Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/22/q/bon-sent-II-d22-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether ignorance in some person can be a fault.*

Secondly, in connection with this, it is asked whether ignorance in some person can be a fault. And that it can, it seems.

1. First Corinthians, chapter fourteen: *He who is ignorant shall be ignored*; but no one is ignored by God except on account of a fault: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm: *He would not understand* etc., the Gloss of Augustine: «Ignorance in those who refuse to understand is a sin».

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. *To know* what is to be believed and what is to be done is an act of virtue, namely of faith and prudence: therefore *to be ignorant* of these is to be deprived of virtues; but the privations of virtues are vices and sins: therefore some ignorance is a fault.

4. Likewise, not *to do* the things which a man is bound to do is a sin, likewise not *to say* them, likewise not *to love* the things which a man is bound to love is a sin: therefore likewise *not to know* what one is bound to know is a sin; but there are many who are ignorant of those things which they are bound to know, namely those things without which they cannot be saved: therefore in such people ignorance is a fault.

5. Likewise, error is a sin: therefore either by reason of what it posits, or by reason of what it deprives. Not by reason of what it *posits*, because sin is a privation, not a positing. If by reason of what it *deprives*; but error deprives of knowledge, and the privation of knowledge is ignorance: therefore ignorance is a fault.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion* says that «ignorance of the things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things have been inflicted upon us»; but no sin has been inflicted upon us: therefore ignorance is not a sin.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason. For in every sin there is a turning away from the unchangeable good and a turning toward the changeable; but in ignorance there is no turning toward the changeable good: therefore ignorance is not a fault.

3. Likewise, no sin remains after penance; but ignorance remains in a man after penance and contrition; therefore ignorance is not a fault. If you say that it remains in act, but passes away as to guilt; then it seems that ignorance would not be an actual fault, but an original one. But it is not *original*, because it remains after baptism, and this will appear better below; nor is it actual: therefore it is not a fault.

4. Likewise, every sin is in the affection, since every sin is voluntary; but ignorance is in the intellect: therefore ignorance is not a sin.

5. Likewise, if ignorance is a sin, then to be ignorant is to sin; but of an ignorant man it is true to say that at every instant he is ignorant: therefore at every instant he sins: therefore there are as many sins in him as there are instants. But if this is false and impossible, it remains that ignorance is not a sin.

### Conclusion

> Ignorance of things necessary for salvation can sometimes be a sin, sometimes not.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since privations are known through the habits, the knowledge of ignorance depends upon the knowledge of the corresponding knowledge. — But it must be attended to that there is a certain knowledge of some things which is neither necessary for virtue nor necessary for salvation, as is the knowledge of the mechanical and liberal arts; and such knowledge is neither a virtue nor of the being of virtue; and that ignorance which is the privation of this knowledge is not a fault, whether it be an ignorance of negation or of disposition, whether also it be voluntary or not. — There is another knowledge, of things to be believed and to be done, which is necessary for salvation in an adult; and this is the knowledge of faith and prudence; and we are bound to have this knowledge, because without it no one can live rightly. — But the privation of this knowledge can be in us in two ways: either with the obligation remaining, or with it not remaining. If with the obligation remaining, then there is a fault there, because, when someone is bound to something and does not fulfill it, by that very fact he is at fault and worthy of punishment. If, however, the privation is in us with the obligation not remaining, as when one cannot know, and incapacity excuses from obligation; then the privation of this knowledge is not a fault, as in the insane. — And accordingly ignorance, which states the privation of knowledge necessary for salvation, is in one way a sin, but in another way not at all.

It can be said otherwise, and it comes back to almost the same thing, that the privation of knowledge necessary for salvation can be in two ways: either such that it is in us, but not from us, and in this way it is not a fault, but rather a punishment, and since we are not its principle, in it we neither merit nor demerit; or such that it is in us and from us, and thus it is a fault. — But this can be in three ways: either when, existing on the way of truth, we voluntarily withdraw from it and cast ourselves into the pit of error, and this privation can be called *erroneous ignorance*, which is in heretics; or when, being able to attain to the way of truth, we desire to walk in darkness, and this can be called *affected ignorance*; or because, out of a certain laziness and negligence, we do not care to learn the truth, and this is called *gross and supine ignorance*. — And each of these is a fault, although the first is greater than the second, and the second than the third.

And thus the reasons showing that ignorance can in some way be a fault are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that ignorance is inflicted upon us; it must be said that, insofar as it is inflicted upon us, it is a punishment and not a fault; insofar, however, as our will is in some way disordered concerning it, as was said before, it begins to be a fault; just as the sufferings inflicted on the holy Martyrs were punishments, considered in themselves, yet compared to the will of the Saints willingly bearing them for the love of Christ, they were meritorious for them. But whether it is in some way a fault, insofar namely as it is contracted, will be seen below when original sin is treated of.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that ignorance is not a turning-toward; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is a pure privation; insofar, however, as our affection in some way accompanies it, it does not hold true; and in this way it is said to be a fault, not primarily.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that ignorance remains after penance; it must be said that it does not remain insofar as it has the character of a fault, namely by reason of the accompanying will, or in some way causing it; but if it remains, this is insofar as it has the character of a punishment contracted from the original. Therefore, as to the first, in which it has the character of an actual sin, it passes away not only in act but also in guilt, when one repents; but as to the second, it remains in some way, and thus ignorance seems to remain in act; and in this it has a certain approximation to original sin; yet according to that by which it is a fault, it is an actual sin.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that ignorance is in the intellect; it must be said that that ignorance which is opposed to the knowledge of virtue, to which we are bound, regards not only the intellect, but also the affection, just as the virtue opposed to it. Hence it states not only a lack of knowledge, but also a heedlessness of the will and a negligence in acquiring knowledge.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that at every instant he is ignorant; it must be said that to be ignorant is not said to be a fault except insofar as one is bound to know what he is ignorant of. And therefore, even if at every instant he is ignorant and at every instant he is bound, yet because an affirmative precept does not oblige for all time, but for a place and a time; one who is ignorant, in being ignorant, does not sin except in that instant and time in which he is bound to know or to learn what he is ignorant of; therefore, although he is always said to be ignorant, he is not nevertheless always said to sin.