Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/20/q/bon-sent-II-d20-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether in the state of innocence there would have been intercourse of the sexes.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that, if man had stood, intercourse of the sexes would have taken place:

**For the opposite [view]:**

1. *First*, by the text of Genesis 2: *Let us make him a help similar to himself.* But man did not need the help of woman except as regards the act of generation, and they could not generate anyone together unless they were joined together: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV: «Whoever says that they would not have come together, would not have begotten human beings, unless they had sinned, what else is he saying but that sin was necessary for the great number of the saints?» Therefore, if this is unfitting to posit, then even if man had not sinned, the man and the woman would have begotten by intercourse of the sexes.

3. Likewise, the distinction of the sexes is for nothing except generation; but in its primary condition there was a distinction in the human species, just as in others: therefore, since the distinct sexes do not concur to one effect unless they are joined, it seems that, if man had stood, man and woman would have been joined.

4. Likewise, the man had generative power; but it is plain that he could not conceive offspring within himself, since he had neither a place in which the fetus could be nourished, nor a way through which it might emerge: therefore it seems that, in order for him to generate, it was necessary for him to be joined and come together with the woman.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the good of marriage*: «Marriages cannot be except of mortals»; it is clear that this was said as regards the intercourse of the sexes: if therefore, the state of innocence remaining, man could not die, then he could not be joined to the woman either.

2. Likewise, Damascene: «God could have multiplied this race even without generation, if man had kept his commandment to the end»: therefore it seems that, if man had stood, the man would not have to be joined to the woman nor to procreate a son.

3. Likewise, generative power was given for this, that those things which cannot be continued in themselves might be conserved in their like; but with man standing, he could be continued in perpetuity: therefore it does not seem that the man would generate.

4. Likewise, the intercourse of the sexes is a carnal work; but the first parents, since they were spiritual, were not given to the works of the flesh nor were they impeded from the quiet of contemplation: therefore it does not seem that, nature standing, they would have to be joined together.

### Conclusion

> *The state of innocence persisting, there would have been generation and intercourse of the sexes.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in the state of innocence without doubt man would have had [offspring] generated from man; and this is attested by the authority of *Scripture* and the judgment of *right reason*. — For it is said to human beings in the state of innocence, as is written in Genesis 1: *Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth.* And another text says that the woman *was made as a help for the man.* — This also accords with right reason, which says that the power of generating pertains to the completion of nature, but that the use of generation pertains to the completing and perfecting of the supernal city. And since in the state of innocence nature was more perfect than in the state of the wayfarer; and if man had stood, the supernal city would in no way have been cheated of the great number of its citizens: it must be posited that man in the state of innocence was able to generate and would have begotten. And since neither the man by himself nor the woman by herself would have sufficed for generating, therefore through joining there would come about a conjoining of one to the other, and they would furnish mutual help to one another in the procreation of offspring for multiplying the human race. — And therefore the arguments showing that, if man had stood, there would have been both generation and intercourse of the sexes are to be conceded.

**Reply to the [arguments] for the opposite [view]:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected on the contrary side from the word of Augustine in the book *On the good of marriage*, it must be said that *mortal* is not called there that which has necessity in dying, but mortal is said generally for animal life, in which alone generation can occur, because in it alone can decision [seminal] and restoration occur; and because this mortality could be in the state of innocence, although not in the state of glory: therefore that point is plain.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the word of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not wish to say that there would be no generation if man had stood, but that it would not be by that mode by which it is now, namely with libido and foulness. Moreover, he himself does not say what God would do, but what He could do.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that generative power was given for this, that corruptible things might be perpetuated; it must be said that this is not the *whole* ground; rather, the principal ground, and the one according to faith, which the Philosopher did not know, is for the multiplication of the number of the elect, which God thus disposed to do successively on account of a manifold fittingness, as was touched on above: namely, both for the manifestation of the divine glory; and also for the greater conjoining of human beings, that they might love each other more; and also for the beauty and perfection of the universe, which is attended to not only according to permanent *being* but also according to *being* in flux; and the flux in irrational things ought to be according to the order and requirement toward rational things, on account of which they have been made.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the intercourse of the sexes is a carnal work; it must be said that *flesh* in one way sounds as vice, as that to the Galatians 5: *The flesh lusts against the spirit*; in another way *flesh* signifies nature, as that to the Ephesians 5: *No one has hated his own flesh.* And thus *carnal* can be said in two ways: either from flesh insofar as it signifies nature, or from flesh insofar as it signifies vice. And in this last way, in the first state, the intercourse of the sexes would not have been a carnal work, since there would not have been viciousness there; it would, however, have been a carnal work according as *flesh* sounds for nature; and it would nonetheless have been a spiritual work, because nature and the work of nature would accord with spirit and grace.