Dist. 22, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/22/q/bon-sent-II-d22-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *If man had not sinned, the human race would not have perished corrupted by sins.* But on the contrary: man contracts the mass of flesh from the woman just as from the man, and more so: if therefore we contract original sin from the corruption of the condemned mass, then it would likewise contract original sin from the corruption of the woman just as from the corruption of the man.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because the principal source of propagation resides in the man, the power of preserving justice resided chiefly in the man, and God had committed this to the man to be preserved; and therefore, if the man had not sinned, his posterity would not be deprived of original justice. — To that, then, which is objected concerning the woman, the reply is twofold: either that man would then have contracted from the woman's side the corruption of penalty, not the corruption of foulness, which chiefly takes its origin from the man's side; or rather, what seems more probable, that the man would no longer have been joined to the woman, but God would have formed for him another, new woman, this being preserved, that the sentence of condemnation and of death and of corruption would have remained in her.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In three modes,* as Isidore says, *sin is carried on,* etc.; for Bede says that four things were inflicted upon us on account of the first sin, namely « infirmity, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence »: therefore, since all these are sources of sins, Isidore's division seems to be insufficient, which posits only three members. — Likewise, just as *industry* is opposed to *ignorance,* so *potency* is opposed to *infirmity*: therefore, just as it is posited that one kind of sin is from *ignorance,* and another from *industry,* so likewise another ought to be posited from *infirmity,* another from *potency.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this division of sin is taken according to the corruption of the powers of the soul, so that *ignorance* regards the rational, *infirmity* the irascible, and *malice* regards the concupiscible; and the same sin is here called both sin from *industry* and from *malice.* Therefore, since all the motive powers can be comprehended under these three, every sin that occurs in the state of fallen nature must be reduced to these three kinds. — But to that which is objected concerning *concupiscence,* it must be said that that member is not distinguished against the others, because, as the same Bede says, concupiscence is compounded out of all these; and therefore no difference is taken according to concupiscence, since all sins proceed from it. For thus Augustine says: « When the law prohibits concupiscence, it prohibits every evil ».

To that which is objected, that *potency* is opposed to *infirmity* as *industry* to *ignorance*; it must be said that *industry* does not stand here principally for the *knowledge* that is opposed to ignorance, but stands there for the *malice* that knowledge accompanies. But why sin from malice is called sin from industry will appear below, when treatment is made of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The ignorance of those who refuse to know, when they are able, does not excuse;* because, as the Philosopher says, « all men naturally desire to know »; but what is natural is in no way habituated to its contrary: therefore it seems that no man rejects knowledge. — Likewise, *knowledge* is related to the intellect as *peace* is related to the affection; but since peace is the perfection of the affection, there is no one who does not desire peace, as Augustine says: « For all who make war make war for the sake of peace »: therefore it likewise seems that no one rejects knowledge.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as it happens that one *knows* something in the universal and is *ignorant* of it in the particular, so it happens that one *desires* something in the universal and yet *despises* it in the particular. And this is clear: for every man desires beatitude; yet that beatitude which Christians await, many there are who spurn and refuse; and the first desire is from the *natural* will, the second is from the *elective* will. In this manner it is in the matter at hand. Although all men by nature desire to know and wish to be knowing, yet very many spurn the knowledge of God's commandments. — And thus the reply to those two objections is clear; for to refuse knowledge, this belongs not to *nature,* but to the *elective will.* And although no one refuses peace in the universal, yet many shun this mode of peace, or that, and therefore flee to war.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *One must not flee to the shadows of ignorance.* For since
ignorance is a pure privation, and nothing is desired except under the aspect of the good and the useful, it seems that ignorance cannot be sought after, or fled to. *Moreover,* nothing is loved unless known: but the shadows of ignorance are not known: therefore it seems that no one flees to them.

**I respond:** It must be said that some things are desired on account of something desirable and delightful which they have *in themselves,* like spiritual and corporeal goods. Some things are desired on account of a good which *follows* upon them and is drawn out of them, as one desires distresses and tribulations, through which a man comes to perfection in merit and reward. Some things are desired on account of the *comparison of a greater evil,* as one, lest he be captured, throws himself down from a height; and that is not properly *to desire,* but to *flee* to it. In this manner it is to be understood in the matter at hand. For because a man fears to be caught in a crime, therefore he flees the light; *for he does not come to the light, lest his works be reproved*. And because one cannot flee the light except in darkness and through darkness, therefore *the eye of the adulterer watches for the gloom,* and he who wishes to do evil seeks the ignorance of the divine commandments: not because he desires it for its own sake, but because he shuns the detection of his crime and loves the delight which he loves in the perpetration of the crime.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In man himself and in another the cause existed, that he should become worse.* For from this it seems that man would not have sinned unless the devil had existed; and this seems false, because man had a changeable free will: therefore, every temptation of the devil being set aside, he was able to consent to evil and thereby to sin. — Likewise Augustine proves that « by another author no one can be made worse », at the beginning of the *Eighty-three Questions*, because neither by a *lesser* nor by an *equal* nor by a *superior.* For the *lesser* cannot; the *equal* does not prevail over its equal; the *superior* does not will it, because nothing is superior to the good except the good, and the good does not will to make the good worse.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, with no temptation impelling, man was able to sin, as is clear in Lucifer, who sinned without an impulse from another, who also was more excellent than the first man. But the Master speaks by supposing the mode of sinning according to which man fell, namely at the suggestion of the devil; and therefore he says that in man himself and in the devil it lay, that man should become worse; but in different ways, because the devil was only the *inducing* cause and, as it were, an assisting one, but man was the *perfecting* and consummating cause. And because every sin which we commit in some way takes its origin from the first sin on account of the corruption which grew in through the transmission of the original [sin]; hence it is that not only is the first parent said to have been made worse by the devil, but rather every sin is also said to be from him. Whence Jerome on Jeremiah says in the original: « Whatever we sin, whatever evil works we perpetrate night and day, is the command of the demons »; because either every sin proceeds from the immediate suggestion of demons, or from that primary suggestion. — And thus is made clear that which the Master says in the text; nor does that of Augustine stand in the way, who understands it of the principal agent, wishing to show that of the primary corruption no one could be the principal author, except man himself.

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