Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/22/q/bon-sent-II-d22-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the fault of the first parents in relation to the ignorance of the intellect.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the sin of the first parents in relation to ignorance on the part of the intellect. And concerning this, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether the sin of the first parents was from ignorance.

Second it is asked whether ignorance is in any way a fault.

Third it is asked whether there is an excuse for the fault.

### Question I. *Whether the sin of the first parents was from ignorance.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the sin of the first parents was from ignorance, at least the sin of the woman.

1. *Genesis* third chapter: *The serpent deceived me,* etc.; but where there is deception, there is privation of knowledge; and where this is, there is ignorance: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, one who doubts about something about which he ought to be certain is rather said to be ignorant of it than to know it; but the woman ought to have been certain about the word of the Lord, who had said: *On whatever day you eat, you shall die the death,* and she doubted about this when she said: *Lest perhaps we die:* therefore she seems to have sinned from ignorance.

3. Likewise, one who believes a mortal sin to be venial is ignorant of the truth of the divine law; but Adam believed that sin to be venial, as Augustine says, and the Master adduces in the text: «He reckoned it to be a venial, not a mortal, offense»: therefore it seems that both the man and the woman sinned from ignorance.

4. Likewise, every sin is either «from ignorance, or from infirmity, or from malice». But the sin of the first parents was not from malice, because then it would be a sin against the Holy Spirit; nor from infirmity, because they had no proneness to sinning: therefore it was from ignorance.

5. Likewise, if Adam and Eve had believed that they were offending God so gravely and incurring such great penalties, since they had no proneness to sin, it in no way seems that they would have committed a fault: if therefore they committed a fault, it seems that they were ignorant of this, and so sinned from ignorance.

**On the contrary:**
1. If they sinned from ignorance, that ignorance was either a punishment or a fault. If a fault: then there was a fault in them before the first fault, which is impossible, since two opposites are here implied. If a punishment: then a punishment was before the fault.

2. Likewise, if there was ignorance there, then it was either of law or of fact. Not of fact, because they well knew that they were eating from the forbidden tree. Not of law, because they well knew that they ought to obey God and in no way act against His command. Therefore no ignorance seems to have been in them.

3. Likewise, if there was ignorance there, then it was either voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary: then it seems that already their will, in desiring ignorance, was disordered. If involuntary: then it seems that in no way ought a fault to be imputed to them. If therefore it was imputed, it does not seem that it was from any ignorance.

4. Likewise, if it was from ignorance, then it was either innate, or contracted, or inflicted, or procured. Not from one procured nor contracted nor inflicted: therefore it was from innate ignorance. But it was not fitting for God to make human nature with proneness and impotence: therefore by parity of reasoning He ought not to have made it with blindness and ignorance: if therefore they sinned from ignorance, it seems that this could be imputed to God.

5. Likewise, if in any way the woman is said to have sinned from ignorance, this is because she was deceived by the serpent; but the man was not deceived, as the Apostle says: therefore his sin did not proceed from ignorance. If therefore the root of sin in the man and in the woman was not one and another, it seems also that not even the woman sinned from ignorance.

### Conclusion
> The sin of Eve and also of Adam was from a certain ignorance, taken in the broad sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that for a sin to be from ignorance can be said in two ways, namely *properly* and *commonly:* properly, insofar as sin from ignorance is distinguished against sin from infirmity and from deliberation; and in this way ignorance signifies a privation of knowledge which does not belong to man by nature, but was contracted by the merit of the first fault. And in this way the sin of the first parents cannot be said to be from ignorance, nor is it contained under that division by which it is said that every sin is either from ignorance, or etc. For that division of sin is according to the state of fallen nature. — But commonly a sin is said to be from ignorance which is committed while some not-knowing exists in the one sinning, by reason of which he considers neither the gravity of the fault nor the gravity of the punishment. And in this way the sin of the first parents can be said to have been from ignorance, because both in the man and in the woman there was a certain not-knowing, which was not a punishment, but a certain natural imperfection, more found in the woman than in the man. For the woman was ignorant whether the serpent was suggesting to her something true or false; she was also ignorant of the severity of divine justice. The man, however, is said to have been ignorant of one of these, namely of the severity of divine justice, in that he reckoned that for that transgression he would quickly find pardon: for he was inexperienced in the severity of divine justice. Yet each was able to know, by the knowledge which he had, that he was doing wrong.

And so, taking ignorance broadly, it can be said that the sin of the first parents was from ignorance; and the sin of Eve more than that of Adam. And this is what the reasons adduced for the first part conclude. — But taking ignorance *properly,* insofar as it signifies a punishment, and this is, insofar as it signifies a not-knowing of that thing which a man ought to know according to requirement; in this way the sin of the first parents was not from ignorance, as the reasons adduced for the contrary part show; and this is plain by running through them one by one.

**To the arguments for the contrary part:**
1. As to what is objected, that ignorance is either a punishment or a fault; it can be said that this division is not sufficient, unless ignorance is taken *properly.* For not only man as first instituted, but even the blessed Angel is ignorant of some things, since *many things become known to the Principalities and Powers through the Church*. Hence such ignorance is neither a fault nor a punishment, because it is in respect of those things which he need not know, so far as pertains to the first condition of nature.

2. To what is objected, that it was either ignorance *of law* or *of fact;* it must be said that there was not there, properly speaking, ignorance *of law* as regards the principal point, but as regards *something annexed,* namely as regards the severity of the judge. Likewise there was not there ignorance *of fact* as regards the principal point, because they well knew that they were tasting the forbidden tree; yet there was in the woman a certain ignorance as regards that which she believed she would attain through it, namely likeness to God; and so there was not there ignorance *properly* called, but *commonly.*

3. To what is objected, that ignorance was either voluntary or involuntary; it must be said that this is not a division *through immediates,* if ignorance is taken broadly. For someone there is who thinks nothing about that which he is ignorant of; and then he is affected toward it neither voluntarily nor involuntarily; and so it was with that ignorance of Eve.

4. To what is objected, that it was either innate, or contracted, etc.: it must be said that that ignorance signified a certain incompleteness and imperfection of knowledge, which was in the souls of the first parents from the defect of their own nature, in that their souls were not in the entire fullness of light. But in such a state it was fitting that man should be made so, because, as will be plain below, he had to be a *wayfarer* before a *comprehender.* Yet man is not said to have been in darkness or in blindness by that ignorance, because he had sufficient light to walk along the way of justice; and therefore it is not similar in the case of *proneness.* For proneness signifies not only an imperfection, but also a certain curving of nature, and through this a disorder.

5. To what is objected last, that the man did not sin from ignorance, because he was not deceived; it must be said that the woman is said to have been ignorant not only on account of the *deception,* but also because she was ignorant of the bitterness of the subsequent punishment. And although in Adam there was not the ignorance of that *deception,* yet there was ignorance through inexperience of the *divine vengeance;* and therefore some ignorance or not-knowing was in Adam, though less than in Eve. — Nor does what is objected about the *root* avail, because ignorance is not posited there as being from one root, but because in a certain way such not-knowing furnished an occasion for sinning.