Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/19/q/bon-sent-II-d19-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the immortality of man on the part of the soul.*
### Question I. *Whether the human soul is by nature immortal.*

Concerning the first [article] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the rational soul is not naturally immortal.

**On the contrary [side]:**

1. First by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Timothy, last chapter: *Who alone has immortality*; he is speaking of God: therefore immortality does not belong to any creature. If you say that this is said because it belongs to God alone by nature, but to the soul of man not by nature but by grace; against [this]: grace does not repugn nature nor change nature, but rather conserves it. If therefore mortality is in every creature by nature, immortality, which is the opposite condition, is in no creature by grace, therefore neither in the soul.

2. Likewise, Damascene: «Everything that begins from change [*versione*] tends toward change»; but the rational soul begins from change, since it is created, as was shown above: therefore it tends toward change: therefore it is not immortal. *If you say* that it tends [thus] so far as itself is concerned, but is held and sustained by the hand of the Creator; *against this* is that [saying] of Augustine, *On the City of God* VII: «He so administers the things which he founded, that he allows them to perform their proper motions»; he speaks of God. If therefore [the soul] of itself tends to corruption, the power of the divine hand does not stand in the way.

3. Likewise, by the authority of the Philosopher: «The intellect is corrupted by some interior thing being corrupted»; but the intellect is not corrupted except by the corruption of the rational soul: therefore the rational soul is not immortal.

4. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [shown] by reason. The soul suffers in the body by nature, as is plain; but «passion made greater and greater casts away from the substance»; and from whatever substance some casting-away takes place, there also takes place some corruption, by which something is thereby corrupted; and every such substance is corruptible: therefore the rational soul is corruptible.

5. Likewise, the rational soul condoles the suffering body: therefore [it condoles] the more-suffering [body] more, and the most-suffering [body] most: therefore it seems that it dies-with the dying [body].

6. Likewise, if a substance is incorruptible, also [its] operation corresponding to that substance, because a substance is never deprived of its proper operation: therefore if the operation is destroyed and injured, the substance also is destroyed and injured. But upon the injury of the body the act of the rational substance, which is *to understand*, is injured and impeded: therefore it seems that the substance itself also is injured: therefore the substance is corruptible and mortal.

**Foundations [for the contrary].** On the opposite side are innumerable authorities both of philosophers and of the Saints, and so let us demonstrate this by reasonings. Now in order that the immortality of the soul may be sufficiently shown, one must attend to this, that the soul can be considered in *order* and can be considered in *itself*: in order with respect to the *whole of creation*, or with respect to *divine justice*, or with respect to the *end* which befits its proper nature; and in *itself* as regards *power*, as regards *act*, and as regards *object*; and thus it can be considered in six modes. *(Six modes of consideration.)*

1, 2. And the first consideration is according to the order which it has among the *creatures of the universe*, and according to this consideration its immortality is shown from a twofold reasoning. The first is this. In the order of the creatures of the universe we find prime matter and ultimate form, and the ultimate form pertains as much or more to the completion of the universe as does prime matter. If therefore prime matter is incorruptible, then also the ultimate form; but this is the rational soul: therefore etc.

Likewise, another reasoning to the same [conclusion]. For the universe to be complete, it is necessary to find differences of creatures according to a perfect combination; but it happens that there is found in the universe a substance having magnitude, existing as incorruptible, namely the body of the heavens; and it happens that there is found an incorruptible substance which is neither magnitude nor conjoined to magnitude: therefore it happens that there is found a middle incorruptible substance, which is not magnitude but is conjoined to magnitude; but this is the rational soul. — From the perfection therefore of the order of the totality it is gathered that the soul is immortal.

3, 4. From the second consideration, namely from the order of *divine justice*, [the case] is shown thus. «No good is unrewarded, and no evil is unpunished» with him *who judges justly*; but many goods remain unrewarded, and many evils unpunished according to the present life: therefore one must posit another life than this one; but this would not be unless the soul remained after the body: therefore etc. *If you say* that this does not compel [the conclusion], because, just as the body is raised, so the soul could be raised; such an instance is not fitting. For since the soul is created from nothing, if it were corrupted, it would tend toward nothing: therefore it would not be raised, but another soul would be created anew.

Likewise, it pertains to *divine justice* that nothing well and justly done ought to incline toward an evil outcome; but according to the moral philosopher and according to the divine law and according also to all sects, man ought rather to suffer death than depart from the truth of life and from the truth of justice. But if the soul were utterly destroyed, the justice which is in it would be utterly destroyed: therefore such a suffering of death, which is just and which all right reason praises, would have simply an evil outcome; which is against divine justice. — Therefore from the order of justice it is gathered that the soul is immortal.

5, 6. From the third consideration, namely from the order of the soul itself to its proper *end*, [the case] is shown thus. The ultimate end being removed, which principally moves, all other ends are empty and vain; but the ultimate end of every rational operation is perfect beatitude: therefore if that does not exist, whatever the soul does, it does in vain. If therefore this is unfitting, it is necessary to posit that end. But «beatitude is a state perfect by the gathering-together of all goods»; and where this is, there must be immortality: therefore the soul by nature is born apt for incorruption and immortality.

Likewise, every rational soul naturally desires beatitude; but nothing is idle in the foundation of nature: therefore every rational soul is born to attain beatitude. But where beatitude is, there is perfect security; where perfect security is, there is immortality; for where death can come, one must fear. — Therefore from the order of the soul itself to its end it is gathered that it has immortality. And this threefold consideration has been taken according to a threefold *order* of the soul itself, namely to its proper end, to divine judgment, to the whole universe.

7, 8. From the fourth consideration, namely of the soul itself as regards its proper *power*, the argument runs thus. No material and corruptible power is born to reflect upon itself — this is manifest of itself — [but] the rational soul, according to its proper act, is born to reflect upon itself by knowing itself and loving itself: therefore the power of the rational soul is not material and corruptible: therefore it is immaterial and incorruptible. But if the power is incorruptible, so also the substance: therefore etc.

Likewise, every power which by withdrawal and unmingling with a corruptible body is fortified and rendered more powerful, is incorruptible by nature; the rational soul is of this kind, as is plain, because the spirit and the interior man are the more raised up the more the exterior man is mortified: therefore the power of the rational soul is incorruptible. — And thus from its own power it is gathered that the rational soul is immortal.

9, 10. From the fifth consideration, namely as regards *operation*, [the case] is argued thus. The operation of every spiritual substance whose being and duration depend on the body, depends on the body; but the rational soul has its proper operation, according to which it does not depend on the body, namely *to understand*, because it appropriates no organ to itself: therefore the duration of the soul does not depend on the body. But of itself it does not undergo corruption, since it has no contrariety: therefore of itself it is immortal and incorruptible.

Likewise, the operation of every corruptible substance grows old and decays in time; but the operation of the rational soul neither grows old nor decays in time, but rather grows young, because *in the ancients is wisdom, and in much time prudence*. — Therefore from its proper operation we can gather that the rational soul is immortal.

11, 12. From the sixth consideration, namely by comparison to the *object*, the rational soul is proved to be immortal thus. There must be a proportion of the knower to the known, or of the power to the object; but the rational soul is born to know and understand truth; and truth is incorruptible, as Augustine proves in the *Soliloquies*, since it is of such a nature that the very negation of truth posits truth: therefore the rational soul, since it is proportionable to truth, is immortal. Now this reasoning concludes not only that the soul is immortal through the truth of *understanding* or of conscience, but also through the truth of *life* or of justice, of which it is said in Wisdom 1: *Justice is perpetual and immortal*, and through this the soul which is capable of justice.

Likewise, every corruptible power is injured by an object of disproportionate excellence, and is born more to delight in a mean than in an extreme. But the rational soul, understanding greater and greatest [things], does not on that account understand lesser [things] worse, and more delights in the cognition of the highest light and in the perception of the wisdom of God than in the cognition of any created [thing]. — Therefore from comparison to the object it is gathered that the rational soul is immortal. If, therefore, substance is known through power, and power through operation, and operation through object, since according to this threefold consideration of the soul itself it has been shown that the soul is immortal: every consideration of the soul, whether *in itself* or *in [its] order*, establishes the soul's immortality.

> ### Conclusion.
> **That the rational soul is immortal is proved by a fourfold reason.**

**I respond:** To the foregoing it must be said that the rational soul is immortal, as the catholic faith says, with which philosophy and every right reason concord. Now although we can be led and led-by-the-hand to the cognition of the immortality of the rational soul along many ways, yet the most powerful mode of coming to that cognition is from the consideration of the *end*; and this mode Augustine especially approves in book thirteen of *On the Trinity* and in his book *On the City of God*. And not without reason, because the *end* imposes necessity on those things which are toward the end.

*Reason on the part of the final cause.* This therefore must first be supposed as true and certain: that the rational soul has been made to participate in the highest beatitude. For this is so certain from the cry of every natural appetite that no one doubts it, except one whose reason is wholly subverted. For it is most certain to us that all of us will to be blessed. If therefore he cannot be blessed who can lose the good he has — because by this very fact he has whence to fear, and whence also to grieve, and so whence to be wretched — it is therefore necessary that, if the soul has been made capable of beatitude, it be by nature immortal. And thus its immortality is gathered on the part of the final cause.

*On the part of the formal cause.* Likewise nonetheless consequently is it gathered on the part of the *formal* cause. For because it has been made for participating in beatitude, which consists in the highest good alone, it has been made capable of God, and so [made] to his image and likeness. But if it is the image of God, it is expressly assimilated to him; but this would not be, «if it were enclosed by the term of death»: since therefore by its nature it is the image of God, it cannot be enclosed by the term of death.

*On the part of the material cause.* From this also is had and gathered a reason on the part of *matter*. For because the very *that-by-which* the soul is, namely its *form*, is of such great dignity that it renders the soul itself stamped with the image of God — which is the most noble condition — the matter which is united to this form is united to it with such great appetite, and so its appetite is so terminated in it, that it can in no way desire another form, since the best-fitting [partners] are joined to one another.

*On the part of the efficient cause.* And because «what is joined by good reason — for it to will to be dissolved is not [proper] of God», hence it is that God, who was the soul's author, is the continuous conserver of the soul. — And thus appears the reason for the soul's immortality from the fourfold kind of cause, though principally it is taken from the *end*. And these are the reasons that show not only *that* it is immortal, but also *on account of what* it is. — But the reasons adduced above show that the soul is immortal and conclude true, and therefore are to be conceded.

**Solution of the contrary arguments.**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary from the Apostle, it must be said that the Apostle says God alone has immortality because he alone is the one who can perpetuate himself supremely without the help of another. The soul, however, even if it is according to its origin suited to immortality, nevertheless cannot sufficiently continue itself in *esse* unless it is conserved by the highest Author; and that conservation is from the gratuitous goodness of God, nor does it repugn the soul's nature as regards the principles from which it is constituted, but rather it conserves the appetite of those principles.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from Damascene, that it tends to *versio*; it must be said that that tendency is not through any *appetite of power* but rather through a *defect of vanity* by which the creature is from nothing. But this defect the highest Truth and Power, by his presence and sustaining, excludes from the creature. And because he is so present to the rational soul which he made, that he never forsakes it but is in it through potency, presence, and essence; therefore the rational soul can never be corrupted. — Nor does the instance avail which is objected from a saying of Augustine. For Augustine understands [it] of motions which are from *nature*, according as *nature* means the original principle of some effect, not according as it means a defect. And so also it must be understood that grace perfects nature and does not repugn it; and this has been better explained in book one, distinction eight.

*To 3.* To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that the intellect is corrupted, etc.; it must be said that that saying *must have a pious sense [intellectum]*. *(To be noted.)* For one must not believe that the Philosopher meant to say that the intellect is *corruptible*, since afterward he proves it *impassible*, *incorruptible*, and *immortal*, as is expressly plain in book three *On the Soul*; but he means that the operation of the intellect, which it has in the body, is impeded on account of some injury made interiorly in the organ of imagination, or of some other sensible power. And as regards this he spoke truly, as is plain and manifest to sense.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the soul suffers; one can respond in two ways. First indeed, because its passion is not through its own injury, but through compassion with respect to the injured body: and this does not posit that anything is cast away from its substance, but [from] the substance to which it has [to be] united. — *(Another solution.)* Otherwise it can be answered that the soul itself has [to] suffer not only in the body but even outside the body; nor however does it follow that it has [to] be corrupted: for that corruption is not through removal of a part but through continual impedition of rest and peace. But this has been more clearly determined in [book] four, where the punishments of the souls of the damned are treated.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the soul condoles the body; it must be said that that compassion is not [present] except when the conjunction of soul and body is preserved. And since death separates that conjunction, therefore one need not extend compassion to death, because that consequence does not hold except while the cause remains. Moreover, that consequence does not hold, namely that, if the soul most compassionates the most-suffering body, it dies-with the dying [body]. For the soul, since it is capable of joy, is also capable of sorrow; but since it is capable of life, it is in no way susceptible of death.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the operation of the soul is injured or impeded: it must be said that this is by accident only. For because the soul with great inclination is inclined toward the body and communicates its operations to the body, and the sensitive powers immediately subminister to the intellective power itself; hence it is that, when the bodily organs are injured and the sensitive powers are impeded, the operation of the intellect, while it is in the body, is impeded, the intellect itself being in no way injured in itself; which appears from this, that as soon as it is separated from the body it has its complete use. And let these suffice as regards the matter proposed.

### Scholion.

**I.** The arguments for the immortality of the human soul brought forward in this place and taken chiefly from St. Augustine are also proposed, in other words, in the *Summa de anima* of John of La Rochelle, p. I. c. 42, 43 (edited at Prato 1882). — In the solution to [argument] 3 Aristotle is absolved from the accusation that he did not know the immortality of the soul; the same is the opinion of St. Thomas with the more common opinion of the Scholastics. But on this matter, with Henry of Ghent (cf. above, scholion at d. 18 a. 1 q. 1), Scotus doubts (IV. *Sent.* d. 43, q. 2, n. 16), saying: «It is probable that Aristotle in that conclusion was always doubtful»; but Durandus (here q. 1), more favorable to Aristotle, considers the first opinion to be the more probable.

**II.** Scotus, *loc. cit.*, IV. *Report.* d. 43, q. 2, nn. 10 sqq., and apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75, a. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. unica a. 1; S.T. I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG II, c. 79, 80. — B. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. II, tr. 12, q. 73, m. 2, and tr. 13, q. 77, m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1, and dub. lat. 1. — Durandus, *loc. cit.* — Dionysius the Carthusian has something on this, II. *Sent.* d. 18, q. 1. — Biel, II. *Sent.* d. 16, q. unica.

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