Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/19/q/bon-sent-II-d19-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On Adam's immortality on the side of the body.*

Next it is asked, as concerns the second article, of Adam's immortality on the side of the body. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether, the soul not sinning, the body of Adam could have been dissolved.

Second it is asked, whether, the soul having sinned, it could have been perpetuated in life through the eating of the tree of life.

### Question I. *Whether the body of Adam, he himself not sinning, could have been dissolved.*

Concerning the first, it is proceeded thus, and it is shown that, even if Adam had not sinned, his body could have been dissolved, by this reasoning.

**To the opposite:**

1. Adam in the state of innocence had a mortal body, as Augustine and the Master in the text say, therefore corruptible; but "every corruptible thing will of necessity be corrupted, as the Philosopher holds, although not every generable thing is of necessity generated": therefore the body of Adam would have been corrupted, granted that he had remained in the state of innocence.

2. Likewise, contrariety is the cause of conflict, and conflict in a composite is the cause of dissolution: therefore in that state, in which contrariety can exist, dissolution can exist; but the body of Adam, even according to the state of innocence, had a composition from contraries: therefore, that state remaining, it could have had dissolution.

3. Likewise, to whatever state restoration belongs, loss belongs; but to the body of Adam in the state of innocence restoration through the taking of foods belonged: therefore loss also was in that same body according to the state of innocence. But in whatever loss is, consumption also is, and in whatever consumption is posited, corruption is posited: therefore the body of Adam, persisting in the state of innocence, could have been dissolved and corrupted, no fault intervening.

4. Likewise, it is established that Adam could not live unless he ate, since he had an animal body; but he could not-eat: therefore he could, without any sin, let his body fail. If you should say that he would sin in not eating, because he was bound to eat; *on the contrary*: he was not always bound to eat — for let us mark out some hour in which he was bound. In that hour either Adam would be hungry, or not. If he were hungry, then he would suffer before he sinned; if he were not hungry, then nature would not be in need, since a well-disposed nature seeks food in time of necessity: therefore he would not then be bound to eat, nor at another time; therefore never.

5. Likewise, if Adam had stood, some one of his sons could have sinned. Let it be supposed, then, that he had sinned; but it is possible that a just man be slain by a sinner lying in wait without his own fault, as Abel was slain by Cain: therefore it would be possible that Adam himself, at least while sleeping, be cut down by him and, cut down, perish, no fault of his own intervening. 

6. Likewise, impassibility is a dowry of glorified bodies; but the body of Adam in the state of innocence was not glorified: therefore persisting in that state it did not have impassibility: therefore by persisting in that state it could die and not die: therefore the body of Adam was dissoluble, the soul not sinning.

**On the contrary:**

**Fundamenta.**
1. Isidore *On the Trinity*: "If man were to live innocently in paradise, neither would fire burn him, nor water drown him, nor the absence of air suffocate him, nor would all the things that harm mortals impede him": therefore it seems that, he remaining in the state of innocence, his body was not resoluble.

2. Likewise, death is the penalty of sin; but every penalty is ordered; a penalty, however, is not ordered except through fault: to none, therefore, can penalty nor death nor corruption be present, except to him in whom fault is first present: therefore, the soul not sinning, it was impossible for the body of Adam to be dissolved.

3. Likewise, to this — that a composite be duly constituted — it is necessary that matter and form be proportioned to one another. If, therefore, the soul as form and perfection is united to the body, it was impossible for that body to be resolved and corrupted, unless some corruption first fell upon the side of the soul; but the corruption which can fall upon the side of the soul is only of fault: therefore it was impossible for the body of Adam to be resolved and to suffer, unless fault had been preambulary in the soul.

4. Likewise, the state of innocence was a middle between the state of glory and the state of misery; but dissolution of the body is wholly opposed to the state of glory: since therefore the state of innocence would not be directly opposed to the state of glory, Adam persisting in the state of innocence, his body was not resoluble.

5. Likewise, every passion is from something repugnant and predominant; but Adam existing in the state of innocence, either all things would agree with him, or be subject to him: therefore nothing could harm his body nor inflict any passion: therefore his body would be neither passible nor dissoluble.

6. Likewise, it is impossible, the rectitude of anything standing, for it to be bent aside; but all rectitude consists in being subject to God and in presiding over the other creatures, both over its own body and also over the brutes: therefore the rational spirit standing in the purity of innocence and obedience, it was impossible for the body to recede from his will. But the soul always seeks to be united to the body: therefore it was impossible for the body in such a state to be dissolved.

> **Conclusion.** The body of Adam in the state of innocence could not in act be dissolved, although it had the potency that it might be dissolved.

**I respond:** For an understanding of what has been said it must be noted that just as, according to the word of the Philosopher, *Twofold sense.* this is twofold: something is now immortal, because the adverb *now* can determine this either by reason of the act of dying, or by reason of potency; so too the foregoing locution: whether the body of man was dissoluble or could be dissolved, he himself not sinning, must be distinguished. For those absolute ablatives can determine either this verb *could*, or this verb *be dissolved*. *Conclusion 1.* If they determine the verb *could*, the locution has truth. For the sense is that Adam, while he existed in the state of innocence, had the *potency* that his body might be dissolved. — *Conclusion 2.* If, however, those ablatives are referred to the *act*, which is *to be dissolved*, then the locution is false. For the sense is that Adam could be dissolved in the state of innocence, so that there were at once innocence and the penalty of death or corruption; and this is impossible, the order of divine justice providing, which sustains no disorder in the universe. If, therefore, a penalty is disordered unless fault precedes, and dissolution of the body cannot but be a penalty to a pure and innocent soul; it seems unfitting and against the order of divine justice that the body of man should be dissolved in the state of innocence. — And this the Saints say, and the reasons adduced to this end show, and therefore they must be conceded, since they conclude truly.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, that every corruptible thing is of necessity corrupted; it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of that corruptible whose governance is not subject to will, but only to natural power; and that of necessity has to be corrupted, because it has the cause of corruption within itself. But the body of Adam, even though it was mortal and corruptible, nevertheless was subject to the will by the order of divine justice; and therefore, unless the will were disordered, that body would never be corrupted. 

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that being composed from contraries belonged to the body according to that state; it must be said that *Distinction.* contraries comport themselves in one way in the composition of the body according to the state of fallen nature, otherwise according to the state of instituted nature. For according to the state of fallen nature they not only act upon something extrinsic, but they also act and suffer upon one another mutually, not only in the very constitution, but also after constituted being. In the state of innocence, however, they were so commingled and proportioned in the first composition and reduced to such concord, that, that state remaining, they would not fight one another. And therefore on account of that composition that body did not need to be dissolved.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that according to the state of innocence in that body loss took place; it must be said that just as universal nature suffers the elements to be corrupted according to part, but in no way suffers them to be corrupted according to the whole; so also nature well instituted in man, regulated by the order of justice and providence, admitted loss to take place in man according to some part on account of the state of animality in which he was; but in no way did it suffer corruption to take place in the whole. For just as corruption and loss took place, so too restoration took place; and therefore dissolution did not follow.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that Adam could abstain from food; it must be said that he could not abstain from eating, when there was place and time; both because it was expressly commanded him that he should eat of the trees of paradise, other than the tree of knowledge of good and evil; and also because, if the Lord had not commanded, nature well instituted would dictate what it dictates, that no one ought to lay a hand upon himself. — Nor does the objection avail which is raised concerning hunger; for he ought to forestall hunger, and he himself well knew the hour and the indigence of his nature, which if he were to let pass, he would omit and sin.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a sinner can kill an innocent man; it must be said that this is true according to the state of fallen nature, in which every man, by the merit of original sin, is a debtor of death. Hence to permit an innocent man to be killed by an impious one is not against the order of divine justice according to the present state; but in that state, since no fault had preceded, the order of divine justice ought not to admit such disordering or punishment.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that impassibility is a dowry of glorified bodies; it must be said that this is true according as impassibility deprives of both the act and the potency of passion according to every state. That impassibility, however, was present to the body of Adam only according to a determinate state, and therefore was not perfect nor ought to be called a dowry.