Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the temptation of our first parents.*
### Question I. *What principally moved the devil to tempt man.*

Concerning the first point, the procedure is thus and it is asked what principally moved the devil to tempt man. And that it was envy, it seems:

*Fundamenta.*
1. *First*, from what is said in Wisdom 2: *By the envy of the devil, death entered the world*; but the entrance of death was through the temptation and seduction of man: therefore envy moved the devil to tempt man.

2. *Likewise*, Gregory in the *Morals*: "In paradise the devil, envying man, inflicted the wound of pride": therefore, since he inflicted the wound through temptation, the temptation was from envy.

3. *Likewise*, the devil by tempting man became a homicide, according to what is said in John 8: *He was a homicide from the beginning*; but homicide proceeds from hatred, and hatred proceeds from envy: therefore *from the first*, the temptation of man, in which the devil was a homicide, proceeded from envy.

4. *Likewise*, one who desires the fall of another without his own profit is not moved by love of his own advantage, but by hatred of another's happiness; but the devil desired man's fall without his own profit, as is plain: therefore he was moved by hatred of human happiness to tempt man. But such hatred is nothing other than envy: therefore etc.

*Ad oppositum.*
**On the contrary:** 1. All envy is with respect to an equal or superior, according to what Gregory says on that text of Job: *Envy slays the little one*, "a superior," I say, at least according to reputation: but the devil did not reckon man superior to himself: therefore it seems that he did not envy him: therefore if he tempted him, this was not from envy.

2. *Likewise*, envy is with respect to a good which in some way can be acquired; but the devil could not attain eternal beatitude, since he had fallen irreparably: therefore it seems that on account of acquiring it he did not envy man.

3. *Likewise*, envy is with respect to a good which is desired; for no one envies another concerning anything unless he loves and longs for it; but the devil did not long to obey God's commands nor to ascend to the supernal fatherland nor to be a friend of God, on account of his despair: therefore it seems that he would not envy this in man: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, envy is only with respect to that which is naturally fitted to diminish one's own good; but the acquisition of beatitude can diminish no one's good: therefore there is nothing which can be envied by anyone: therefore it seems that if the devil by some appetite made man fall, he was not moved by envy.

> **Conclusion.** The devil was moved indeed from pride, but immediately from envy, to tempt man.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been touched upon, these are the two sins which most possess the mind of the devil, *pride* and *envy*. Hence, as has been held above, and as Augustine says, from these two, he who before was Lucifer became the devil: and these are, as it were, two inseparable things, so that one accompanies the other. For the *proud man* loves excellence, and so wills to have no equal, and on account of this he immediately desires to possess excellence in singular fashion; and therefore he immediately, either in act or in habit, envies, when he is unwilling that a good similar to the good which he desires be shared by another. — The mind of the devil, therefore, possessed by these two vices, namely *pride* and *envy*, seeing man in a state in which he could fall under diabolical power and in which he could ascend to the supernal happiness from which he himself had fallen — was moved both from pride and from envy to tempt him. For from *pride*, that he might subject him to himself; from *envy*, that he might impede him from supernal happiness. And *pride* was as the first mover, but *envy* as the proximate and immediate mover. — For granted that he could not acquire dominion over man, still he would have striven to impede him from the joys of paradise; and therefore Scripture says, and its expositors, that the devil was moved from envy to tempt man. — And the arguments showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*
1. To that, then, which is first objected, that envy is with respect to a superior or equal; it must be said that it is not only with respect to one who is superior in being superior, but also with respect to one who *can be*. For although the devil in that state did not reckon man superior to himself; he nevertheless envied him, lest by the merit of obedience he be raised to the state of glory, in which state he would not doubt him to be superior to himself. — *Otherwise* it can also be said that he then reckoned him superior to himself in this, that he could attain that glory to which the devil could not ascend.

2. To that which is objected, that envy is with respect to a good which can be acquired; it must be answered *by way of qualification*, because someone envies not only that which he can obtain, but also that which he *is naturally fitted to have*, although he cannot, just as a mutilated and blind man envies sight and walking in others. Now although the devil could not attain to beatitude, nevertheless he had a natural aptitude for it.

3. To that which is objected, that envy is with respect to a desired good; it must be said that envy comes not only from the desire of some private good, but rather from hatred of another's good. — *Another solution.* Yet since the desire of one's own good seems to be the principle of every sin, it can therefore be said otherwise that envy is not only with respect to that good which is desired, but also with respect to that good by whose attainment the desired good is diminished, or is reckoned less. And since the devil desires to be singularly exalted, therefore from the exaltation of man he reckoned his own good to be impeded; and so he envied and from envy fought against him.

4. And by this is plain the response to the last argument, because, although the glorification and exaltation of man would not according to the truth diminish anyone's good, nevertheless according to false estimation it could be believed to be diminutive of someone's good, and from that estimation envy could arise. For affections arise not only from certain judgments, but also from suspicions and false estimations.