Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/19/q/bon-sent-II-d19-a3-q1
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### ARTICLE III. *On the immortality of the first man as regards the composite [of soul and body].*

Next there is inquired about the immortality of the first man as regards the composite. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether that immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.

Second it is asked whether that immortality was the same in essence as glorious immortality.

### QUESTION I. *Whether immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.*

Concerning the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether that immortality was from *nature* or from *grace*. And that it was from nature, it seems.

*On the opposing side.*

1. That is *natural* to us which is innate in us and with which we are born; but man was produced with that immortality, and that immortality was instilled in him from his constitution: therefore it was natural to him, or from nature.

2. Likewise, death could not be in man unless culpability preceded, as has been proved above; but culpability could not be in man unless nature were disordered: therefore if death was in man contrary to nature, immortality was in him through nature.

3. Likewise, man was immortal through that by which he was innocent; but he was innocent from the constitution of nature; for grant that he had no grace, he would nonetheless still have innocence: therefore he was immortal from the constitution of nature, not from the benefit of grace.

4. Likewise, the immortality of man consists in the continuous union of soul and body, but the continuous union of soul and body is through the continuous appetite of one for the other; but the soul has a continuous appetite for the body, and conversely, through nature without grace: therefore immortality was in man through nature.

5. Likewise, the same is the principle by which *being* is given to a thing, and by which it is continued in *being*; but the rational soul, which is by nature an immortal and incorruptible form, naturally gave to the body *being* and completion: therefore it also naturally continued the *being* of the body itself, or of man; but from that from which the continuation in *being* comes, from the same is the perpetuation of immortality: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is natural for man to eat the things set before him; but man through the eating of the tree of life and of the other trees of paradise was able to perpetuate his life, as Augustine and the Master say: therefore it seems that man's perpetuation was in man through nature.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations.*

1. Augustine on Genesis, and the Master says in the text: «Man was created immortal, which belonged to him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature; he was mortal by the condition of the animal body, immortal by the benefit of the Creator». And the same Augustine says more expressly that just as it was granted to the sons of Israel that during forty years their garments did not wear out, so it was granted to Adam that he should not die.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Luke ch. 10: *They stripped him, and inflicted wounds upon him,* etc., the Gloss interprets it of the first man, whom it says was stripped of the gratuitous gifts and wounded in the natural ones: if therefore immortality was not wounded but simply taken away from man himself through culpability, therefore it was not in him from nature, but from grace.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by reason*. Natural properties do not abandon their subject on account of culpability: therefore if immortality was in man from nature, it does not seem that it ought to have left him on account of culpability; but if he lost it, it is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible for two opposites to be in the same subject according to the same principles, especially according to principles naturally causing, which do not incline toward opposites; but man through his own nature could die: therefore either he was not immortal, or if he was, he was not [so] through nature, but through grace alone.

5. Likewise, Adam's body, through its own nature, was nobly composed, therefore he had soft and tender flesh; but naturally what is soft yields to what is hard: therefore through nature Adam's body could be wounded and cut: therefore through nature Adam was not immortal.

6. Likewise, fire naturally consumes a body constituted of the four elements, and the animal body by nature requires inhalation and respiration: therefore if man fell into water or into fire and did not die, this would not be *through the power of nature*, but rather *against* or *above* it: therefore it would not be from nature, but rather from grace.

### Conclusion.

> *Adam's immortality in the state of innocence as regards aptitude was from nature, but as regards completion from grace.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text, on this matter there was a manifold and varied opinion. *A twofold opinion.* For some have wished to say that the immortality of the first man was from *nature*; others, that it was from *grace*. Both of these opinions had some efficacious moving reason, and each has some truth, although one has more than the other. — *An example.* For just as when it is said: man is *beatifiable*, two things are touched on, both *aptitude* and *disposition*; so likewise when it is said: man is *immortal*. Hence, just as man in one way can be called *beatifiable through nature*, and in another way *through grace*; so also in the matter at hand. For insofar as that which is *beatifiable* implies *aptitude*, it belongs to man *through nature*; for man from his nature has *aptitude* for beatitude. But according as it implies *sufficient disposition*, by which one arrives at beatitude, or sufficient order to the *act*, thus it belongs to man not *through nature*, but *through grace*, by which he is sufficiently disposed for glory, nor without it can nature suffice. — *Conclusion.* So also in the matter at hand, as regards the state of innocence, man could be called *immortal through nature*, and also *immortal through grace*, because from nature he had the *aptitude*, but from grace he had the *completion*.

And this is clear as follows. *Threefold cause of death.* For death can happen to man in three ways: either through the conflict and dissolution of the *elements*, or through the consumption of the *moisture*, or through *extrinsic injury*. Immortality therefore signifies the privation of this threefold mode of dying as regards *act* and *potency* in the *Blessed*, who are called immortal because they cannot die; but as regards only the *act* in the *men in their original state*, who are called immortal because they were able not to die by this threefold kind of dying: for they had the aptitude to escape this threefold kind of death through that which they had from nature.

*As regards the 1st kind of death.* For the body was very well composed, and the soul was of itself incorruptible, which ruled and preserved that body; and so the first man was, constituted of these, suited never to fail through the *conflict of the elements*. But yet that was not sufficient; for a sinful soul could not do this, if it were placed in a similar body. *Grace's gift is added.* And therefore there was given to that soul the gift of *grace*, by which it might preside over the body and rule it and guard the elements as in a kind of friendship, and this, as long as it willed, by being subject to its Author. Now this gift of grace Anselm calls *original justice*. And thus it is clear that, as regards immortality against the first kind of dying, he had the *aptitude* from *nature*, but the *completion* from *grace*.

*As regards the 2nd kind.* Likewise as regards the *second* kind of dying, which is through the *consumption of the moisture*. For the nutritive power was capable of converting sufficient food for itself, and the foods had efficacious power to nourish; and from this man was suited to have the natural moisture preserved in him without corruption. But because the radical moisture is gradually consumed and cannot be repaired by any food whatsoever: *The power of the tree of life is added.* therefore a special power was given to a certain tree, which is called *the tree of life*, through whose eating the radical moisture would be repaired. And this indeed was not from the *condition of nature*, but from the *benefit of the Creator*, as Augustine says.

*As regards the 3rd kind.* Likewise also as regards the *third* kind, which indeed comes about through *extrinsic injury*. For Adam was strong and powerful to repel harmful things, wise and diligent to take precautions, nor did he have extrinsic harms; and therefore he had the *suitability* that he might not incur death through the injury of anything. Yet that beasts, and if there were any other things that could harm, did not harm him at all, neither in sleep nor in waking; *Special providence is added.* this was not from *nature*, but from God's *special providence*, which thus guarded him, that all things should be under his feet, so that nothing should desire to offend him, and if it did desire, it would not be able.

And so it is clear that the immortality which was in the state of innocence, as regards *aptitude* was from *nature*, and as regards *completion* was from *grace*. — And through this for the most part the response to the objections is clear. For the reasons that prove that it was not simply from nature are to be conceded, because they conclude truly.

*Solution of the objections.*

1. To what is objected, that it was from nature because it was innate to him; it must be said that not everything that is in man from the beginning of his nativity is *natural*, unless this name *natural* be extended; for many goods given freely are co-created and given with nature, as is plain. And therefore that does not hold.

2. To what is objected, that death could not intervene without preceding culpability; it must be said that this was not solely on account of *nature*, but on account of the *benefit of grace*, which was superadded to nature. For because original justice made nature to be immortal, and he could not lose this except through culpability; therefore death could not intervene except through culpability.

3. To what is objected, that innocence was from nature, therefore likewise also immortality; it must be said that *innocence* can be spoken of in two ways: in one way *privatively*, because it excludes culpability; in another way *positively*, because it posits the contrary justice. *Distinction to be noted.* Now innocence was not the cause of immortality according as it expresses mere *privation*, but according as it implies *original justice*, by the merit of which there was in the soul a power containing the whole body.

4. To what is objected, that the continuation of life is from the union of soul and body; it must be said that for the continuation of life appetite does not suffice, just as for beatification it does not suffice to desire beatitude; but a power further is necessary to satisfy the appetite. For every nature desires *to be* and to endure, not only of men, but also of brutes; yet not in all is there immortality. And therefore it does not follow that, if continuation of appetite is from nature, then continuation of immortality is from nature.

5. And through this the response is clear to the other objection, that from the same source is the giving of *being* and the conservation. For it must be said that, though that be true of *conservation*, which is for a time, yet it is not true of *perpetuation*; for there are many things that can give *being*, and yet cannot *perpetuate* it.

6. To what is objected lastly, that through the eating of the tree of life and of other trees he was able to be preserved in *being*; it must be said that that was not the whole cause; rather divine power was necessary, protecting and prohibiting harmful things, and interior power conserving and reconciling contraries. *Moreover*, that the tree of life had such effect, this was a special gift of God; just as also, that for so long a time the garments and shoes of the people of Israel were able to render service to them. And thus that is clear.