Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/20/q/bon-sent-II-d20-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether the multiplication of men and women would have been equal, if man had stood.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether the multiplication of men and women would have been equal. And that it would, seems thus.

*Fundamenta.*
1. Nature would so proceed in generating as God instituted it; but God, when he produced human nature, produced male and female in equal number: therefore similarly nature also would have multiplied in equal number.

2. Likewise, the generation of man could not be continued except through male and female, and so woman is as necessary for generation as is the male: therefore it seems that nature would equally intend each sex; but as it intended, so it multiplied: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, just as the man intends to preserve himself in the like, namely in the man whom he generates, so too the woman in what is co-like, namely in the woman; but nature is just as well ordered in the woman as in the man: therefore if the man were not frustrated in his intention, neither would the woman: therefore as many males as she would conceive for the preservation of the male sex, so many females would she conceive for the preservation of the female sex.

4. Likewise, in the state of innocence, just as everyone would eat, so everyone would multiply offspring, since to all it was said: *Increase and multiply* etc.: therefore everyone would have a spouse. If therefore matrimony requires that there be *two in one flesh*, there would be as many men as women, neither more nor fewer.

*On the contrary.*
1. As the Philosopher says in the book *On Animals*: «woman is a man by accident (vir occasionatus)»: therefore she seems to be beside the intention of nature; but in the time of nature as instituted, since nature was upright, nothing would be produced beside its intention: therefore it seems that no woman would be generated, or at any rate few: therefore there would be more men than women.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds: «Nature always desires what is better»; but the male sex is more perfect and better than the female sex: therefore nature more desires to generate a man than a woman; if therefore she should produce according to what she desires, she would produce more men than women.

3. Likewise, the generation of the male is on account of the vigor of the generating virtue and of the seed cut off, as the natural philosophers and physicians say; but in the state of nature as instituted the generative virtue and the seed cut off would have complete and sufficient strength: therefore it would always — or for the most part — happen that males be generated.

4. Likewise, since the seed of the man dominates the seed of the woman, it draws and converts it to its own nature; but according to the order of nature the male is more potent than the female: therefore, nature standing, the male seed would always — or for the most part — prevail: therefore nature would generate more males than females.

### Conclusion.

> If man had remained in the state of innocence, nature would equally have multiplied men and women.

**I respond:** It must be said that if man had stood, nature would equally have multiplied men and women. — The reason for this, however, is easy to grasp from the side of the end *to which*, but difficult to grasp from the side of the principle *from which*.

*Reason from the end.* For from the side of the *end to which*, the reason is at hand. Since the distinction of the sexes was for the multiplication of the human race and the completion of the number of the elect; and that multiplication would pertain to all, and this only according to the law of matrimony, in which one only belonged to one: it is necessary, if nature had stood, that there be as many women as men, since no woman would lack a man and no man would lack a wife, neither would one belong to many nor many to one.

*Reason from the principle.* But to assign a reason from the side of the *effective principle* is difficult; it can however be investigated thus by descending to the principles of another science, namely natural philosophy and medicine, both of which are to serve theology. *Note.* For there is a great question among natural philosophers and physicians concerning the distinction of the generation of male and female; and when it is asked why now a male, now a female is generated, a threefold reason is given by different authors.

*A threefold reason is given.* One is from the side of the *receiving vessel*: for if the seed is received in the right part, they say that a male is there generated on account of the strong heat which thrives there; if in the left part, then a woman has to be generated. — The second reason is given from the side of the *commixture* of the two sexes, namely of man and woman. For if the seed of the man dominates, then it is drawn to the man's nature, and a male is generated; but if the woman's seed dominates, then it is drawn to her nature, and a female sex is generated. — The third reason is given from the side of the *virtue of the male seed*. For if the male seed has been of strong virtue from the concurrence of the threefold heat and spirit existing in it, then a stronger coagulation and complexion takes place, and a vigorous sex is generated, that is, the masculine. But if it has been of weak virtue, then a softer and frailer coagulation takes place, and from it a weak sex is generated, namely the feminine. — *Note.* This reason, the one given third, is the principal among these three, nor do the others have efficacy except from it. For, as the Philosopher holds, what principally moves in the generation of either male or female is the male seed; and therefore the seed of the woman does not properly have to dominate the seed of the man, unless this be said on account of the weakness of the male seed, by which it approaches the conformity of the woman's seed; nor does the place of the womb make the diversity of the sexes principally as principal mover, but rather as cooperating with the principal mover, which indeed is the strength or weakness in the virtue of the male seed.

*The third reason is declared from three reasons.* But if it be asked what the reason is of the diversity in weakness and strength of the male seed; a threefold reason also can be given. — One is on account of the *heat and good disposition of the member*, from which the generation of the seed takes place, and through which the transfusion of the seed takes place, such that it neither exceeds in heat nor inclines toward cold; for then the seed which is transfused from that member is of strong virtue and vigor. But if the member is in the opposite disposition, then the seed is of weak virtue. — Another reason can be taken from the side of *exterior aid*, namely of food and wind and time, which contribute much to the strengthening or weakening of virtue. For Boreas by its blast strengthens the virtue, while it encloses it within; but Auster weakens it, while it makes it exhale; so too does food and time. And when the exterior dispositions concur which have the power to strengthen, then the seed is of strong virtue; but when they are in the contrary disposition, then the seed is of weak virtue. — The third reason is taken from the side of the *soul*. For the generative power is much conformed to the accidents of the soul and to imaginations, as appears by experience. For from the memory of pleasure there often arises a stirring of the itching of the flesh; and from strong imagination in sleep there is an effusion of seed, as occurs at the presence of a woman; and the formative virtue, which is the principal virtue in the seed, is much aided by the imaginative, as is shown by the examples set down both in sacred Scripture and in medicine, as appears in Jacob's sheep, Genesis thirty. And it is told as an example that a woman who would gaze on a dwarf, when she was known by her man, would conceive all her sons as dwarfs.

*As regards the state of fallen nature.* Among these reasons, since all are good and contribute to the vigoration of the seed, according to the state of fallen nature the principal reason is taken from the side of the complexion of the member; the other two are as auxiliaries only, or as impediments.

*As regards the state of nature as instituted.* But in the time of nature as instituted, in which the body was subject to the soul, the principal reason for the generation of male and female is taken from the side of the moving and imagining animal virtue. For when the man would intend and will to generate a man, then his natural virtue would be strengthened in acting, and the seed would be of greater virtue, and a vigorous sex, namely a male, would be generated; but when he would will and imagine to generate a female sex, then by a less strong impression he would act upon the inferior bodily nature, and then the seed would be less strong, and a female sex would be generated: and therefore in the time of nature as instituted the generation of male and female would be subject to the rational will. — And since reason would dictate that all things ought to be done in order, and to produce as many women as men, that every man might have *an aid like to himself* according to the exigency of the law of matrimony; therefore he would then produce men and women in equal number. Now however, since the generative is not entirely subject to the animal virtue, that is the imaginative, nor even to the rational, although it is in some way conformed to it, but is rather varied according to the disposition of the member and of exterior aid; hence it is that there is no fixed determination of the number either of the men or of the women to be generated; indeed sometimes, when one believes he is generating a male, he generates a female, and when he believes he is generating a female, he generates a male; and some have more females, others more males. — So therefore it is plain that, if man had stood, the multiplication of men and women would have taken place in equal number. Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*
1. To that which is first objected, that woman is called *a man by accident*; it must be said that the Philosopher does not mean that woman is beside the intention of nature, but that the virtue of nature has some defect in the production of the woman with respect to the production of the man; that defect, however, does not conflict with the order of nature, but rather preserves it. For according to the order of nature, just as in the same body certain members are produced as more strong, certain as less strong: so in the same species certain individuals of one sex are produced, certain of the other. And therefore, although that *defect* which corrupts the order of nature — namely that which is the cause of a defect of a member or of a good complexion — is *beside* theintention of nature; nevertheless the *generation* of a woman is neither *beside* nature nor *contrary to* nature, but *according to* nature.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that nature always desires what is better; it must be said that this is not to be understood as that she always desires what is better *simply*, but what is better *in order*; for although the masculine sex is better in itself than the feminine, yet the salvation of nature would not be sufficiently secured in the male sex alone, as it is in the male and the female together: and therefore nature more desires both than the one alone.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the seed of the man dominates the seed of the woman; it must be said that this argument must be soundly understood, that it may have force. For properly speaking, never does the seed of the woman dominate the seed of the man; but the woman's seed is said to dominate for this reason: that the seed of the man is so weak in virtue that it is more fitted for the production of the female sex than of the male; and this in fact could be the case in the first state, as has been touched on above.

*To 3.* And by this is plain the response to the other [objection] which is raised concerning the strength of the heat and of the virtue. For there the degrees would have been according to the order of reason and according to the exigency of the end, such that the man would sometimes operate with a more strengthened action in the production of a man, sometimes with a less strengthened action in the production of a woman. — But if anyone should wish to say, as some hold, that the woman would always conceive twins, such that the right part would draw what is of greater virtue of the seed to the generation of the male sex, and the left part what is of weaker virtue to the generation of the female sex; then it would be easy to respond to the objections. But this is neither easily proved nor refuted with the certitude of reason: and therefore the mode of solution previously set out seems to be the more reasonable.

*See the scholion on the preceding question* (q. 5 SCHOLION II) for the names of the authors who treat this question.

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