Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/2/q/bon-sent-II-d2-p1-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether spiritual and corporeal substances were created simultaneously.*

Thirdly it is asked whether spiritual and corporeal substances were created simultaneously. And it seems that [they were] so.

1. In Genesis: *In the beginning God created* etc.; the Gloss: «that is, spiritual and corporeal nature».

2. Likewise, the twelfth [book] of the Confessions: «I find two [things] which you made lacking in times: one which enjoys your immutability, the other which was so formless that it had not [a form] out of which to be changed into [another] form».

3. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason.* It is established that the Angels were not created without place, because then one would not have an order to another according to existence: it was therefore necessary that the empyrean be made; and again, its concavity could not be empty: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the distinction of days is reckoned according to the distinction of things, therefore the production out of nothing precedes every day: therefore since the matter of corporeal things was produced out of nothing, just as also the angelic nature, then just as the angelic nature is before time, similarly it seems [so] of matter: and if this [is so], then [it was] at the beginning of duration: therefore simultaneously.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ecclesiasticus, chapter one: *Wisdom was created before all things*; it is established that it speaks not of divine wisdom, but of that which is created; and this is the Angel, as the Gloss says. *If you say* that it is prior in dignity; the objection [is made] from Hilary, twelfth [book] *On the Trinity*: «What [is it so] great, that before every creature God should have begotten our Lord Jesus Christ, when even the origin of the Angels is found older than the creation of the earth».

2. Likewise, this seems [so] by the reason which Isidore makes: «In the primary founding of things the place of punishments was founded»; but God did not prepare punishment for the innocent: therefore the devil sinned before the production of things.

3. Likewise, it seems that they could not [be produced] simultaneously, because no power is greater than the infinite; but for the production of one creature it is necessary that an infinite power be expended: therefore if for this effect an infinite power is required, and to the infinite nothing more can [be added], then that power cannot for that time produce another effect.

4. Likewise, the simple [agent] turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself: therefore if the divine power is most simple, when it turns itself to producing some effect, it is impossible that it turn itself to another, and so that it produce another: therefore it is impossible that it produce several [things] simultaneously.

5. Likewise, it is asked: why only these four are said to have been created first?

### Conclusion

> Four [things] were created first, namely the empyrean heaven, the angelic nature, matter, and time.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that, as is drawn out from the Gloss, four [things] were created first, namely the empyrean heaven, the angelic nature, matter, and time.

A twofold reason for this can be assigned: *one,* because in the beginning the first [members] in every genus had to be created, namely among things and measures, and among corporeal and spiritual things, and among corporeal active and passive [things]. Since therefore the first among spiritual substances is the Angel, the first among corporeal active substances is the empyrean, and the first among the passive [ones] is the matter of the elements, and the first among measures is time — because it states not only the measure of duration but also of issuing-forth: therefore these four are said to have been created first.

Another reason can be given: that the spiritual angelic substance had to be made first as a head and as less dependent, and when it was made, it at once had distinction and order; but it did not have an order of existence except in some container: therefore at once was made the empyrean heaven, the highest of bodies, and therefore the most capacious. And again, since it could not be empty, it was necessary that corporeal matter or mass be made; and because every production is in some measure, these three of necessity entail time.

It must therefore be granted that four [things] are created first, and that the angelic nature and the corporeal [nature] are created simultaneously as regards the concomitance of the measures, because the duration of matter and of intelligence began together, as has been proved.

1. 2. To what then is objected, that *[wisdom was created] before all things* etc.; it must be said that, as Augustine says at the end of the twelfth [book] of the Confessions, *prior* is said in four ways, namely *by eternity, by time, by election, by origin.* By eternity God precedes all things, *by time* the flower [precedes] the fruit, *by election* the fruit [precedes] the flower, *by origin* the sound [precedes] the song. By priority therefore of *duration* neither is the corporeal nature before the angelic, nor conversely; but by priority of *election* or dignity *wisdom was created before all things.* — To the authorities of Hilary and Isidore it must be said that they speak according to that position which held that creation precedes distinction in time. Hence at the beginning of time the Angel and matter were created; but things were not distinct until the third day. — *Or* it can be said that Hilary speaks according to [an] *opinion*, and Isidore of the priority according to *foresight.*

3. To what is objected, that God expends his whole power for the production of one thing; it must be said that although he may expend the *whole* [of it], yet he does not expend it *wholly.* For the divine power is said [to be] infinite not only because it can make a being out of non-being, but also because it cannot [make] so many [things] but [that it can make] more; hence it never produces so many at once but that it can still [produce] more; hence it can, as far as in it lies, [proceed] to infinity in intensity and extension. And therefore that [argument] does not hold.

4. To what is objected about the simple [agent], it must be said that this holds in that simple [thing] in which simplicity and finitude are together; but of that which is simple and infinite at once and at one time, it is not true. For that [agent], although by reason of [its] simplicity it turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself, yet by reason of [its] immensity it never turns itself wholly to producing the effect.