Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-a3-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the first sin was the gravest of all sins.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the sin which followed from that temptation was the gravest of all sins. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. Augustine in the fourteenth book *On the City of God*: "Great was the iniquity in sinning, where there was such great ease in not sinning." From this saying such an argument is drawn: where there is greater ease in obeying, there is greater fault in despising; but for the first man to obey was most easy: therefore in that transgression there was the greatest sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the same place: "The obedience of the second man is the more praiseworthy, in that he was made *obedient unto death*." From this saying such an argument can be drawn: just as he who is obedient unto death has the greatest merit in obeying and is most praiseworthy, as was the Son of God; so he who is so disobedient that he does not even desist on account of the fear of death is most blameworthy and reprehensible; but such was the disobedience of the first parents, who under the threat of death did not fear to transgress the divine command: therefore it seems that that sin was the greatest.

3. Likewise, a sin is the graver the more it corrupts, for sin is a corruption of mode, species, and order; but the sin of the first parents was most corruptive, because it corrupted not only themselves but also the whole human race: therefore it was the greatest of all sins.

4. Likewise, a sin is the graver the greater the penalty by which it is punished through the just judgment of God; but the sin of the first parents was punished by the penalty of death and disinheritance in themselves and in their posterity, and this is the greatest of all penalties: therefore that sin was the greatest.

**On the contrary:**
1. A remissible sin is less than an irremissible one; but that sin was remissible, as was proved above; but many sins are irremissible: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a sin which is in no way excusable is graver than one which has some excuse; but the sin of the first parents has some excuse in this, that it was done at the instigation of another; the sin against the Holy Spirit, however, has no semblance of excuse: therefore that sin was not the gravest sin.

3. Likewise, a sin is the graver the more it proceeds from greater lust; but in the first parents lust and wickedness of will reigned least of all, since their nature was clean and sound: therefore it seems that that transgression by disobedience was not the greatest.

4. Likewise, a sin which is against *reason* and *nature* and *divine institution* is graver than one which is only against a *divine command*; but the sin of the first parents, which followed from that temptation, was neither wholly against *nature* nor against *reason*, but only against the *divine institution* — for neither nature nor reason of itself dictated that one ought not to eat of that tree — whereas there are many sins which are against *nature* and *reason* and *divine institution*, which we call *sins against nature*: therefore it does not seem that that transgression of the first parents was the greatest of all sins.

> **Conclusion.** The sin of Adam was not the gravest on account of greater lust or ingratitude, yet it was in a certain way, that is, under a twofold respect, the gravest of all human sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although in many ways one sin can be called graver and greater than another, for the present it must nevertheless be observed that in three ways one sin is said to be graver than another: either on account of greater lust, or on account of greater ingratitude, or on account of greater corruption. — If we speak in the first way, then that sin was neither the greatest absolutely nor the greatest of all human sins; for from greater

lust the devil sinned, and also many of the children of Adam sin from greater lust than the first parent sinned. — But if a sin is said to be greater in the second way, namely as regards ingratitude; then the sin of Adam was not the greatest absolutely, yet it was the greatest of all human sins. For it was not the greatest absolutely, because the devil sinned from greater ingratitude, since he had received more goods in his creation and fell from a more sublime state. Yet it was the greatest of all human sins, because he was in a nobler and higher state than any of his descendants who fell into sin; and therefore he is judged to have been most ungrateful. — But if a sin is said to be greater than another in the third way, by reason of greater injury; then in a certain way it was the greatest of all, and in a certain way not. For a greater injury can be understood and exist in two ways, namely intensively and extensively. Speaking intensively, the sin of Adam was not of the greatest injury, because it did not so deprave his will as many sins deprave [it]. But speaking extensively, that sin was of the greatest injury, because there is no sin which has harmed so many persons and passes into so many, as that sin which was perpetrated from the original temptation; and so in a certain way it was the gravest, and in a certain way not.

And from this is clear the response to the reasons brought forward on both sides: for both sets conclude what is true according to different ways, as is sufficiently plain to one who looks.