Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/20/q/bon-sent-II-d20-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether in the state of innocence in that intercourse there would have been a cutting-off of seed.*

Secondly it is asked whether in that intercourse there would have been a cutting-off of seed. And that there would be, seems to be the case.

***For the affirmative:***

1. *« To generate is to produce someone from one's own substance* *»*; but no one produces another from one's own substance unless one gives him a part of one's substance, since to give the whole is possible to God alone; but one does not give a part of one's substance except by cutting it off from oneself: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the son is generated from the father and the mother not only effectively, but also materially; but whenever any two things are matter of one thing, it is necessary that they be united to one another and commingled either according to their whole selves, or according to some part of themselves; but that in which they are united has the character not only of the material but also of the effective, and such a thing we call *seed*: therefore, if man had stood firm, generation would nonetheless have been by commingling of seed.

3. Likewise, the man by his intercourse would impregnate the woman, but this would not happen unless something were imparted to the woman; but it is clear that what is necessary would not be imparted, because nature reserves it to itself: therefore there would be imparted the superfluity of nourishment, and this is *seed*: therefore there would occur a commingling of seed.

4. Likewise, from the original constitution man and woman had vessels suited and apt for the generation, cutting-off, and commingling of the seminal humor; and these are the organs of the generative power: therefore in the generation of offspring it is natural for seed to be cut off: therefore if man had generated then, according to what was fitting to nature, in the state of innocence there would have been a commingling of seed.

***On the contrary:***

1. Seed is a superfluity of nourishment; but wherever there is superfluity, there is defect; but in instituted nature there was no defect; therefore neither superfluity: therefore neither seminal humor.

2. Likewise, seed is a superfluity of the third digestion; but if man had stood firm, there would not have been in him a superfluity of the second digestion, namely feces and urine: therefore neither a superfluity of the third. The *first* is shown through the Philosopher; the *second* is manifest, because those superfluities are never without foulness and shame: therefore if foulness and shame are not in man except through fault, in no way would there be such superfluity in them.

3. Likewise, if there were seed in them: either it would be *suitable* to one's own complexion, or *not*. If *not*: then it does not seem that offspring could or should be generated from it. If *yes*: but nature naturally retains what is suitable to itself, and if it expels something, this is not by nature but by violence: if therefore in the state of innocence man would generate man not violently but naturally, it seems that in generation he would not emit seed.

4. Likewise, the actual cutting-off of a part from a part is a path toward corruption; but man in the state of innocence was not tending toward corruption: therefore in generating he was not cutting off seed.

> **Conclusion.** *In the state of innocence both the man and the woman would have generated by the cutting-off of seed.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the generation of offspring, so far as concerns the order and power of nature, takes place through the conjunction and commingling of the two sexes in human beings — who in regard to offspring stand as the *material* and the *efficient*, in such wise that the character of the *material* belongs more to the woman, and that of the *efficient* or *active* belongs more to the man — it is necessary for generation that certain particles be cut off both from the woman and from the man, in which there would be the seminal power and account in regard to the body to be propagated. Since therefore this is the order of nature, not only of fallen but also of instituted nature, it must therefore be said that in the state of innocence both the man and the woman would have generated by the cutting-off of seed.

***Solution of the opposites:***

To that, then, which is objected on the contrary about the superfluity of seed, it must be said that there is a superfluity of *residuity*, and a superfluity of *impurity*. The superfluity of *residuity* is in seed, and this superfluity does not exclude necessity; rather, that very same thing which is necessary is superfluous — but necessary to the species, superfluous to the individual; necessary to the generative power, but superfluous to the nutritive; and this superfluity is not repugnant to the goodness and completion of nature, because it does not sound of vice but of complement. There is also another superfluity of *impurity*, such as feces and urine, the flow of rheum and the emission of sweat and similar things; and this is of a twofold kind. One sort comes from the *weakness of the retentive and conversive power*, such as rheum and sweat; and such would not have been in Adam, because the natural powers in him were efficacious in their operations. Another sort comes from the *quality of the nourishment* and the *purity of the one nourished*; and this would have been in Adam — such as is the superfluity of excretion and urine, which are for the separation of the pure from the impure, so that what is pure and apt may be taken up as nourishment, and what is less apt may be cast out externally, though not with such great stench and foulness as now. And this is sufficiently shown by the vessels and intestines and openings, which have been naturally assigned to man from his first constitution.

1. And through this is plain the response to virtually all the objections. For the *first*, which objects that where there is superfluity, there is defect, does not hold, because it has no truth concerning the superfluity of *residuity*, such as is the superfluity of seed.

2. The *second*, which objects that the superfluity of the second digestion is with foulness, and so with penality, likewise does not hold; because, although that separation of the pure from the impure is in us with foulness, in them it would have been without any corruption of stench, in attestation of the power of the conversive faculty and of the purity of the nutritive.

3. Likewise the *third* is not very compelling; because seed, since it is a superfluity of the nutritive, is necessary to the generative; it does not agree with nature as something saving nature in itself, but as saving nature in another. And therefore nature does not seek to retain it for itself, but to transfuse it into another; and although it does not agree with the nature of the *generator* in itself, as it is, yet it does agree with the nature of the *generated*.

4. Likewise the *last* does not compel — that which says that cutting-off is a path to corruption. For this has place where there is a cutting-off of a necessary part with a certain violence, and where there is a cutting-off without restoration. But this is not the case in the cutting-off of seed, as has been shown. — And thus all the objections can be solved through the distinction made earlier and also through several other middle terms which can be brought to bear on the matter.

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