Dist. 21, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/21/q/bon-sent-II-d21-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first about what is said, that the devil spoke through an ignorant serpent, just as through those possessed. But on the contrary: The devil moves the possessed by means of a sensible power: therefore it seems likewise that he moved the serpent to form speech by means of a sensible power; but this does not seem possible, because the imagination of the serpent was not capable of speech and discourse: therefore by means of it articulate speech could not be formed. — In keeping with this it is asked from what power that speech was principally formed; and whether a *new* power was given to the serpent; and whether also it was a *miracle*, as it was in the speaking of Balaam's ass.

**I respond:** It must be said that three things concur for the formation of speech: first, *the aptitude of the instruments* and their fittingness; second, *a motive power*; and third, *a directive power*, by whose governance articulate speech is formed. And these three are in man completely by his nature; but in brute animals they are found incompletely. For some animals have organs apt, though not completely, for the formation of voice; they have also a sensible motive power; they have also a cogitative or imaginative power, by reason of which they are trained to pronounce certain sounds; yet it is not in them completely, but when a rational power is present, which can both govern and move, then that incomplete potency must be reduced to act. — And so it was in that first temptation. For the devil aroused the motive power and assisted and directed it,

so that it could form those articulate words, in such a way that no new power was given to the serpent, but a higher power was assisting. Hence properly it was not a *miracle*, although one might reasonably wonder, since it was above the power of an irrational creature that such words be formed. — Therefore, although there is a greater aptitude in the possessed by reason of the motive power and the organs in speaking than in the serpent; yet because the power principally moving in both cases, and directing in the forming, is the power of the demon, therefore the Master says that the devil spoke through the serpent in the same way that he speaks through one possessed.

To that, then, which is objected, that the imaginative power of the serpent was not capable of speech; it must be said that this is true of speech as to its *signification*, but it is not true as to the *expression* of the voice. — Or it could be said that, although the motion of the serpent cooperated toward the motion of the tongue, yet the cognitive power did not cooperate toward the articulation of the voice. — And by this what was asked is made clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *the serpent was called most cunning on account of the cunning of the devil*. But if this is the reason why the serpent was called most cunning, by the same reasoning, if the devil had assumed any other animal whatever, it would be called most cunning: therefore there would be no reason why he assumed that animal rather than another.

**I respond:** It must be said that cunning is observed in a knowledge ordered to harming and seducing. And since harm is twofold, namely spiritual and corporeal, cunning can be twofold: either in harming *corporeally*, or in harming *spiritually*. The cunning in harming man corporeally the serpent has from the industry of its own nature, speaking at least according to the state of fallen nature. But the cunning of harming spiritually it does not have of itself, but from the presence of the devil; and of this Augustine speaks, and the Master in the text. And because spiritual things ought to be signified by corporeal things like them, therefore, since the serpent has of itself the cunning of harming and lying in wait corporeally, it was fitting for the devil through it to exercise his cunning against man in harming spiritually; and according to this twofold sense Scripture can be understood.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what Scripture says: *It must be known that there are two species of temptation, interior and exterior.* For exterior temptation is only on account of the interior, nor does it lead to fault except by means of the interior: therefore it does not seem that they should be distinguished from each other. — Likewise, he subdivides the interior into that which is from the enemy, and into that which is from the flesh; and it seems that that division is insufficient, because temptation is not only from the enemy and from the flesh, but also from the world, according to that of the first of John, chapter two: *Everything that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh* etc.

It is asked therefore concerning the *sufficiency* of these members. And since elsewhere several other differences of temptation are read, it is asked how they are distinguished from those.

**I respond:** It must be said that temptation can be considered in five modes, namely as to its *motive* and as to its *instrument* and as to its *effect* and as to its *degree* and as to its *manner*. — As to the *motive*: either generally or specially. If generally; thus temptation is divided into that which is from the enemy and from the flesh and from the world, as is said in a certain sequence: «World, flesh, demons stir up diverse battles». — If specially, so that the motive be called that which presents itself not only by way of *object*, but also that which induces and incites by way of an *impelling* thing; thus is that division which the Master places in the text, that one temptation is from the enemy, another from the flesh, each of which has the power to enkindle toward evil.

But if we speak as to the *instrument*, thus it can be considered in two ways: either generally, or specially. If generally; thus is that division of Gregory, that one temptation is through *vices*, another through *scourges*. — If specially; thus is that division of temptation which the Gloss places on the Psalm upon that text: *Her soul abhorred all food* etc, where it is said that temptation is manifold; of which the first is *error* or ignorance of the way of truth; the second, *the difficulty of overcoming concupiscences*; the third, *weariness of the good*; the fourth, *the storm of the world*.

If in the third mode, namely as to the *effect*, the temptation itself be considered, likewise it can be considered in two ways: either generally, or specially. If

generally; thus is that division which is placed in the Gloss upon that text of the first to the Corinthians, chapter ten: *Let no temptation take hold of you* etc, where it is said in the Gloss that one temptation is *diabolical*, another is *human*. And they differ because, as is there intimated, diabolical temptation is that which has an evil outcome and which terminates in mortal sin; but human temptation is called that which does not have a perilous outcome, because either there is venial sin there, or there is no fault there, according to what is shown in the Gloss, where it is said that human temptation comes about in three ways. — If specially; thus is that of Augustine *On Christian Doctrine*, that the devil tempts either by vexing the flesh, or by wounding the natural endowments, or by despoiling of the gratuitous gifts: for here the effects of diabolical temptation are placed specially.

But if in the fourth mode temptation be considered, namely as to its *degree*, this can be in two ways: either generally, or specially. If generally; thus is that which the Master places in the text: one temptation is *exterior*, another *interior*. — If specially; thus is that which Gregory places, and is had in the Gloss upon that text of James, chapter one: *Each one is tempted by his own concupiscence* etc, that temptation is accomplished in three ways: by *suggestion, delight*, and *consent*, where the degrees in the progress of temptation are noted explicitly, which in the division had before were placed implicitly. For by exterior temptation we understand suggestion; by the interior we understand that in which there is delight or consent. — And by this is made clear the response to that which is first objected, that those members are not distinguished from one another, since one is ordered to the other.

But if in the fifth mode temptation be considered, namely as to the *manner* of tempting; this likewise will be either generally, or specially. If generally; this can be explicitly, or implicitly. If implicitly; thus is that which is placed in the Gloss upon the Psalm: *He who dwells in the aid*, where it is said that one temptation is light and hidden; another grave and hidden; another light and manifest; another grave and manifest. But if explicitly; thus is that which Bernard places through seven members. Of which the first is *importunate*, namely that which presses on boldly; the second *doubtful*, namely that which involves the soul in a cloud of doubt; the third is *sudden*, namely that which forestalls the judgment of reason; the fourth *hidden*, which namely escapes the order of deliberation; the fifth *violent*, which transcends our strength; the sixth *fraudulent*, which namely seduces the soul; the seventh *perplexing*, which entangles with diverse vices. — For in this division are explained the difficulties and gravities of temptations or of the modes of tempting, and the hidden qualities, which in the prior division were enclosed implicitly. Nevertheless both this division and the preceding one is concerning the modes of temptation considered in their generality. — But if temptation be considered specially, as it is contracted to the temptation of the devil, thus its modes can be assigned in two ways: either implicitly; and thus Augustine divides in a certain sermon: «The devil tempts as a lion, he tempts as a dragon». Or explicitly; and thus is that division of Gregory upon Job, chapter forty, upon which place Gregory speaks thus: «To his faithful servant the Lord intimates all the machinations of the cunning enemy, namely that by oppressing he *snatches away*, by lying in wait he *circumvents*, by threatening he *terrifies*, by persuading he *flatters*, by causing despair he *breaks*, by promising he *deceives*». But in this division are explained the modes which Augustine had enclosed under these two words, that «he tempts as a lion, he tempts as a dragon». — And thus is made clear the reason for assigning the diverse divisions of temptation according to its diverse considerations. There is made clear nonetheless the response to the objections.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says in the text: *The temptation which comes from the flesh is not without sin.* For since the devil can stir up and vex the flesh, it seems likewise that the temptation which is from the enemy could not be without sin. — Likewise, since it is not in our power to be tempted, or not

to be tempted, it seems that temptation of itself does not place fault in us, unless it be consented to. As therefore the temptation of the enemy, which is not consented to, is matter for the exercise of virtue, so it seems also is the temptation of the flesh. — On account of this there is a question, why the temptation of the flesh is more always with sin than the temptation of the enemy.

**I respond:** It must be said that the temptation of the flesh is an impulse of sensuality, which we are accustomed to call *the first motion*; and since in that impulse sensuality is moved inordinately and beside the order of reason, hence it is that the temptation of the flesh is never in us without there being in us some inordination, and so some venial fault. But the temptation of the enemy is altogether outside, and can be without any inordinate delight existing in us. And therefore the Master says that the temptation of the enemy can be without sin, but the temptation of the flesh by no means. — Another reason also could be given, namely that the flesh is in our power, and we can subdue it at our pleasure; and therefore the impulse of the flesh is imputed to us as fault rather than diabolical suggestion. But in what way the impulse of the flesh, or the first motions, ought to be said to be sin, will be determined below in its proper place more expressly.

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