Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the modes of temptation in general.*

Next we inquire concerning the second article, on the modes of temptation in general. Now the Master divides temptation into that which is from the enemy, and that which is from the flesh. But since some knowledge of the temptation which is from the enemy can be had through those things which have been determined above concerning the power of demons, here we inquire concerning the temptation which is from the flesh. And concerning this three questions can be asked.

First it is asked, whether it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

Second it is asked, whether the temptation of the flesh can be separated from the temptation of the devil.

Third it is asked, which of these temptations is more difficult to resist.

### Question I. *Whether it belongs to the flesh to tempt.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

*Foundations.*

1. James 1: *Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence*; but the concupiscence which most of all draws us away and entices is the concupiscence of the flesh: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Cassiodorus, defining temptation, says that temptation is *the likening of a good unto deception*; but the carnal appetite makes a good *as for now* be believed to be a good *simply*; and this deceives and fools the spirit: therefore it happens that the spirit is tempted by the carnal appetite.

3. Likewise, diabolical temptation is nothing other than his suggestion; but as the devil suggests evils to man, so also does the prudence of the flesh, *which is enemy unto God*: therefore if the devil is said to tempt when he suggests evils, by the same reason also the flesh, when it draws the spirit unto carnal things.

4. Likewise, the devil assails us by tempting, nor is the devil's temptation other than his assault; but as we are assailed by the devil, so also are we assailed and impelled by the flesh: therefore it seems that, as we are tempted by the devil, so truly and properly are we tempted by the flesh.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Hugh of St. Victor: « *To tempt is to test cunningly and, as it were, to prove by certain bland efforts* »; but to take an experiment is of a rational substance alone: therefore it does not seem to belong to the flesh.

2. Likewise, the tempter differs from the tempted, for no one tempts himself; but he who is tempted is the carnal man: since therefore the carnal man does not differ from his flesh by substance, it seems that no man is tempted by his own flesh, nor by any other: therefore it stands that no flesh tempts.

3. Likewise, a persuasion ordered toward deceiving is rather sophistry than temptation, — for temptation is a persuasion ordered toward taking an experiment — but the vicious flesh inclines directly toward evil and by its inclination seduces the spirit: therefore the impulsion of the flesh ought rather to be called sophistry than temptation.

4. Likewise, whenever any act is said of several subjects, it is said according to something common found in them; but *God* is said in Scripture to tempt, and *the devil* and *man* and *the flesh*: therefore it ought to be said according to something common. But the flesh does not seem in any way to share anything in common with God and with angelic spirit: therefore it seems that temptation cannot belong to it; or if it does belong, this will be equivocally and according to another mode of speaking. — *Incidental question.* And if it is so, then there is the question: according to which mode is it said, and why is that impulsion of the flesh called temptation?

> **Conclusion.** *Since temptation is a certain touch ordered for proving, and the concupiscence of the flesh impels us, upon whose impulse follows the approval or disapproval of the man, the flesh is rightly said to tempt.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this word *tempt* has many acceptations, as those say who have studiously searched out the significations of words. *What it is to tempt.* If however we wish to take its principal and chief signification, *to tempt is to prove*; whence *temptation* may be called a certain touch by which that which is touched is proved: as a blind man is said to *tempt* when by his touch he wishes to have some certainty about something which he touches. By this mode in spiritual matters *temptation* is said to be a certain touch ordered for proving. — *Fourfold temptation.* And this can be in a fourfold way:

either because he who strikes intends to *prove* and *approve*, or to show as proved; and in this manner God tempts, according to what is said in Wisdom 3: *God tempted them and found them worthy of himself.*

— Or he who strikes intends to *prove* and *reprove*, or to make reprobate; and so the devil tempts, according to what is said in Acts 5: *Why has Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?*

— Or because he who strikes intends only to prove and to take an experiment of that which is in the man; and so the prudent man tempts; and concerning this in Ecclesiasticus 13: *From much speech he will tempt thee, and smiling he will question thee about thy hidden things.*

— *To the incidental question.* Or because, even though the one striking *intends nothing*, upon his striking nevertheless *follows the approval* or *reprobation* of the man; and so tempts the flesh or carnal concupiscence, of which James 1: *Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence.* For from the flesh, or from the concupiscence of the flesh, the man is struck and as it were touched, to which touch or striking if he consents, he is *proved and reproved*; but if he dissents, he is *proved and approved*. And so rightly and properly *Conclusion.* may the impulse of the flesh be called temptation. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary, that *to tempt is to test*; it must be said that that account is assigned by Hugh only *properly* of the temptation of the devil. — *Another solution.* But if anyone wishes to understand it *generally*, so that it may extend to every temptation which inclines toward evil, then we shall say that it is understood *by way of cause*, so that the sense is, that through temptation occurs an experiment and proving, whether a man is worthy to be *approved* or *reproved*; and this is done not only by the devil, but also by the flesh. — *Another interpretation.* But if he wishes to say that this is said *essentially*, then we shall say that by the name *flesh* is understood not the body alone, but the carnal reason; and the same man, insofar as he is *carnal* and turned toward the flesh, tempts himself insofar as he is *spiritual* and subject to the divine law.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the tempter differs from the tempted by substance; it must be said that just as *to judge* and *to be judged* are acts of different persons, nonetheless the same person, according to one and another portion of itself, can judge itself, as a man examines himself, and the superior portion judges the inferior; so also it is to be understood that spiritually sensuality itself can tempt reason, or the exterior man the interior; and so, when the flesh tempts the spirit, the same is not tempted by itself, but one by another; nevertheless these are found in the same person.

3. To that which is objected, that a persuasion ordered toward deceiving is rather sophistry than temptation; it can be said that *temptation* taken broadly comprehends both *sophistry* and *temptation* properly so called. For by a sophistic persuasion a man can take experiment of another; and so that objection is not valid, because *temptation*, in the sense in which it is taken here, is not divided against *deception* and *sophistry*. — *Another solution.* Yet otherwise it could be said that the name *temptation* is rather transferred from *material* temptation, in which there is a certain palpation — according to which a blind man is said to *tempt* — than from that temptation which is in ratiocinations, by which mode it is divided against *sophistry*, so that one syllogism may be called *sophistic*, another *tentative*.

4. To the last the response is clear from what was said. For something *common* is found in all those of which the act of tempting is said, namely a certain striking by a touch, upon which follows the proving of the one struck; and this was explained before.