Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/2/q/bon-sent-II-d2-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether of all aeviternal things there is one age.*

Secondly it is asked whether spiritual things have *one* measure by essence; and this is to ask whether there is *one age* of all aeviternal things. And that there is not seems true.

1. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*: «He is the age of ages»: therefore there are several ages: not by interruption, so that one [is] after another: therefore by the diversity of things existing simultaneously.

2. Likewise, the unity of an accident comes from the unity of the subject; but one cannot posit one subject of all aeviternal things, since certain spiritual things do not have anything in common at the regard of which they would be measured: therefore one cannot posit that the age is one. And that they have no such subject which would be containing of spiritual things, this appears, because that [subject] would have an excellence and an influence and a containment with respect to aeviternal things, just as the first movable [has] with respect to temporal things; but no such thing can be found with respect to spiritual substances, as is plain to one running through them singly: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, all other things being corrupted, it is possible for a single Angel to remain, since it does not depend on the others; and if it remains in complete *being*, it has a measure consequent upon that *being*, and this is the age: therefore the age remains, with any Angel whatever remaining, and it remains whole and perfect: therefore as many as the Angels are, so many are the ages.

4. Likewise, the age is the measure of a perfect thing and of one having much of species or of form: if therefore the age most of all follows complete *being*, since that is not one in number, but only in species, it seems that the age is one only according to species.

**Against this:**

1. It is argued *from a likeness*. As time stands to temporal things, so the age to aeviternal things; but time is one, which measures all temporal things, as Anselm says, and the Philosopher: therefore likewise the age is one, which measures all aeviternal things.

2. Likewise, this seems so *from the lesser*. There is greater variety and disformity in changeable things than in unchangeable things: if therefore all changeable things can be measured by a single measure by essence, then much more so aeviternal things.

3. Likewise, this seems so *from the cause*. For it is the position of many why *time* can be one: because, although it is an accident, it is nevertheless an extrinsic measure, like place, and because it is not a positional accident; but all this is found in *the age*: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if there are several ages, then either *simultaneously* or *successively*. Not *successively*, because each would be infinite on the side of the after; not *simultaneously*, because things that are simultaneous are in the same instant, therefore if aeviternal things are simultaneous, they are in the same *now* of the age: therefore if of all aeviternal things there is one *now*, then one *age* by essence.

### Conclusio

> Although of all temporal things there is one time, nevertheless as many as the aeviternal things are, so many are the ages.

**I respond:** For the understanding of this question it must be premised how unity is understood in *time*. Now it must be known that in three ways some have attempted to take the unity of *time*, according as an accident can be compared in three ways to its subject. For it has there a *cause*, an *existence*, and an *appearance*.

Some, then, have said that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily and *per se is*, on the removal of which time too is removed. Whence they said that time is one because it is in the first movable, on whose motion ceasing, time too ceases. — But it does not suffice to say that, because, as Augustine says, if the motion of the first movable were to cease, a potter's wheel could still be moved; and it is evident that that motion would be measured: therefore it is not only there, but also in other movable things. *Likewise*, time is in the affections and thoughts of free choice, which is not subject to the celestial motion, as Augustine holds.

And therefore others have said that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily *appears*. For since time is the number or measure of motions, and that number, according to *essence* and *habit*, is in the movable or moved thing, in which there is before and after, but according to *actual numbering* is on the part of the soul, as the Philosopher holds and Augustine — since the soul numbers all motions and changes by looking to the measure of the motion of the first movable, namely by day, year, and hour — they wished to say that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily appears; because, even if all things have their own periods, nevertheless all are numbered and measured by the measure of the regular and certain motion best known to us, namely the motion of the first movable. — But that does not suffice, because the Philosopher says, *On the Heavens and the World*, that if there were two first movables, there would still be one time. Then it could not be called one by reason of the *subject* in which it primarily *was*, nor in which it primarily *appeared*, since each would be equally primary and evident; nor by reason of the *soul*, because time is not numbering number, but numbered, as the Philosopher holds, and time is a disposition of the thing outside, not a fiction of the soul.

And therefore a third group said more profoundly that the unity of time is taken from the unity of the subject by which it is *caused*; but the subject by which it is caused is matter as changeable, and so as a being in potency. For matter, as it is in the acquisition of form, is changed, and so is a being in potency; and therefore time, among all accidents, holds itself most with matter. As, therefore, matter is one by *essence*, differing by *being*, one not by the unity of *universality* nor of *singularity*, but in a *middle* way, so too time in all temporal things.

*And if you ask* whence this is, that *time* is one, while yet *the motions* are various; it must be said that *motion* is defined by that to which it tends, whence motion regards the mover and the movable and the terminus; but *time* regards the very duration, varied and successive, which comes from the potency of the movable thing. And because the motion of an enduring nature is alike, and the one nature on which it is founded is one in number; therefore time is not only one in *species* in all temporal things, but even as to *essence* one in *number*, differing by *being*, as all the wise have held who have spoken about this matter.

*But if you ask* why it is not so in the other *quantities* — they all regard matter — it must be said that all the others, even if they have *incomplete being* in matter — for there are infinite dimensions in matter — nevertheless their *complete being* is from matter existing under form. But time has *being* from this, that matter tends toward form, on account of the fact that it is caused by motion, which is «the entelechy of what exists in potency», and therefore it holds itself most on the side of matter, and therefore is least distinct.

Nor do I say that time is in matter itself, all form set aside, because this would be against Augustine, in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*, since there is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form in it; but although it is in matter, which is under form and is caused by it, it is nevertheless caused more by matter, as it tends toward form, and this is in matter by reason of its potency.

According to this threefold mode there were some who [tried] to posit the unity in *the age*, first by reason of the subject in which it primarily *is*. For they posited an order in the intelligences according to virtual containment, just as among visible things one finds local containment. And as time is founded in the first movable, so the age in the first intelligence, which virtually contains the others [and] flows into the others. — But this position cannot stand. First, because all the intelligences in incorruption have equality, as is said in the following distinction. Second, because the conservation of the intelligences depends immediately on God. Third, because, if that intelligence were destroyed, then the foundation of the age would perish; and it was possible for it to have sinned, indeed perhaps it did sin, since the devil is believed to have been the most excellent of the Angels.

And therefore others tried to assign the unity by reason of the subject in which it primarily *appears*, which indeed is the empyrean heaven, in which no variation falls; rather it is wholly at rest. — But neither does that suffice, since immortality and immutability is prior in spiritual substances than in corporeal ones, since they are worthier; and the worthier should not be measured by regard to the less worthy.

And therefore others attempted to take the unity on the side of the *cause*, who said that the duration of the intelligences is continued and conserved by the *divine* influence, which, since it is one, the age measuring it is one. — But neither can that stand, since that influence is understood either *actively* or *passively*. If of the *active*, it is nothing other than God, who does not have the age as a measure. If of the *passive*, there are as many ages as there are receivers.

And therefore no other mode remains except by the unity of *matter*, as was said before about time. But many deny that the intelligences have matter, and therefore [it is] least distinct. Nor do I say that time is in matter itself, all form set aside, because this would be against Augustine, in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*, since there is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form in it; but whatever may be the case concerning this, *the age* nevertheless regards *actual being* and *stable being*, but *time* [regards] matter as in *potency*. And therefore, just as the unity of time is conformed to matter, so the unity of the age is conformed to form — not, I say, to form insofar as it is this or that, but insofar as it is immutable.

Whence just as a line in bodies however diverse is posited as the same in *species*, so the age has the unity of a *universal*, not the unity which time has.

And thus the reasons proving that there is not one age of aeviternal things, but many, are to be conceded.

1. As to what is objected, then: as time stands to temporal things; it must be said that it is not similar, because, since *time*, so far as it is of itself, regards variation and motion, it follows the very things of which it is the measure, by reason of that principle by which they are beings in potency; and because that single [principle] is said to be by essence, therefore time too [is one]. But *the age*, from its own proper account, regards *complete* and *stable being*, and therefore regards form more: and therefore it does not have unity except of *universality* or of conformity, like the other accidents.

2. As to what is argued *from the lesser*, that temporal things have one measure; it is already clear that there is no place for [an argument] *from the lesser*, because that variation, by reason of which it is said to be in potency, regards the material principle itself, and therefore makes [it] recede from distinction; it is not so in the age.

3. As to what is objected, that time is one because it is an extrinsic accident, not situated or positional; it must be said that it is false: for this is not the cause, but rather that which has been said before.

4. As to what is objected: if there are several ages, then either simultaneously or not simultaneously; it must be said *simultaneously*. — As to what is then objected: therefore in the same *now*; it must be said that to be simultaneous in duration is twofold: either by *concomitance* of measure, or by *unity* and indifference of measure. When it is said that God, man, and Angel are simultaneous, it must be said that this is said by *concomitance* of measure. But when it is said: Peter and Paul are or run simultaneously, this can be said by *unity* and indifference of measure; and therefore it does not follow that, if the ages of aeviternal things are simultaneous, they are one.