Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/2/q/bon-sent-II-d2-p1-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article I. *On the measure of the angelic nature in itself.*
### Question I. *Whether spiritual things have their own proper measure.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus. That they have their own proper measure seems true, first:

1. Through the Philosopher in the book *de Causis*, in the next-to-last proposition: «Between a thing whose substance and operation is in eternity, and a thing whose substance and operation is in time, there is a middle thing, whose substance is in eternity and whose action is in time»; but this cannot be understood of uncreated eternity: therefore of created [eternity]; and he distinguishes this from time and posits it as the measure of spiritual and incorruptible substances: therefore it seems so, etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter one: *All wisdom is from the Lord God*, up to the place, *before the ages*: therefore if *before the ages* signifies something uncreated, *the age* (*aevum*) signifies something created; not a substance: therefore a measure; not of material things, but of spiritual ones; and this differs from time, whence Boethius, *On Consolation*:

> *You who bid time*
> *go forth from the age*:

therefore, etc. For everything that goes forth from another differs from it.

3. Likewise, Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, in the chapter on the age: «It is the property of the age to be ancient, of old standing, measuring according to its whole being, but [the property] of time to hold itself otherwise and otherwise in alteration»: therefore if the same thing does not hold itself thus and otherwise at once and at the same moment, time and the age are not the same measure. But the age is the measure of things enduring perpetually, and such is the angelic nature: therefore [it has its own measure].

4. Likewise, as *unity* stands to distinction, so *now* stands to duration; but in spiritual things one finds not only distinction according to substance, but also its measure: therefore by parity of reasoning the being of an Angel also has a measure of duration; but not time, since it is not varied nor changed: therefore [it has] another, proper measure.

5. Likewise, everything that has a being limited in act has a measure, by which its limitation can be known; but such is the being of everything created: therefore, etc.; let it be argued as before.

6. Likewise, the measure of duration regards the mode of enduring; but spiritual things have a mode of their duration differing from corporeal things, especially from changeable ones, since they endure perpetually and immutably: therefore they must be measured by that measure.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine to Orosius: «God moves the spiritual nature through times, but the corporeal nature through places and times»: therefore the measure of the spiritual nature is time.

2. Likewise, Bede: «Four things were created first: the angelic nature, prime matter, the empyrean heaven, and time». If, then, time stands for the measure, then either spiritual things in the beginning had no measure, or they had none other than corporeal things, or Bede was deficient in that enumeration.

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*. There is one place that is the container of visible and invisible things, namely the empyrean: therefore if the measure, which is time, is not of less appropriation than place, then it seems that there is one time in which spiritual and corporeal things exist: therefore they do not have their own proper measure.

4. Likewise, just as it is the same number by which ten dogs and ten men are measured, so it is the same number by which ten Angels and ten men are numbered: if, then, spiritual things do not have a measure of distinction other than corporeal things, then neither another measure of duration.

5. Likewise, a beatified man and an Angel are measured by the same measure, since all the blessed [are]; but a beatified man has the same *being* as himself not beatified, therefore also the same measure: therefore a wayfaring man is measured by the same measure as an Angel, therefore also any corporeal nature: therefore it does not have its own proper measure.

6. Likewise, *by way of the impossible*: if it has a measure, it is either a *substance* or an *accident*; not a *substance*: therefore an *accident*. If an *accident*, in what genus? In none but the genus of *quantity*; not *discrete*: therefore *continuous*. But it is not a line nor a surface, nor a body nor place: therefore it is either time, or nothing: therefore either the angelic nature has no measure, or, if it has one, it does not have its own proper one.

### Conclusio

> Spiritual creatures, according to their immutable being, have their own proper measure, distinct from time, which is called aeviternity.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether the angelic nature has its own proper measure, distinct from time, a distinction must be made, because either we are speaking of the measure of spiritual things according to *being*, which is not changed, or according to *affections*. If, then, we are speaking of the measure that regards *being*, which is called the age, in this mode it has been customary among the ancient doctors to reply: either you are speaking of diversity in the genus of *measure*, or in the genus of *being*. If in the genus of *measure*, then a difference must be posited, as the authorities and reasons adduced for the first part show. But if you are speaking of diversity in the genus of *being*, then there was a threefold opinion.

For some have said that, just as place and surface are the same by essence, differing according to comparison, so *the now of the age* and *of time* are the same, differing by comparison alone. For *the now* regards the substance of the thing; but the substance of the first movable, as to *being*, is wholly immobile: yet compared to position, it is mobile. And in the first mode *the now of the age* is measured, in the second mode *the now of time*, so that the *now* is the same, compared in diverse ways, just as the same outermost [surface], compared to the containing body, is a surface, [and] compared to the contained body, is place. — But that cannot stand, because around the outermost [point] of a body those two comparisons are not incompossible; whereas *the now of time* and of the age have incompossible properties about the same thing. For, as Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions*, the one, namely *the now of the age*, is stable, the other, namely *the now of time*, is flowing; but it is impossible that one and the same thing, and in the same respect, should at once be moved and stand still.

And therefore there is a second position, that the *now* itself follows the essence of prime matter. As, therefore, matter is the same in all things by *essence*, differing by *being*; so the *now* of time and of the age is the same by essence, not as an individual, but after the manner of matter the same by *essence*, differing however only as to *being*. And these have held that the quiddity of every thing is measured by a measure the same by essence. — But neither is that very intelligible. For since the age regards stable and quiet *being*, which indeed matter has from a perfected form, and this measure regards only *actual being* and the completed mode of being; it seems that the age cannot be taken thus from the side of matter, whatever may be the case concerning time. Since, then, the mode of enduring differs *essentially* and *formally* on both sides, it is also clear that [there is] a proper measure.

And therefore there is a third position, that spiritual things have a measure distinct from time, not only in the genus of *measure*, but also in the genus of *being*; and this not only by *comparison*, but also according to *substance* and form. But whatever may be the case concerning diversity in the genus of *being*, the diversity according to the mode of *measuring* there is no one who can deny. And this suffices for the present question, in which it is asked whether spiritual things have a measure distinct from corporeal things. For it must be said that they do.

But if you ask what that [measure] is; it must be answered, according to the Saints and the philosophers, that it is called *created eternity* or *the age*; but since *eternity* is properly taken for the uncreated, and *the age* is frequently taken for time, therefore by its proper name it can be called *aeviternity*. Thus it must be answered, if it is asked about the measure that regards the very *being* of a spiritual creature — *being*, I say, immutable and perpetual.

— But if it is asked about the measure of angelic *affections*, whether that is distinct from time; this will have its question below. Now, however, it is plain that the measure called *aeviternity* does not measure the variation of affections, as Augustine says to Orosius. For the age is the measure of immutable *being* alone.

It must therefore be conceded, as the reasons show, that in some way spiritual things have their own proper measure with respect to time and temporal things.

1. As to what is objected, then, that the spiritual nature is moved through times; the response is already clear: for this is said as to *affections*, not as to *being*.

2. As to what is objected about the four things created first, it must be said that the name *time* is there extended to the measure of every duration that has a beginning; whence it is taken very broadly and includes the age, as will better appear below.

3. As to what is objected about place, it does not hold, because corporeal *place* is not the measure of spiritual things, although it contains them; but the age measures and conforms; therefore it does not hold: there is one place that does not measure, therefore one time that measures. — If you ask me whence this; it must be said that an Angel truly has duration, but does not have extension; and therefore it has a measure of duration, not of extension.

4. As to what is objected about number, it must be said that it is not similar, because the mode of *distinction* is the same in spiritual and corporeal things; but the mode of *duration* is not the same. Therefore the measure of *distinction* is the same according to species, [but] the measure of *duration* is not the same in that way.

5. As to what is objected about a beatified man and an Angel, it must be said that they are measured by a like measure, namely the age, because they have a like mode of enduring; but a wayfaring man is not measured by a like measure, because, although he has the same *being*, he yet has another *mode* of being and of enduring; and the measure regards not only *being*, but also the *mode* of enduring.

6. As to what is asked, in what genus the measure of angelic duration is; some say that it is not a quantity except a quantity of power, and therefore it is not properly in the genus of quantity. — But if it is truly a measure, how is it not a true quantity?

Therefore others say that it is in the genus of quantity as a principle. — Yet if it is asked of what it is the principle, since it states a measure distinct from time, as has been shown, it will be difficult to assign.

And therefore it can more soundly be said that, just as time is posited in spiritual substances as to affections, according to Augustine, although the consideration of the Philosopher did not ascend to that; so too a measure is posited differing in species from the other quantities, although the Philosopher does not speak of it, because he intended to determine the measures of lower things. Nor on this account is there posited any insufficiency in him; and even if it were posited, one would not on this account have to depart in any way from the path of truth.