necessary that there be some form which embraces the whole being; and this we call *essence*, and this is the universal form, as Avicenna says. For he says that *essence* is nothing other than the quiddity of the thing, as universal. — Similarly, there is no true *univocation* unless when some things are really likened in one common form, which is essentially predicated of them. Now the form in which many things are likened can only be a universal form; and that which is essentially predicated of them can only be a form embracing the whole. Therefore the universal form is nothing other than the form of the whole, which, since of itself it is apt to be in many, is universal; but it is particularized not by the addition of a further form, but by its conjunction with matter, from which conjunction matter appropriates the form to itself, and the form the matter, as has been said above. And because this form is never separated from matter, the universal form is never without the particular. Although however the one is not without the other, yet the one differs from the other. For although whiteness cannot be without body, it differs nevertheless from body, hence *inseparability* does not posit *identity* in every mode.

*Reason 2.* This position also agrees with *authority*. For the Philosopher says, that "when I say *heaven*, I say *form*; when I say *this heaven*, I say *matter*": therefore the individual adds no form over the universal form, but only matter. Boethius also says, "that the species is the whole being of the individual": therefore the universal form, which is the species, is the form of the whole, which embraces the whole *being*, and which is a sufficient ground of cognition with respect to substantial *being*; and this has been better treated above in the third distinction.

*Reason 3.* This also agrees with *sense*. For there is one order and mode in the *egress of species from a genus*, and another in the *eduction of forms* from the *potency of matter*. For the natural philosopher says that matter first receives the *elemental* form, and through that it comes to the form of *mixture*, and through that it comes to the form of *complexion*, because he considers that potency of matter according as through the operation of nature it has to come forth into effect. But the metaphysician, who considers universal forms or essences in which singular things are to be likened, posits *more* universal and *less*, according as more or fewer are likened in it; and that in which the first likening is, he calls the *most general genus*; that in which the perfect likening is, he calls the *most special species*. And therefore he says that the species adds to the genus, and finds all this in reality; he also says that the genus is simpler than the species and found in more things. And hence it is that the genus is in some respect more like God than the species, and in another the converse. For God, since he is most noble at the end of all nobility, has all perfection at once in himself, so that he is *most simple* and altogether incorruptible; he is also perfect and constituted in every mode of actuality. The creature, however, in so far as it can, partially likens itself to God; and with respect to the account of *simplicity* and *incorruptibility* the more universal is more like; with respect to the account of *actuality* the less universal is more like.

*Judgment on the two opinions.* Which of these two positions is more probable and truer is difficult to see for one standing in the common consideration; but for one descending to particular operations of nature it will appear that the consideration of the physicist and the metaphysician are diversified and cannot well correspond to each other at once. For whiteness is defined in one way, as has been touched on before, and produced by nature in another way. For it is defined through its genus, which is color, and color through a higher genus, and so on up to the highest of its genus. But nature in producing does not keep this order, but whiteness is produced just as the operation of the elemental qualities, together with the power of light, requires. And therefore the position said last is more common and more intelligible and closer to sense.

Sustaining this then, in accord with the common way, we can answer the question proposed *Conclusion 1.* that if universal form be taken *properly*, according to which a thing is ordinable in a genus, which the metaphysician has to consider, the seminal reason is not a universal form. *Conclusion 2.* If, however, *universal form* be taken as a form existing according to *incomplete being* in matter and *indifferent* and *possible to many things to be produced*; thus the seminal reason can be called a universal form.

*On the arguments.* And according to this the response to the objections is clear on both sides. For the reasons which prove that the seminal reason is not a universal form speak of the universal *properly*; but the reasons brought to the opposite speak of universal form according to *another acceptation*, according to which universal form is called any form existing in potency, whether it be the form of the whole or the form of the part; and this is seen by running through them one by one.

*Solution to the opposite.* 1. For as to what first objects, that animal is prior to man; it does not force that the seminal reason be a universal form properly so called. For *man* and *animal* and any other universal form is not said to be except through the eduction of some singular. Hence the author of the *Six Principles* says that "nature works secretly in these things".

2. To what likewise objects, that the universal is simpler; the answer is plain. For it is true that the universal is simpler according to that way in which it has coordination to that which is less universal, namely according to *definitive being*. But according to the *way of generation* it has no coordination except by accident; for it happens that through the operation of nature sometimes the genus is prior to the species; but the species never is, unless it be the individual.

3. To what is objected, that something in reality corresponds to philosophical consideration; it must be said that this is true. For there is a true and real likeness between Peter and Paul: and so it is necessary to posit some third thing in which they are likened. Similarly between man and ass there is a real likeness; and therefore philosophical consideration is not vain; nor however does it follow that essences of things must be *produced* just as they have to be *known*; for it is enough that they so be related to *being* as they are related to *cognition*, but it is not necessary that they so be related to *production*.

4. To what is objected, that the particular form expresses being in complete act; it must be said that it is true that that, through the medium of which one passes from being-in-potency to complete being, is in some way being in act, and in some way in potency. But this is not being in potency in *any* way whatever, but that which has ordination to this; and this is the active potency of matter, which does not have the account of the universal, since it is the form of the part, although it is in some way in act and in some way in potency.

5. To what is objected, that a man generates a man, not an ass; it must be said that this is not on account of the form of humanity, but on account of the power given to that nature for producing its like.

6. To the last the answer is plain. For I concede that that active potency is not the singular form either of fire or of air, but is indifferent to either; and therefore from it either of them can be educed, and into it either of them has to be resolved; and that can be called the seminal reason.