Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/2/q/bon-sent-II-d2-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether spiritual things have a permanent or a successive measure.*

Thirdly it is asked whether spiritual things have a *permanent* or a *successive* measure. And that [they have] a *permanent* one, lacking before and after, seems true first *by authority*, then *by reason*.

1. And *by authority* thus: Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the City of God*: «The immortality of the Angels does not pass in time, nor is it past, as though it now were not, nor future, as though it were not yet»: therefore it is wholly present, therefore permanent, not successive.

2. Likewise, Augustine, eleventh book of the *Confessions*: «If the present time were to stand and not pass into the past, it would be eternity»; but not on that account would it be uncreated eternity: therefore it would be created eternity; and this is the age: therefore the age has a *now* that does not pass: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher: «In perpetual things *being* and *being able* do not differ»: therefore the potency is in its whole act, therefore it awaits nothing, therefore [it is] all at once: therefore there is no succession or priority there.

4. Likewise *by reason*: a property must correspond to the substance, therefore the measure of a simple substance must be simple; but a spiritual substance is simple: therefore also its measure. But its measure is the age: therefore it is simple: therefore it does not have before and after.

5. Likewise, every successive thing is reduced to a permanent one, therefore the successive before-and-after to a permanent before-and-after; but the permanent before-and-after is in magnitude alone: therefore what lacks a permanent before-and-after lacks also the successive one. But such is the Angel: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, where there is before and after, there necessarily falls something new, which from being later becomes earlier, and through this a lapse into the *past*, and something new; but in perpetual things there is no change: therefore neither succession.

7. Likewise, where there is a before, there is some expectation with respect to that which is later and not yet possessed; but in the Blessed no expectation at all falls, because faith and hope are wholly emptied out, and all that they will have is had: therefore in no way is there before and after there.

**On the contrary:**

1. Jerome to Marcella: «He alone is, who does not know *to have been* or *to be about to be*»: every creature, therefore, in its own *being* has a pastness, that is, a *having been* and a *going to be*: therefore it has in its own *duration* a succession.

2. Likewise, Anselm in the *Proslogion*, treating that word: *The Lord shall reign forever and beyond*, [says] this is said not because there is something after eternity, but because God's eternity, which is wholly at once, exceeds the eternity of the creature, which is not wholly at once; this is the sense: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: angelic unity falls short of the divine unity, therefore the simplicity of created eternity [falls short] of the simplicity of uncreated eternity: if then this is true, then it has composition in some way. But composition in duration posits before and after: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems so, because the measure of angelic duration is not the Angel itself, but rather differs from the Angel, as a measure from the measured; but a measure, in truth, is in the genus of quantity, and such a thing is divisible, therefore having parts: therefore, etc. *If you say* that it is the *principle* of quantity, like a point; *on the contrary*: a point does not have completely the account of a measure, but is the *principle* of a measure; but the age is truly and properly a measure: therefore it cannot be like a *principle*.

5. Likewise, the duration of an Angel is infinite: if then it is wholly at once in act, then some created thing is infinite in act. But this is impossible: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, in that which has its whole being at once, *to have been* and *to be* and *to be about to be* are the same; but what has been, it is impossible to think not to have been, if it is understood to have been: therefore if in the aeviternal *to have been* and *to be going to be* are the same, then it is impossible to think it not going to be. But this is false, because this is proper to God alone: therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, if the whole *being* is present, then *being* and *having been* do not differ: therefore what now is not, never was, and if it was, [now] is. But God cannot bring it about that what has been should not have been: therefore He cannot bring it about that the aeviternal not be. But this is manifestly false: therefore, etc.

8. Likewise, if the whole being of the aeviternal is at once, and the whole duration without before and after, then there is not there a longer and a shorter; therefore the soul of blessed Peter was neither earlier nor longer in glory than the soul of blessed Francis. If, then, this is manifestly false, it is plain, etc.

### Conclusio

> In the age there is some succession, which does not imply before and after with variation and innovation, as in time, but only an extension of duration.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there was a twofold opinion.

For some have said that the age is wholly simple, just as also that which it measures; and the *being* of the aeviternal substance and its *duration* is wholly at once, not having a succession of before and after. Whence they said that the age is not properly a quantity, but is in the genus of quantity only by reduction; whence it is *simple* as to extension, but is nevertheless *quantitative* in power, and so quantitative that by its power it exceeds all temporal *being* in likeness to uncreated eternity. For just as the soul is simple as to the quantity of *mass*, yet on account of its *power* and simplicity is in every part of its body; so it must be understood in the matter at hand. — But, as was touched on in objecting, if anyone posits the age as wholly simple, he will posit from this that it is not a true measure; he will also posit a created duration actually infinite; he will also posit a created duration so much a being that neither could God destroy it, nor could the intellect think it not to be; all of which, since they are not intelligible, make that aforesaid position to be neither reasonable nor intelligible.

And therefore, since the authorities of the Saints seem to sound otherwise, the position of the others is more probable and more intelligible, that in the age one must posit *before* and *after*, and one must posit some *succession*, yet a succession other than that in time. For in time there is *succession* with variation, and *before and after* with aging and renewal. But in the age there is *before and after*, which states an extension of duration, which nevertheless states no variation nor innovation. And by this distinction it is easy to solve all the objections to the contrary, if one understands it.

But if perchance it be asked: *how* can there be before and after without newness about being; it must be said that, as we see that a brook flows forth from a spring in one way, a ray from the sun in another, so we see in the matter at hand. For the brook flows forth from the spring in such a way that new water always goes out, not the same; the ray flows forth continuously from the sun, not because something new is always emitted, but because what has been emitted is continued; whence the sun's influence is nothing other than the continuation of what is given. Likewise in *motion*, and in the *being* of a *movable* thing, some property possessed is lost, or one not possessed is acquired; but in the *being* of an *aeviternal* thing what was first given is *continued* through God's continual influence. For no creature of the age is wholly act, nor any power of it, whence it continually needs the divine power cooperating. Therefore, even though it has its whole *being*, it nevertheless does not have the *continuation of being* wholly at once, and therefore there is succession there without any innovation about *being* or absolute property; yet there is there a true continuation, with respect to which the creature has *being* in a certain way in potency, and through this it has succession.

God alone, therefore, who is pure act, is infinite in act, and has the whole *being* and possession of His *being* at once. These things being seen, the objections are quite easily solved.

1, 2. As to what is objected, then, about the past and the future and about transit, it must be said briefly that these are understood as they state a variation.

3. As to what is objected, that *being* and *being able* do not differ; it must be said that it is true of *being able* and *being* that they do not differ, that is, that they are not apart; for motion and time make [them] apart; but in the eternal alone is it true that the potency is wholly act, not in any creature.

4. As to what is objected, that the property of a simple substance cannot be composite; it must be said that it is true, if that property has a composition of parts existing at once; but now it is not so, indeed of the age there is never anything but *now*, before, just as is said also of time. And so it can well be in the simple as in the composite; whence the *duration* of a single grain of millet has as great an extension as that of a single mountain.

5. As to what is objected, that *before* and *after* is reduced to a permanent thing; it must be said that it is true that it is reduced to a permanent thing; but it is not necessary that [it be reduced] to a permanent before-and-after. For the empyrean has an aeviternal duration and is equally simple as the duration of an Angel: therefore before and after in permanent parts does nothing toward this.

6. As to what is objected about the new and the old, it is already clear: because there is nothing of alteration there, yet there is there an increment of duration without any alteration of an absolute property. For it is true to say that the soul of Peter was [in glory] longer than the soul of Francis, when it entered into glory, but it is not so with regard to God; for He has not endured longer today than before yesterday.

7. As to what is objected about expectation, it must be said that, just as there is *succession* not through *the acquisition of something new*, but through *the continuation of what was given before*, so too there is *expectation* not of having something new, but of the continuation of what was had before, which, because they already have it, and are certain they will have it, is therefore rather called a *holding* and *comprehension* than an *expectation*. And thus that [objection] is plain.