Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/19/q/bon-sent-II-d19-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether every soul, even the brutish, was from its first condition immortal.*

Secondly it is asked whether every soul, namely the brutish, and not only the rational, was from its first condition immortal. And that it was, seems thus:

*To the contrary [Ad oppositum].*

1. Ecclesiastes 3: *One is the destruction of man and of beasts*; but men, although they perish as to their bodies, do not however perish as to their souls: therefore by parity of reasoning neither do the brute animals.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 1: *God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living*; therefore death has not been introduced except on account of sin: therefore if man had not sinned, neither would he himself die, nor would the brute animal die. But this would not be, unless the souls of brutes were immortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems from reason. When it is proved that the soul of Peter is immortal, it is proved that every soul is immortal *by hypothesis*, because there is no greater reason as to one than as to another, speaking of rational souls; therefore by parity of reasoning, speaking of sensible animals, if one sensible soul is immortal, then all are. But the human sensible soul is immortal, because never is [the soul] rational without the sensible: therefore since in this man shares with the brutes, the sensible soul of brute animals is by nature immortal.

4. Likewise, every soul, however little nobility it has, surpasses every body, as Augustine wills, therefore it more nearly approaches the likeness of God; but certain bodies are by nature immortal, like the celestial bodies: therefore much more so the souls of the brute animals.

5. Likewise, a substance whose power and operation does not grow old in time, is not corrupted in time: but the sensible soul is of this kind, because, as the Philosopher says, « if an old man took the eye of a youth, he would see thus as a youth »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, because man serves God, he is worthy of recompense; and therefore it is necessary to posit his soul to be immortal, that he may be recompensed after death: therefore by parity of reasoning, since the brute animals serve man, and through this serve God in man, it seems similarly that they ought to be recompensed.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations [Fundamenta].*

1. No form is separable from the body, except one which has its own operation apart from the body; but no brutish spirit is of this kind: therefore etc. The *major* is manifest, both because the Philosopher says it, and also because there is no substance which lacks every operation, since none is idle. The *second* [premise] is manifest to sense.

2. Likewise, all the brute animals were made for the use of man; but the use of man consists in feeding on them, and he feeds on them when he kills them: therefore they were made for this, that they should serve man not only through life, but also through death; but this would not be, if their souls were immortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an immortal body is owed to an immortal soul, so far as is from the first institution: therefore if the souls of brutes were immortal, they had immortal bodies. But it is established that the brutes have not sinned: therefore they ought still to be immortal. But if this is established to be false, it is plain also that the first thing [is false].

4. Likewise, if the souls of brutes were immortal, therefore all the bodies of brutes ought to return, just as the bodies of men also; but if so, it would be impossible that all should be on the earth, since an innumerable multitude of beasts and animals continually succeeds itself: therefore it is inconvenient to say that the souls of brutes are immortal.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Irrational souls are, from their first condition, mortal.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that the souls of brutes are immortal, on the ground that the same souls vivify the bodies of brutes and the bodies of men, since by the merit of their sins they pass through, going around from body to body. — *First opinion.* — *It is reproved.* And this was the position of certain philosophers and heretics, as has been said above, and has already been disproved above as heretical; and this position is altogether to be cast aside as vile and derogating from the dignity of the rational creature, when it posits that men and beasts are equals. In this matter it indicates that its inventors and defenders are bestial men, when they believe their own souls either to have been or to be in future those of beasts. — *Note.*

*Second opinion.* There have been others also who wished to say that the souls of brutes are neither so immortal as the rational souls, that they could live after their bodies, nor are they so corruptible as other forms which have contrariety; but as far as is from their own nature, they are born to endure continuously, unless they have an impediment to their duration from the body, without which they cannot subsist. And this kind of impediment to duration they say has been introduced into the bodies of brutes on account of the sin of men. For if Adam had not sinned, no brute animal would perish. Hence just as by the merit of human sin those things which were made for his service were made worse, so also the brute animals were made subject to death. — *But it is disproved in a threefold way.* But this at first sight conflicts with what Augustine says in his book *On Genesis according to the letter*, book three, that if man had not sinned, there would nonetheless be animals living by rapine, which to preserve their own life would kill other animals. — It is also repugnant to *reason*, since no reason says it is fitting that the sheep should be killed because man has sinned, when it has in no way shared with him in sin, nor has it transmitted its sin into the sheep. — It is also repugnant to sensible *imagination*. For where would those animals be, which would have been multiplied upon the earth from the beginning of

the world unto its end, if none were dying? But if you say that they would not have been multiplied, if man had not sinned; how then would that be true which is said to them in Genesis 1: *Increase and multiply and fill the waters*? Now if this was said to the fishes, why is it not to be understood as said also to the other animals? Or were they made more fruitful on account of man's fault? If all these are inconvenient, that position is to be rejected as inconvenient.

*Third opinion and conclusion.* And therefore it must be said in a third way, that no other soul than the rational is immortal. — And the reason for this appears, if we look to the end on account of which creatures were made, from which end is set in things perpetuity, or corruptibility, according to their need. Now since all creatures were made on account of God, according to that [text]: *The Lord hath made all things for himself*, the rational creature alone has been made to enjoy God, and that it should be made blessed in him, and it alone is to the image. But other creatures, which hold only the character of vestige, were made either for the *manifestation of divine goodness*, or for the *service of the rational creature*. — *Reason from the principal end.*

*This is twofold.* Now the manifestation of the divine exemplar and of God's goodness consists in the production of the universe, which is a certain exemplated thing, completely representing that exemplar, and on account of the completion of representation it must have a complete and perpetual duration. But the universe in a twofold way has being, namely *running* and *permanent*. *Running being* cannot be perpetual, because it is necessary that at some time it be at rest. But *permanent being* is perpetual. Those parts, therefore, which respect the universe so far as *permanent being*, such as are the orbs of the heavens and of the elements, have perpetuity. But those which respect [it] as to *running being*, namely those which consist in generation and corruption, such as are minerals, plants and brute animals, ought not to have perpetual *being*, but terminated, which by a certain transit of their own and by a certain growing-old and renewal, by death and vivification, adorn the universe. And thus it is plain that the brute animals, as to body and soul, are by nature corruptible, inasmuch as they were made for *representing* the divine goodness and wisdom. And this reason is taken from the principal end.

*Secondary reason.* There is also another reason, taken from the non-principal end, namely inasmuch as the creatures in which there is only the character of vestige were made on account of the rational creature, namely man. For some were made on account of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland; some only according to the state of the way; and some only according to the state of the fatherland. — *Distinction.* And those which were made on account of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland, since the state of the fatherland is perpetual, ought to be perpetual; and such are those which complete man's dwelling-place, like the heaven and the four elements. But those which were made on account of man according to the state of the way, since that state is transitory and has an end, ought to be corruptible; and such are the brute animals, which were made to supply the body's need according to that state, in which it needs foods and nourishments. — And thus the reasons showing the brutish souls to be mortal from their first condition are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposite arguments.*

1. To that, then, which is first objected from Ecclesiastes, that *one is the destruction* etc.; it must be said that he speaks as to the exterior understanding; and therefore he adds: *Who knoweth, if the spirit of the sons of Adam ascend upward?* as if to say: the man does not know who walks according to the carnal intellect, who considers only those things which appear outwardly; but the wise man knows, who attends to that which Ecclesiastes himself at the end says: *Know thou that for every error God will bring thee into judgment*.

2. To that which is objected from the book of Wisdom, it must be said that it speaks either of the death of eternal damnation, or of temporal death in him for whom death is a punishment. But such is only the animal capable of reason, which, just as it alone is born to be blessed, alone is born to be miserable, so alone is born to be rewarded, alone is born to be punished, because it alone is that to which has been given the discretive force between good and evil, true and false. Hence even if the beast feels pain, when it is killed or wounded, it is not however punished; for it is not capable of misery; for only he is miserable, who either knows that he is miserable, or ought to know it, when he has evil.

3. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul of man is immortal; it must be said that it is not similar. For *sensible* in *man* names a power, namely of the rational soul, as below it shall be made plain; but *sensible* in *brutes* names a form, which is substantialized in transmutable matter; and because it depends on it as to *being*, when that is corrupted, it is corrupted.

4. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is nobler than every body; it must be said that greater or lesser nobility does not make for greater duration of a creature — for man is more noble even according to the state of fallen nature, than a stone is; nevertheless the stone now endures longer — but this is the work of the privation of a corrupting cause. And the sensible soul has this on account of the fact that it is founded upon and depends on a body composed of contraries, above which contrariety the celestial nature has been raised.

5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul does not grow old; it must be said that it is true, so far as is of itself; nevertheless it grows old by reason of that in which it is rooted, namely by reason of the body, by reason of which also it has corruption; and this from its primary condition.

6. To that which is objected, that the brutes serve men; it must be said that recompensable service is not anything except that which is praiseworthy. But only the rational and deliberative power, in which consists the freedom of choice, is that in which praise and blame fall; and therefore however great and useful the service may be, it is not worthy of recompense, unless it has been done from freedom of choice: therefore it is not fitting that the souls of brutes be recompensed. And thus that is plain.

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