Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the first sin of man was remissible or irremissible.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the sin which first followed from that temptation was remissible or irremissible. And that it was irremissible seems [to be the case].

**On the opposite side:**
1. Augustine, in *On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture*, speaking of the Angel, says that he could not rise again, because he fell from the most sublime state; but man fell from the noble grade and state which he was able to have in the wayfaring condition: therefore if the demon could not rise again, by parity of reasoning neither could man.

2. Likewise, a sin toward which a man has no inclination has no excuse, and that which lacks all excuse is not worthy of remission; but a sin which is wholly unfit for remission is irremissible: therefore that sin is irremissible which is done without any inclination. But such was the sin which followed from the first temptation: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, a disease which infects the whole nature is incurable, because it wholly expels health and the principle of health; but the sin which followed from the first temptation infected the whole human nature: it seems therefore that it was an incurable disease.

4. Likewise, Adam, before he sinned, had not only natural [gifts] but also gratuitous [gifts], as will be shown below — and the Gloss intimates this, on Luke chapter ten, where it says that man « was wounded in his natural [gifts] and despoiled of his gratuitous [gifts] » — but the Angel did not have gratuitous [gifts], but only natural ones, as was shown above: therefore the sin of man worked a greater corruption in man than the sin of the angel in the angel. But the sin which corrupts more is less apt to be healed: therefore if the sin of the angel was irremediable, much more so the sin of man.

**On the contrary:**
1. Penance is the way to finding pardon; but the first parent, after he sinned, was able to repent which is evident, because he grieved and repented: therefore he was able to find pardon and mercy: therefore his sin was remissible.

2. Likewise, it is fitting that he who is cast down by another should be helped by another; but man, when he sinned, was cast down by another tempting him: therefore it was fitting that he should have a safeguard and aid for rising again; but, this being had, the sin of man is remissible: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the sin of the first man infected the whole human nature: therefore if it had been irremissible, the whole human nature would have been damned: therefore the divine providence and disposition, which had made man for the sake of beatitude, would have been frustrated, and thus would be vain.

4. Likewise, fault is not of greater stability than grace, nor demerit than merit: therefore if the fault of Adam had been irremissible, the preceding grace would have been unlosable: therefore if he was able to lose grace, by parity of reasoning he was able to rise again from fault.

The question therefore is, on account of what the human sin was remissible, and not the angelic.

### Conclusion.

> The first sin of man was remissible, which is proved to be fitting by a threefold reasoning.

**I respond:** It must be said that the first sin of man, which followed from the temptation of the devil, was remissible.

And if the reason for this be asked, it must be said that from three grounds one sufficient reason can be gathered. For the sin of the first man was remissible because he was *mortal in flesh*, because *changeable in will*, because *excusable in his transgression*. — The *mortality of the flesh* made for remissibility. For the divine justice was able to exercise the severity and equity of its judgment upon man apart from eternal damnation in this, that it handed over the sinful man to death and took up the death of an innocent man for satisfaction, so that thus there should be exercised upon man the vengeance of severity for the fault perpetrated, so that, just as man by sinning voluntarily had forsaken God and had slain himself by the death of fault, so the spirit should unwillingly forsake the body, and death be exacted in punishment, just as it had been committed in fault. But the angel was by nature immortal and could not die, except

by eternal death; and therefore there was no other way of exercising upon him the severity of justice except through the death of eternal damnation. And thus the *mortality of the flesh* contributes much to this, that the sin of man should be remissible.

The *changeableness of the will* made for this nonetheless. For since man was constituted in changeableness of free choice, which ought to be in him not only for a moment but also for a long time, because for a long time he was to be a wayfarer; hence it is that, just as the grace coming to his will did not take away its changeableness toward evil, so the fault supervening did not take away the power of returning to good; and just as he was able to transgress, so he was able to be contrite; and just as through fault he came to divine wrath, so through penance he returned to grace. But the angel did not have this, as was shown above in the seventh distinction, on account of the brevity of the span for meriting, after which his will could not have changeableness, as was there shown.

The *excusableness in the fault* also made for the remissibility of the sin of man. For since he fell by another's suggestion, it was fitting that he should be raised up by another; and therefore it was suitable for him to have a mediator. And since the fallen cannot rise again without a hand to raise him, and the enemy cannot be reconciled without a mediator intervening; hence it is that the sin of man was remissible, not the sin of the angel: because man, who fell through another, ought to have another as helper and restorer; but not the angel, because he fell through himself. And this is the reason which the Master renders in the text.

**Epilogue.** And thus it is evident that there is a threefold reason why the sin of man was remissible; and these three concurring render one integral reason. Among these, however, the principal one is the reason placed in the middle position, namely the *changeableness of the will* after the fall, through which man was capable of penance, by means of which he could come to pardon. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that the sin of man, which followed from the first temptation, was remissible.

**Solution of the opposing arguments:**
1. To that, then, which is objected, that he fell from the noblest state; it must be said that, although man was in a sublime state, nevertheless he is not said to have fallen from the most sublime state as the angel did. For the angel was next to glory, so much so that by one single motion of conversion to God he could be made glorious; it was not thus with man; and therefore it is not similar.

2. To that which is objected, that man had no inclination; it must be said that, although he did not have an inclining [cause] *within*, he nevertheless had an impelling [cause] *without*, by reason of which his sin was in some way excusable. Yet granted that it was not excusable in itself, it was nevertheless made excusable when man began to grieve over his transgression.

3. To that which is objected, that the whole nature is corrupted; it must be said that, although it is corrupted as a whole with respect to the whole posterity which proceeds seminally from Adam, nevertheless there remained to Adam himself a seed in which all nations are blessed, that is Christ, in whom there was no corruption, but rather he was a most healthy member; and therefore by his cauterization he healed the other members from the dregs of sin. There remained also in man some natural rectitude, namely *synderesis*, which was not extinguished in him, by whose moving and instigating he was able to detest sin, and by detesting to return to God, and by returning to be healed.

4. To that which is objected, that man had natural and gratuitous [gifts] when he sinned; it must be said that, although he lost some gift in sinning which Lucifer did not lose, because he did not have it; nevertheless the rectitude of nature is not so bent in man as it was in the devil; and he did not cleave so wickedly and obstinately to what he desired as the angel, who had nothing to hold him back.