Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the magnitude of the sin of the first parents.*

Consequently, with regard to the third article, the question is raised concerning the magnitude of the sin of the first parents. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the first sin could have been venial. Second it is asked, whether it was remediable or remissible. Third it is asked, whether among the other kinds of sins it was more grave.

### Question I. *Whether the sin of Adam could have been venial.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether the first sin of man was, or could have been, a venial sin. And that it could, it seems.

1. In departing from rectitude something is first bent by a small obliquity rather than a great one; but a great obliquity is a mortal fault, and a small one a venial fault: therefore when he fell from the state of the rectitude of innocence, he passed through the venial to the mortal: therefore he sinned venially before mortally.

2. Likewise, appetite precedes consent or choice, for we choose nothing unless we first desire it: therefore before the consent of the first man there was appetite. But that appetite was toward something illicit, therefore it was a sin; but not mortal, for nothing is mortal short of consent: therefore venial: he therefore sinned by a venial sin before by a mortal sin.

3. Likewise, it happens that one loves something inordinately and above God. It also happens that one loves something ordinately and under God; but between these two there falls a mean, namely to love something under God, but inordinately: if therefore one passes from one extreme to the other through a mean, man loved something inordinately under God before above God. But the first is mortal, the second venial: therefore etc.

If you should say that man, existing in the first state, could not sin venially; it is shown that he could:

4. First, because an idle word is a venial sin, so far as concerns its own genus, since it is not against any commandment; but Adam could speak an idle word and jest with his wife: therefore he could sin venially in that state.

5. Likewise, what can [do] the greater can [do] the lesser, which is ordered to it; but Adam could sin mortally; but a mortal sin is greater than a venial one. Since therefore Adam could first sin mortally, he could first sin venially.

6. Likewise, one must posit a state in which one can sin neither venially nor mortally, namely the state of the comprehensor; and a state in which one can sin venially and mortally, namely the state of the wayfarer; and a state in which it happens [that one can] sin mortally and not venially, like the state of the fallen angel: therefore one must posit a state in which it would happen [that one can] sin venially and not mortally; but this is none other than the state of man as instituted: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. A venial sin is venial precisely on account of the impulse and the proneness which a man has toward it; but the first man had no impulse: therefore he could not first commit a venial sin.

2. Likewise, in the first man there was no brute motion, but every [motion] was according to the deliberation of reason; but to commit a sin with the deliberation of reason, where there is no proneness, cannot be other than mortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the kingdom of the soul was so ordered, as Augustine says, that, if it [the soul] kept the order under God, nothing would go forth from its rule: therefore it was impossible for man to sin unless he first turned himself away from God; but this is through a mortal [sin]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the angel, on account of the dignity of his state, sinned not only mortally, but even irremediably: therefore if the state of innocence exceeded the state of misery in great pre-eminence, it seems that what is in us now small and light would, in that state, be great and grave: therefore there would be no light and slight sins there, but all would be grave and mortal.

5. Likewise, every sin takes away innocence; but what took away innocence from man took away immortality; and what took away immortality brought in death; and what brought in death was mortal: therefore from the first, no sin could be in man at the beginning which was not mortal.

6. Likewise, if Adam had first committed a venial [sin], I ask whether he could have repented, or not. If not: then it would have been irremediable. If so: then on account of the venial sin he would have grieved: then he would have become passible; and if passible, then also mortal, since the ground of passibility and of death would be the same in him. Therefore it was necessary that the first sin of the first man either be mortal, or be irremediable, or that something be venial and bring in death; which two could not stand together.

> **Conclusion.** The first sin of Adam was mortal, nor could it have been venial.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this there was a twofold opinion. For some said that Adam by his first sin sinned mortally, but could nevertheless have sinned venially, yet not by every kind of venial [sin]. For one [kind] is venial which is venial by the genus of the act, like speaking an idle word and a jesting falsehood, or breaking out into dissolute laughter; and this is venial not only when it precedes the judgment of reason, but also when it follows it; and by this sin

they say Adam could first have sinned. There is another genus of venial sin, which is called venial from "coming" (*a veniendo*), because it comes from the surprise and proneness of corrupted nature; and this precedes, does not follow, the judgment of reason; and by such a sin they said Adam could not sin, on account of the order of original justice, by which the lower power was so subjected to the higher that it would desire nothing apart from its rule and dictate. — And this position was sufficiently probable.

Nevertheless the doctors of theology do not commonly approve it; for it has improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which he was; from which also, since he had nothing impelling him, he could not depart except by despising the divine justice and by defiling his innocence and by corrupting his nature; all of which make the first fault of Adam to have been not venial, but mortal, nor could it have been otherwise. And therefore it is the common opinion, which today the doctors approve, that Adam in the state of innocence by his first sin sinned mortally, nor could his first sin have been venial. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**
1. To that, then, which is objected, that one first arrives at a small obliquity rather than at a great one; it must be said that this is true where there is a gradual bending by succession; but there it was rather a breaking than a bending, or if it ought to be called a bending, it first began in the consent, which was a mortal sin, and so between rectitude and that obliquity no mean fell in. And if you ask: whence this? I say that this was not on account of the immediate opposition of rectitude to mortal sin, but because in such a subject, which indeed had either to be sound, or dead.

2. To the second which is objected, that appetite precedes consent; it must be said that this is true; but the appetite which preceded the consent of the first parents was not lustful, but natural; from then on, however, it began to be lustful, when the deliberative will consented, and then also it began to be mortal; and so it did not begin to be a sin before it was mortal.

3. To that which is objected, that there is a mean between loving ordinately under God and inordinately above God; it must be said that, although there is a mean comparing the state to the state simply, yet comparing it to that man, no mean fell in. The reason for this was on account of the great nearness to God, on account of which he could love nothing inordinately without thereby doing injury to God, and thereby loving [it] above God.

4. To the other [argument] which is objected, that he could speak an idle word, which is venial; it must be said that an idle word would have been mortal for him on account of the perfection of his state. Hence, as to what is said, that some sin is venial generally or by the genus of its act, this is to be understood with respect to fallen nature.

5. To that which is objected: what can [do] the greater can [do] the lesser; it must be said that this is not always true, because the power of man is sometimes not so ordered toward the lesser as toward the greater. Hence it is greater for a man to die than to be sick with fever, yet one can more easily inflict death on another than fever; so too the first man could more readily kill himself than weaken himself, that is, [could] sin mortally before venially.

6. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a fourth state, in which one could sin only venially; it must be said that such a state in no way is fitting to be. For that some sin be venial to someone is on account of the great proneness which he has to sinning, and the difficulty which he has to doing good; and where these are, there is facility to the mortal. And so there is never to be posited a state in which one sins venially, in which one cannot sin mortally; there is nevertheless to be posited, conversely, a state, namely in which it happens [that one can] sin mortally and not venially, on account of a defect of repentance; and of this kind is the state of the demons.