Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/22/q/bon-sent-II-d22-a2-q3
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### Article II. *On the sin of our first parents in relation to ignorance on the part of the intellect.*
### Question III. *Whether ignorance is an excuse for fault.*

Thirdly it is asked whether ignorance is an excuse for fault. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. First, to Timothy chapter one: *I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly*: if therefore ignorance was the reason why he attained to mercy, it seems that ignorance made his fault excusable.

2. Likewise, knowledge aggravates fault, as is said in Luke chapter twelve: *The servant who knew the will of his Lord* etc.: therefore, by the opposite, ignorance lightens [it], therefore it excuses.

3. Likewise, every sin is voluntary: therefore what diminishes from the character of the voluntary diminishes from the character of sin; but ignorance diminishes from the character of the voluntary, because «the voluntary, as the Philosopher says, is that whose principle is in the very one who knows the singulars»; therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as fortitude is required for resisting sin, so too knowledge is required; but a defect of fortitude, namely weakness, excuses fault: therefore it seems likewise that a defect of knowledge, namely ignorance, [excuses too].

5. Likewise, what in its fullness wholly removes fault, short of fullness diminishes it in some way; but when someone is simply ignorant, «as is an infant and a madman, nothing he does is imputed to him as sin», as Bernard and other doctors say: therefore it seems that all ignorance, once a sin has been perpetrated, in some way affords the protection of an excuse.

**On the contrary:**
1. Isidore, in the book *On Ecclesiastical Institution*: «No one is greater in fault than he who does not know God»: therefore it seems that ignorance does not excuse, but aggravates.

2. Likewise, upon that passage to the Romans chapter two: *Or are you ignorant* etc., the Gloss of Ambrose: «You sin most grievously, because you are ignorant»: therefore it seems that ignorance aggravates fault.

3. Likewise, ignorance is of itself an evil, but an evil added to an evil makes a greater evil: therefore it seems that ignorance increases sin, [and] does not excuse [it].

4. Likewise, knowledge neither increases nor diminishes merit, but grace and charity alone do: therefore by parity of reasoning neither does ignorance increase nor diminish demerit, therefore it does not excuse sin.

5. Likewise, suppose that one who knows sins from a certain amount of lust, and another who is ignorant from as great a lust; if the lust there is equal, then the punishment ought to be equal: therefore it seems that the excuse, or the accusation, is equal on both sides: therefore ignorance does not excuse, or accuse, any more than knowledge does.

There is therefore a question: on account of what does ignorance excuse more than knowledge? And since both ignorance and weakness excuse, there is likewise a question, which of these excuses more.

Again, since there are many differences of ignorance, along with this it is asked which of them excuse and which not, and which more and which less.

### Conclusion
> Every ignorance in some way excuses sin, either wholly or to a degree.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that all ignorance in some way excuses sin. — And the reason for this is that it diminishes from the character of the voluntary, [and] diminishes also from the character of contempt. For, other things being equal, he who sins on purpose shows more contempt than he who sins ignorantly. And again, since the voluntary includes within itself knowledge, what removes knowledge removes from the character of the voluntary. — Since therefore sin is measured according to the quantity of lust and of contempt, and ignorance diminishes from the character of these; it is generally true that all ignorance, insofar as it is such, excuses sin; and if it be so great that it wholly removes the character of the voluntary and the character of contempt, it excuses wholly; but if it does not wholly remove [them], it excuses to a degree. — The reasons showing that ignorance excuses sin are therefore to be granted.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**
*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Isidore: *He sins most grievously who does not know God*; it must be said that Isidore there compares the sin of unbelief to the other kinds of sins; and it is in itself very grave, because it is not without a great disordering of the soul. Nevertheless, when someone does something ignorantly and in unbelief, as the Apostle says of himself, he sins less grievously than he who does it from certain knowledge.

*To 2.* To that of Ambrose, who says that he who is ignorant sins most grievously; it must be said that this is said not by reason of greater fault, but by reason of a more dangerous weakness; for since he has no knowledge of the disease or fault, he does not seek the medicine; and so the disease and corruption always remain. And this is what Augustine says in the book of *Confessions*: «I sinned the more incurably, the more I judged myself not to be sinning».

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that an evil added to an evil makes a greater evil; it must be said that this holds true when an evil conforms to an evil. But the evil of punishment, since it is involuntary, does not conform to the evil of fault, which is voluntary; and therefore it does not increase but rather diminishes [it]. And since ignorance in us is not so much a fault but that it is also in some way a punishment, therefore it excuses the sin perpetrated.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that knowledge does not increase merit; it must be said that this does not follow. For the quantity of merit is not from us, but from the grace of God; whereas demerit and its quantity have their origin from the will of free choice: and therefore what contributes to the character of the voluntary contributes in some way to the increase of sin, and likewise, what diminishes [it] contributes to the lightening of sin. But ignorance is such, as was said above.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that those who sin from equal lust are equally punished; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion] that ignorance does not excuse; because if he who is ignorant sins from as great a lust as he who knows; existing in the state of ignorance, if he had knowledge, he would sin with a much greater [lust]; and so he would sin more gravely and be punished more gravely; and therefore the ignorance which is in him excuses the sin — excuses, I say, and diminishes the quantity of the sin, not [the quantity] which it has, but [the quantity] which it would have if the ignorance were not present.

To that which is asked, which excuses more, ignorance or weakness; it can be answered that there are two things belonging to the character of the voluntary, namely the knowledge of singulars or of circumstances, and that the principle of the operation be intrinsic. Ignorance therefore excuses, because it deprives [it] of the character of *knowing*; weakness excuses, because it deprives [it] of the character of *acting perfectly as a principle*; and since, when the prior is taken away, the posterior is taken away, and not conversely, and to know is preliminary to acting: ignorance removes more from the character of the voluntary than does weakness or impotence: and therefore it excuses more, other things being equal. Yet weakness can so far surpass and the ignorance be so slight, or proceed from our own fault, that it will be the reverse. Hence although, speaking in general, it is true to say that ignorance excuses more than weakness; yet descending to *particular* sins, they can stand as exceeding and exceeded.

To that which is asked, which ignorance excuses and how much; it must be said that there is ignorance *of fact* and ignorance *of law*. — Ignorance of fact can be twofold: either due diligence has been applied, or not. If due diligence has been applied, it excuses wholly; if it has not been applied, it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree.

But if it be ignorance of law, this can be twofold: either it is vincible, or invincible. If vincible, then it is the ignorance which is a fault. And this is either from *true consent*, as *affected* ignorance, and this so excuses on the one side that on the other side it aggravates the more; or it is from *negligence* and *sloth*, as *crass and supine* ignorance, and this, although it excuses in some way, yet does not «so excuse that one does not burn in everlasting fire», as Augustine says, and the Master in the text.

But if it be invincible ignorance, this can be twofold: either this ignorance has been introduced in us through a preceding fault, or apart from all fault. If apart from all fault, either it simply deprives [one] of the knowledge of law, as in infants and madmen, who entirely lack the use of reason; and this excuses wholly — whence Bernard says «that to infant children and to the sleeping, nothing they do is imputed». — Or it does not wholly remove the use of reason, but [removes its] fullness; and then it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree, as is the case in those who are not fully mad, but have in some way lucid intervals, and in children, who are in some way capable of a precept, though not fully. — But if the ignorance has been introduced through one's own fault, as is the case in the drunkard and the madman, each of whom has cast himself into this through his own fault; thus it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree, because, as the Philosopher says, «the drunkard shall have a twofold malediction, namely a malediction for the preceding fault and a malediction for the subsequent [fault]».

But how much and in what manner it excuses the subsequent fault, certain men determine in various ways. — For some say that neither the drunkard nor the madman, who lacks the use of reason, commits a new fault, but the first fault is aggravated by the subsequent disorder; for a fault can be aggravated by the subsequent outcome. — But to others it seems that it does not so excuse but that he commits a new fault; yet it is not so grave as if he did that same thing from certain knowledge. The first manner of speaking, however, seems more probable. — From these things it is clear that Lot is not entirely excused from the fault of incest, when he knew his daughters. First indeed, because there was not in him full ignorance; for although it is said in the text that he did not perceive when his daughters lay down, this is said because he did not discern. But secondly, because he came into that ignorance through the drunkenness which he ought to have avoided; and therefore the Saints say that he was culpable, although on the other side they say that he was to some extent excusable.

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