Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/2/q/bon-sent-II-d2-p1-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the measure of the angelic nature in comparison with the measure of a corporeal thing.*

Consequently it is asked about the measure of a spiritual substance in comparison with the measure of a corporeal thing. Concerning which three things are asked.

The first is, whether the age precedes time by any genus of priority.

The second, whether between the age and time there falls a measure of a middle nature.

The third, whether spiritual and corporeal things, that is, aeviternal and temporal, were produced simultaneously.

### Question I. *Whether the age in any way precedes time.*

Concerning the first, thus. That the age is prior to time is shown:

1. Through that [verse] of Boethius, *On Consolation*, speaking to God:

> *You who bid time*
> *go forth from the age;*

but time's going forth from the age cannot be understood except either by reason of causality, or of duration, or of excellence, because it falls short of the age: therefore it seems altogether to be understood that the age is prior to time.

2. Likewise, every motion and change is reduced to the immobile as to something prior: therefore also the measure of the movable to the measure of the immobile thing: therefore also time to the age as to something prior. The *first* consequence is manifestly true, because everything flowing is reduced to the standing as to something prior. And the *second* consequence holds by the account of proportion, because, as the measured stands to the measured, so the measure to the measure: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, from before and after in *magnitude* is caused before and after in *motion*, and from before and after in *motion* is caused before and after in *time*: therefore by nature magnitude and the *being* of magnitude is prior to the *being* of time; and the substance of the first body is measured by the age, but its motion by time: therefore the age is prior to time.

4. Likewise, the age was from the beginning of the creature, namely also of the Angel; but time began with the motion of the first movable, which began, as is said, on the fourth day, or at least could not begin before the second day: therefore the age precedes time in duration.

**On the contrary:**

1. Bede says that four things were created first, and among them he enumerates *time*; but *the age* is not enumerated among the things created first; and it is created: therefore [it is] later.

2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor says, and takes it from Augustine, that everything that began, began from time; but the age began: therefore it began from time. But what begins from time does not antecede time, but rather follows or accompanies [it]: therefore the age cannot be before time.

3. Likewise, time is the measure of change; but the age is the measure of the stable and fixed: therefore, since before *created being* there precedes creation itself, which is a change, therefore time is before the age.

4. Likewise, that which is imperfect is prior, then that which is perfect; but time is a measure according to imperfect being, which is being in potency, but the age according to actual and complete being: therefore time is by nature before the age. — It is asked, therefore, about the *order* of time to the age, and conversely.

### Conclusio

> The fourfold sense of the term *time* being distinguished, it is asserted that in the third sense the age and time are simultaneous in duration, but the age is prior in dignity; in the fourth sense the age precedes time both in duration and in dignity.

**I respond:** It must be said that *time* has been customarily taken in four ways in the writings of the Saints, namely *most commonly*, *commonly*, *properly*, and *more properly*. *Most commonly* time states the measure of any created duration; in which mode it is taken by Bede, when he says that four things were created first, among which he enumerates time. — *Commonly*; thus it states the measure of any change whatever, whether of that which is from *non-being* into *being*, or of another which is from *one being* into *another being*; and thus

is taken that which Richard says, that everything that began, began from time; and it is had in the Gloss, at the beginning of Genesis: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, namely [in the beginning] of time. — In the third mode it is taken *properly*; and thus it states the measure of a successive variation, whether it be successive by a regular and continuous succession or not; and thus Augustine says, to Orosius: «The varied affections of the Angels are measured by time, and every variation of things». — In the fourth mode it is taken *more properly*; and thus it is called the measure of motion or of a successive and continuous variation regulated according to the rule of the motion of the eighth sphere; and thus it has been customarily taken by the Philosopher: but this is the restricted acceptation of time.

When, therefore, it is asked about the *order*, it must be said that if time is taken in the first mode, then it includes *the age*; and so there is no order of time to the age; but if in the second mode, then time precedes the age according to the manner of understanding, as creation [precedes] *created being*. But if in the third mode, the age and time are simultaneous in *duration*, but the age is prior in *dignity*. But if in the fourth mode, then the age precedes time both in *duration* and in *dignity*. — From these things the principal question is plain, and the objections adduced for the most part.

For what is shown, that the age precedes time, is understood either in the third mode, and so it precedes in dignity; or in the fourth mode, and so in duration.

1. As to what is nevertheless shown, that it precedes by causality; it must be said that this is not necessary; neither of these measures is from the other, but from God producing each indivisible, namely the *now* of the age and the *now* of time. Whence what is said, that time goes forth from the age, is said because it falls short of it and flows away by continual loss; but in the age there is a fixity without loss and without acquisition of anything new.

2. As to what is objected about reduction to the immobile, it must be said that it is true on the side of the mover, and that [mover] need not be created, and likewise neither need the measure be created: and therefore it is not necessary that time be reduced to the age as to something prior.

3. As to that which is objected about the before and after of magnitude and of motion and of time, it must be said that before and after in *motion* or time is not caused from before and after in *magnitude*, except insofar as that magnitude is movable; and so it has to be measured by the *now* of time, not of the age; for as *time* measures motion, so the *now of time* measures the movable itself insofar as it is movable.

4. As to what is objected last, it is plain that it proceeds from the fourth acceptation of time.

But the reasons to the contrary proceed concerning time according to the first acceptation or the second, as is plain to one looking, except the last, which is taken from the comparison of the imperfect to the perfect. To which it must be responded: that the imperfect precedes the perfect is true where they are about the same thing; but about diverse things it is the reverse. And therefore the opposite can rather be argued than the proposition by that middle term.