Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/19/q/bon-sent-II-d19-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the immortality of innocence would have been the same in essence as the immortality of glory.*

Secondly it is asked whether the immortality of innocence would be the same in essence as the immortality of glory, had man stood firm. And that it would be so, seems clear.

*To the opposite.*
1. Augustine, *On True Religion*: «Through Christ we recover what we lost in Adam»: therefore that immortality which we lost in Adam, we recover through Christ; but that immortality which we recover through Christ is the immortality of glory: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the potency of matter when disposed is the same in essence as itself when undisposed; but the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory are related as an undetermined potency and a potency disposed by the disposition which is *necessity*, since in the state of innocence one could die and not die, while in the state of glory one must necessarily not die; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, free choice confirmed and not confirmed is the same in essence, and so likewise charity: therefore by parity of reason also immortality; but this immortality and that are so related: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, mortality in the state of innocence is no other than mortality in the state of misery, since after sin no new potency has been given or taken away: therefore by parity of reason, in the state of innocence and the state of glory there is not one and another immortality.

5. Likewise, had man stood firm, he would have been translated to immortality in such a way that no loss of any noble property would occur in him: therefore since immortality in man would express a noble condition, if he were translated, that immortality would not be lost; but two immortalities are not in the same man together and at once: therefore the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory do not differ.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*
1. What has different proximate principles, differing in essence, is itself different in essence; but immortality in the state of innocence and in the state of glory have different *principles* differing in essence, since the one is from glory, the other is from grace freely given: therefore they differ in essence.

2. Likewise, there is no passage from the same to the same; but there would be a passage from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory: therefore that immortality and this are not the same.

3. Likewise, things whose opposites are diverse are themselves diverse: but the immortality of the state of innocence is not opposed to mortality, since they were both present in the same person — for Adam was both mortal and immortal — whereas the immortality of glory is opposed to it: therefore it is not the same as that immortality.

4. Likewise, although Adam's life would have been one and continuous had he stood firm both in the way and in the fatherland, yet the state of life and its condition would have been one and another, since the condition of animality and of spirituality do not have identity but rather opposition and diversity: therefore since immortality does not signify only life but rather the condition of life according to the animal and spiritual state, it seems that immortality is one and another.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems to be shown by what is said in the letter: «One immortality is that which we lost, another that which we hope for in the resurrection». From this authority it is expressly gathered that the immortality of the way is one, and that of the fatherland another.

> **Conclusion.** The immortality of man in the state of innocence and in glory is the same with respect to *potency*, differing by *disposition*.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be *noted* that, since the same thing is signified in the principal and the assumed, that is, in the abstract and the concrete, the same thing is signified by «*immortal*» and by «*immortality*». For «*immortal*» means that which is by nature apt or able not to die; therefore «*immortality*» is the same as the potency or aptitude of not dying. And this potency of not dying is nothing other than the potency of the soul in ruling and sustaining the body, so that it never fails nor is separated from it. Now this potency follows upon free choice itself and is conformed to it. Hence just as in the state of *innocence* man could sin and not sin, so the soul could *contain* the body and not *contain* it, and man could die and not die. But since in the state of *glory* it is impossible for free choice to sin, it is also impossible for the soul to desert the body. And since in the state of *misery* it must of necessity sin and at some point be in sin, at least in its origin; therefore it is impossible for the soul to continue life to the body. — Therefore, just as the potency itself of free choice in the state of *innocence* and *glory* is the same in essence, differing only according to state and superadded disposition; so that potency of sustaining and ruling the body, which is called *immortality*, is the same in essence, differing only by a superadded disposition. — And therefore, when it is asked whether the immortality of innocence and of glory, or of the way and of the fatherland, would be the same, it can be answered that it is the same with respect to *potency*, but other with respect to the superadded *disposition*; or, that we may speak more properly, it is one and the same, but altered or made altered, just as Coriscus white and Coriscus black are the same, but altered. — And therefore the arguments showing that this immortality and that would be one in essence are to be granted. To the arguments to the opposite it is easy to respond.

*Solution of the opposites.*
1. For to the first objection, that the proximate principle of this immortality and of that is one and another; the response is plain, because the chief principle, namely the containing potency, is one and the same, although disposed in different ways, here by grace, there by glory.

2. To the objection that there is no passage from the same to the same; it must be said that the passage from this immortality to that is by a diversification of *states*, since it is a passage from state to state; and therefore, just as what is moved from a state of imperfection to a state of perfection is not called one and another, but the *state* is called one and another; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To the objection that they have diverse opposites; it must be said that this diversity of opposition comes from the account of a superadded *disposition*, just as is understood in the freedom of choice, which is freedom from *coercion* and from *fault* and from *misery*. For freedom from *fault* adds some disposition, namely grace; while freedom from *misery* adds another disposition, namely either innocence or glory, by reason of which dispositions it is opposed to diverse things. So too the immortality of *glory* adds something beyond the immortality of *innocence*, as the disposition which is *necessity* over the disposition which is *congruity*.

4. To the objection that immortality signifies a condition of life or a state; it must be said that this is true, but not principally; rather, it more principally signifies the containing potency of the body, as has been said; and therefore that argument does not compel.

5. To the last, namely to the authority of the Master, the response is now plain. For what is said, that it is one and another, is either understood to be said because it is altered and altered, or understood to be one and another, not with respect to the *potency* itself, which immortality principally imports, but with respect to the superadded disposition. And so the response to the questions asked is plain.

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