Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/2/q/bon-sent-II-d2-p2-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether an Angel is at once and at the same time in several places.*

Secondly it is asked whether one Angel is at once and at the same time in several places, or only in one. And that [it is] in several places, it seems:

1. First, through Augustine, who says «that an Angel is there where it wills», in the book *On the City of God*; but, existing in heaven, it wills to be on earth: therefore, existing in heaven, it is on earth: therefore it is at once in several places.

2. Likewise, Damascene says «that it is there where it operates»; but the Angel either is or can be the mover of the heaven, and the mover operates over the whole movable: therefore one Angel in either part of the circumference

of the heaven can be at once and at the same time. Therefore if one part of the circumference is more distant from another than the heaven [is] from the earth, it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more it is found in several [things]. And the reason for this is that the more it recedes from constriction and the more it approaches the divine being, which is everywhere. Therefore if the Angel among creatures most of all approaches God, it seems that it can be at once and at the same time in several places, just as the universal, on account of its simplicity, is everywhere and always.

4. Likewise, the glorified spirit does not have volatile thoughts; indeed it can by the gift of glory think many [things] at once; but the intellect by nature in one instant looks only to one intelligible, and by glory sees many at once: therefore by parity of reason it seems that the glorified Angel can at once be in diverse places.

5. Likewise, a body can never be elevated, neither by glory nor by union, so as to be higher than a glorious spirit; but the body of Christ by the grace of union can be in diverse places: therefore by parity of reason, as it seems, also the glorious Angel.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ambrose, in the book *On the Holy Spirit*: «Every creature is circumscribed by the fixed limits of its nature»; but what can be one and the same whole and according to act so in this place that [it is] also in another, is not circumscribed: therefore either the Angel is not a creature, or, if it is, it cannot be in several places at once.

2. Likewise, Damascene in the first book: «An Angel is said to be in a place because it is present intelligibly and is circumscribed where it also operates, for it cannot according to the same [thing] operate in diverse places»: therefore the same [conclusion] as before.

3. Likewise, if an Angel were at once in diverse places, it would not need to be sent nor to be moved; but the Angels are moved, as is plain through the Scripture of the Old and New Testament: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if an Angel could be at once and at the same time in diverse places, it could at once and at the same time be silent in one place and speak in another, be moved in one and at rest in another: therefore two opposites would at once and at the same time be true of the same [thing].

### Conclusion

> An Angel is at once and at the same time only in one place.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the Angel has an individuated being, it has being here and now; but because it has a limited being and a limited power, it has being in one *here* or in only one place. Since therefore both individuation and limitation are naturally and inseparably in the Angel, hence it is that the Angel at once and at the same time must be only in one place; and this the authorities say, and the reasons prove [it]. — And therefore they are to be granted for that which they truly conclude.

1. To what is objected first, that it is there where it wills; it must be said that this is not said by a concomitance of simultaneity, [as] that in the same instant in which there is the willing to be in any place, there is the being [there]; but it is said for this reason, that being in the willed place follows the willing without great delay of time, on account of the angelic velocity, as Damascene says. It follows also that being in such or such a place [follows] the Angel's will at [its] nod, because the Angel does not will except what befits its nature. Hence it does not will to be there in an instant, but in that time in which it knows it can arrive. In the same mode the aforesaid saying is to be understood of the glorious body.

2. To what is objected, that it is there where it operates; it must be said that to operate somewhere is twofold: either mediately or immediately; immediately, as for instance the soul operates in the hand; but by means of the hand the soul of the sailor operates in the whole ship, because by moving the hand it moves the rudder, and by moving the rudder it moves the whole ship; nor however is it necessary that it be in the whole ship, but where it operates first. — In this mode

it must be understood in the matter at hand, that, even if the Angel were the mover of the heaven or [its] moving [cause], it would first move one part, like that over which the influence of the mover would be, and would be in it, not in the whole movable or moved thing. So also it must be understood of the Angels who overthrew Sodom.

3. To what is objected concerning simplicity, it must be said that to be simple is twofold: either by the privation of parts composing in the being of nature, or by the privation of parts constituting in defined being or in a genus. When therefore it is said that the simpler something [is], the more [it is] in several; this is said of simplicity in the second mode, namely which a genus has with respect to a species, and therefore it is found in more [things] than a species. But when we call the Angel simple, this is according to another genus of simplicity; therefore [it is] nothing to the purpose.

4. To what is objected concerning the plurality of knowables, which it understands at once and at the same time; it must be said that it is not similar, for a twofold reason: because the cognitive power is made more deiform by glory than the motive power [is] by exterior motion. Moreover, [there is] another [reason], because God and the divine exemplar in the glorified is the reason of knowing according to thing and essence; therefore the glorified intellect knows many [things], so that it is not dispersed, but is gathered around one. But that the Angel be in several places, this cannot be through a gathering of power to one place, as the intellect [is gathered] to one first knowable; and therefore it is not similar.

5. To what is objected concerning the body of Christ, it must be said that it is not an argument *from the lesser* nor *from the like*, because the body of Christ is in several places [for the reason] that many [things] are converted into it. — *And if you ask* why it is more fitting that some [things] be converted into it than into another body; the reason for this is that it is food, in which all the members of Christ are united and refreshed. — *And if you ask* why the food is of this kind? [it is] the same question as concerning a coal, why it heats? On account of [its] conjunction with fire. So the flesh of Christ is filled with delight, like a coal ignited by fire, and this has been touched on more diffusely in the first book and in the fourth.