Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-a1-q2
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### Question II.
### *Whether the temptation through a serpent was fitting.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the temptation of the first parents with respect to the intermediate instrument. And it is said in Genesis chapter three that the devil tempted man through a serpent. And that this manner was not fitting is shown first as follows.

***For the opposite.***

1. The more hidden a temptation is, the more efficacious it is for deceiving: if therefore the devil was attempting to deceive man with the greatest cunning he could, it seems that he ought to have tempted him by a spiritual temptation without the assumption of any body.

2. Likewise, a temptation is the more efficacious, the more affable the tempter is in suggesting; but the act of speech belongs properly to the human form: therefore it seems that the devil, in order to tempt, ought rather to have assumed the form of a man than of a brute animal, since a brute animal by its speech would be more for terror than for persuasion.

3. Likewise, the more the tempter simulates and puts on the appearance of holiness, the more he prevails in tempting; but there are many animals which in their properties pretend to holiness more than the serpent, such as the dove and the lamb: therefore it seems that the devil ought to have assumed those rather for tempting.

4. Likewise, the instrument or organ ought to be conformed to the exercise carried out through it; but the temptation was for deceiving: therefore the devil ought to have assumed an animal most crafty and cunning. But there is more cunning in the fox than in the serpent: therefore he ought rather to have assumed a fox than a serpent.

***Note.*** For the opposite side there are reasons; but since they conclude what is true, they can be closed within the response.

### Conclusion.

> That man should be tempted by the devil under the species of a brute animal, and indeed of a serpent, is shown to be fitting in a threefold way.

***Notandum.*** **I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that that manner of tempting was not only from *diabolical choice*, as Augustine says, but also from *divine permission*. For it was not permitted to the devil to tempt in every manner he wished and could, but only in that manner which the Lord would permit. Now divine Wisdom, which orders and governs all things, conceded and permitted that the devil should tempt man in the form of a *brute animal*, and not of just any one, but of a *serpent*; for the fittingness of order so required. ***Two-membered conclusion.***

***Threefold fittingness, proof of conclusion.*** For that man should be tempted by the devil in the form of a *brute animal* was fitting both with respect to the *deed*, with respect to the *intended end*, and also with respect to the *divine judgment*. With respect to the *deed*, because man is born to be inclined to the good *as it now is*, chiefly on the sensible and brutal side; and therefore it was fitting that he be tempted in the form of a brute animal. — With respect to the *intended end* it was likewise fitting, because the temptation was ordered to this, that man might be made like a brute animal, when, with the unchangeable good despised, he would cling to the changeable good and there rest; and therefore for the insinuating of this he had to be tempted in the species of a brute animal. — With respect to the *divine judgment* also it was fitting, because the Lord, just and faithful, does not permit man to be tempted beyond what he is able. And therefore he so allows the devil to lie hidden in the temptation that nonetheless he can be detected by man: and therefore he did not allow that the devil should tempt man altogether in a like species, and through this not in human species or form, but rather in a brutal one. — Therefore the threefold fittingness of order required that man be tempted by the devil in a brutal form.

***For the second conclusion.*** This same threefold fittingness requiring, man was permitted to be tempted by the devil not in just any brute animal, but in the serpent. First by reason of the *deed*. For since the temptation came about through the entry of suggestion, which enters into the heart after the manner of a serpent and there spreads the poison of sin, from which man comes to die spiritually; therefore, so that the exterior form might correspond to the interior deed, it was fitting that man be tempted by the devil in the form of a serpent, whose nature it is to creep and to spread venom and by spreading it to kill man. — With respect also to the *intended end* it was fitting. For since the devil intended to turn the face and head and higher mind of man downward and to prostrate the whole, and so by prostrating to lead him to an evil end, proposing to him some delectable reward: therefore he was permitted to tempt in the serpent, which through its whole body has to cleave to the earth in its going. — It was fitting also with respect to the *divine judgment*. For since from that temptation by divine judgment an enmity was to arise between the tempted and the tempter; therefore the temptation of man had to come about in the serpent, which after the fall he most abhors, and which most by its cunning lies in wait to harm man. — And thus the manifold fittingness is plain why the devil was permitted to tempt man in serpentine form.

***Solution of the opposed.*** 1. To that therefore which is first objected, that a temptation is the more efficacious the more hidden it is; it must be said that, although the devil manifested himself to the exterior senses in the form of a serpent, nevertheless in that manifestation he was hiding himself more than manifesting himself. Whence the woman did not believe that he who was speaking in the serpent was an adversary, but rather a good counselor: and therefore that temptation was as hidden as if the devil were speaking to the inner heart. — ***Another solution.*** It can be answered otherwise: that by the just judgment of God he was not permitted to tempt interiorly, because he had no power to enter within, unless man should give him an opening; and therefore he tempted from outside through the senses, and by a sensible voice rather than by a spiritual voice; for he was not to be permitted otherwise.

2. To that concerning the greater affability the response is now plain. It is true indeed that if he had been in human form, he would have been more affable; but divine providence ought not to have permitted this, but rather to have tempered the wariness of the devil; and therefore there was conceded to him the body of a serpent, which however had the face of a virgin, as Bede says, and the rest of the body was that of a serpent, so that on one side he might lie hidden, on the other be detected.

3. To that which is objected concerning friendliness, the response is now plain: because the *appearance of friendship* had to be permitted to be shown thus, so that the *truth of enmity* might be detected. For the tempter, who pretended the appearance of friendship, was in truth an enemy. Therefore for this work an animal was most suited which had a human aspect but the body of *that* animal which is born to be most an enemy to man.

4. To that which is objected last concerning cunning, it must be said that, although there are some animals more cunning and prudent, nevertheless in harming and lying in wait against man the serpent is the most cunning animal. And because the cunning of the tempter was for offending man, hence it is that among other animals he was rather permitted to tempt through the serpent.

### Scholion.

**I.** This and the following question other Scholastics generally resolve in one question, treating specifically of the following. But of this (2.) explicitly there treat Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 103. m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6; *Summa* p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 3.

**II.** Of the following (3.) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 7 and 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; *Summa* II. II. q. 165. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, loc. cit. m. 1. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. and dub. lat. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4.

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