Dist. 20, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/20/q/bon-sent-II-d20-dubia
----------------------------------------
### DUB. I.

In this part there are questions on the letter, and first it is asked concerning that which he says, that *the infirmity prone to the ruin of turpitude is taken up [excused] by the honor of marriage*. For from this he seems to say that this act cannot be performed without sin and turpitude. But to the contrary: every act which is in a precept can be done without sin; therefore so too can intercourse.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is not said of the turpitude which sounds [unto] *fault*, but rather of that which sounds [unto] *punishment*; or if it be understood of the former, then marriage so takes up the proneness of the flesh that the act can be performed without any sin. Hence what the Master says — that marriage orders that act — is not to be understood by reason of any disorder which is in that act, but of that which would be in it were there no marriage; on this however a fuller treatment will be given in the fourth [book], in the tract on matrimony.

### DUB. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *in paradise the nuptials would be honorable*. For it seems that they are likewise honorable in the state of the Church, since they are *a great Sacrament*, as the Apostle says to the Ephesians, chapter five, and since also they are approved by natural law. If you say that the honorability of marriage is to be considered with respect to the act itself, then it is asked why this honest and chaste act should be done with shame rather than another act in which there is the disorder of fault; for a man is more ashamed of that act honestly and chastely performed than of another disordered act, such as to know one's wife rather than to strike a servant.

**I respond:** It must be said that marriage may be spoken of with respect to *what is signified*, with respect to *fruit*, and with respect to *act*; and with respect to these three they were honorable in paradise. *Distinction.* But in the state of misery, although they are honorable as to *what is signified* and as to *fruit*, they nevertheless have shame attached as to the *act*, because every man who uses reason is ashamed to exercise that act before others, even with his own wife. — *Reason.* And Augustine assigns the reason for this in the fourteenth [book] of the *City of God*: because, since reason ought to dominate the body, it is more ashamed that it itself should be subjected to some part of the body, and that some part of the body should dominate it, than that it itself should disorderedly dominate itself; and therefore one is more ashamed of the ardor of lust which is in that act than of the perturbation of fury which is in upbraiding a servant.

### DUB. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *God had not yet commanded that they should come together*. For this seems to be false, because it is said in Genesis 1: *Increase and multiply and fill the earth*; and it is clear that this was said with respect to the act of the generative [power]: therefore etc. — *Incidental question 1.* In connection with this it is asked whether that command bound all. If *yes*: then it seems they transgressed, since they did not come together in the state of innocence; if *no*: then it seems they could continually preserve virginity.

*Question 2.* Likewise I ask whether that command still remains. If it remains: then it is not lawful for anyone to preserve virginity, which is against the Apostle, who says in 1 Corinthians 7: *I wish all of you to be as I am*; he is speaking of chastity. If it does not bind now, I ask: when was it revoked? And it would also seem that men are now in a better condition than then, because now they can preserve virginity, but then they could not.

**I respond:** It must be said that that command *To question 1.* was given to man and woman in the state of innocence; but since it was an *affirmative* command, it did not bind always, but for [a given] place and time. The determination of the time however depended on the revelation of the divine will; and because God had not yet revealed it to them, therefore the Master says that he had not yet commanded.

*To question 2.* To that which is asked, whether that command was revoked; it must be said that it bound differently in the time of nature instituted, differently now. For then it bound all, because for all it was a duty; but now it does not bind all, because there are many who suffice to fulfill it, while others observe the counsel of virginity. This counsel however befits the state of *fallen* nature, not the state of nature *instituted*, because then, when there was no proneness, it would not be a greater virtue to abstain than to marry, and all would generate offspring for the worship of God; but now, because of the difficulty and arduousness, to abstain altogether is of great virtue and dignity. — And thus the things objected are clear.

### DUB. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *When the number had been completed, bodies would pass without death into another quality*. For this position seems to be unsuitable. First, because it would be a great loss for the parents if their glory were deferred for so long, until the number of the elect should be filled. — And again, if *hope deferred afflicts the soul*, it seems there would be some affliction in them. Again, since the number of the elect that was to be would be in a great multitude, how could all men be contained within the space of paradise? This does not seem probable. If you say that for this reason the parents would be translated apart from the others and glorified; this does not seem fitting, because it pertains to the magnificence of God that all be glorified together, as he will do on the day of judgment in the general resurrection.

*Response.* And it must be said briefly that this second opinion is more probable, as the stated reasons show. Nor does that consideration about the simultaneity of glorification stand in the way; for this is rather on account of the judgment and the resurrection of bodies — which it is fitting should be together — than on account of the bestowal of beatitude. The reason for this is more expressly given in the fourth [book], in the tract on the resurrection.

### DUB. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *in little ones an age would be awaited for walking and speaking, just as now*. For this opinion the Master seems to approve. But against this is the word of Augustine preceding a little before this. For he says thus: «To the infirmity of the mind this infirmity of the flesh corresponds». — Likewise, if human nature is more powerful and nobler than the brute, and the offspring of certain animals, as soon as they are born, can walk: much more does it seem that the sons of men [could].

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master does not intend to assert any of these opinions; and it is in doubt, *Note.* whether it would be thus or thus; nevertheless he approves this opinion as more probable, which says that little ones gradually advance and grow to the use of [their] members. Nor does he say this without reason. For the tenderness of members is due to the offspring of man on account of the goodness of his complexion and the congruity of [his] nature, which proceeds from a weaker complexion to a stronger; whence little ones have more tender members than adults. The process however in growth would not have been miraculous, but natural, even in the time of nature instituted; and therefore the Master more reasonably approves this way of speaking. The preceding word of Augustine is to be understood of infancy by reason of the inconveniences accompanying it, not by reason of imperfection of the members. — The other thing which is objected concerning those kinds of animals does not hold, because they are of a different complexion and organization.

### DUB. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *That little ones advance over an interval of time in sense and cognition*. For since the rational soul does not grow old in time, it does not seem to be altered according to the conditions of time: therefore it seems that with the passage of time it would not be made more knowing, since it would not have anything in knowledge to be altered through times. — Likewise, God made the soul of Adam perfect in knowledge: therefore by the same reason he would have made the soul of [his] sons [perfect in knowledge], had he himself stood.

**I respond:** It must be said to this, that this is the more probable position, that in some way they would have advanced through intervals of times in sense and cognition. *Note.* For the soul, while it is in the body, imitates the complexion of the body. And since in infancy the complexion of the brain is soft and fluid, therefore there cannot there be a strong impression of species nor a strong conversion upon them. Hence just as a face does not shine back in moved water, so little ones would not be apt straightway for the use of cognition.

To what is objected, that the soul is not altered in time; it is true so far as the soul is concerned in itself, but by reason of the body to which it is joined — which grows and is strengthened in time. — To the other [objection], that he would have a habit; it must be said that if a boy had knowledge as to *habit*, he would not nevertheless have it as to actual consideration, on account of the ineptitude of the organ, as also those who sleep do not. Hence just as baptized little ones are said to have the virtues «in endowment, not in use» or in act; so it is to be understood that those little ones had knowledge; and afterwards, when the complexion had been made apt for considering, they would straightway be in act of consideration without lack and labor; and most truly would that word of the Philosopher hold in them, which says that «in sitting and in being at rest the soul becomes prudent and knowing», since sitting and rest are said as against motion and the fluctuation of complexion.

### DUB. VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *He added a precept of obedience*; why did the Lord add precept upon precept? And why were there so many precepts which he gave to man? And again, why was the precept of obedience or discipline rather *negative* than *affirmative*?

*Response.* It must be answered to this briefly, that the Lord made for them three precepts at the beginning, namely, first, that which was: *Increase and multiply*. The other was: *Eat of every tree of paradise*. The third was: *But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil eat not*. — The number however and sufficiency of these precepts can be taken in two ways. *Congruity 1.* In one way thus: for there is a certain precept which orders toward God, and this was the precept of obedience. Another, which orders toward the *neighbor*; and this was the precept of multiplying the race. Another, which orders toward *oneself*; and this was the precept of eating. — *Congruity 2.* In a second way thus, that one precept regards the *body*, and this is the precept of eating; another regards the *soul*, and this is the precept of abstaining, which is the merit of obedience; another *conjoined*, and this is the precept of multiplying the like. — But the precept of discipline was *negative*, in order that the keeping of it might be easier, and that man might not have any excuse for transgression or omission. — And in this terminates that whole part of this book which is on the constitution of man.

---