Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/23/q/bon-sent-II-d23-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the permission of the first temptation.*
### Question I. *Whether God ought to have made man impeccable.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that God ought to have made man impeccable or unconquerable, and this:

1. *First*, through the divine *goodness*, because, as Dionysius says, "it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things"; but a rational nature that cannot sin is better than one that can: therefore it seems that it befitted God, who is best, to make man incapable of sinning, and thus unconquerable.

2. Likewise, the same thing seems [to follow] through the divine *liberality*. For it pertains to the excellence of liberality not only to give many and great things, but also to give *swiftly*; but the gift of confirming and beatifying grace is greater than the gift of any grace

that makes pleasing [to God]: therefore if God had disposed to give this to man, and man from his first condition was suited for it; it seems that immediately when He made him, He ought to have given him this gift; but if he had this, he would be unconquerable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the same thing is shown, thirdly, on the part of *wisdom*. For it belongs to a greater wisdom to know how to guard against evils beforehand, than, after they have been done, to apply a remedy: therefore if the divine wisdom was especially to be manifested in the making of man, it seems that He ought to have made him such, and to have applied to him such caution, that he could not fall into evil.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown on the part of the divine *power*. For the greater the power, the more swiftly it works: therefore the divine power is more manifested in a sudden operation than in a successive one. If, then, man's gratification and confirmation and glorification are immediately from God, it seems that God, suddenly and in the same instant in which He made man, ought to have made him pleasing [to Himself] and confirmed him in grace, and thereby made him unconquerable.

**On the contrary:**
1. Glory is a praiseworthy good; but no one is to be praised for what he has, unless he has it through merits: therefore if God made man for this, that he should arrive at the state of glory and reward; it seems that He also ought to have made man in a *state of merit*. But the *state of merit* and [the state] *of reward* ought to be distinct, as the state of the way and of the homeland, according to the common law: therefore also the *gifts* of the way and of the homeland. If, then, to have an incapacity for sinning pertains to the security of beatitude, it seems that it ought not to have been given to man from the beginning: therefore man ought to have been made conquerable.

2. Likewise, for the full perfection of the universe it befitted that every creature be made which could be conceived by right reason, as Augustine says in the third book of *On Free Choice*; but it can reasonably be thought that there pertains to the perfection of the universe a creature which would have freedom of choice and *be left in the hand of its own counsel*: this, therefore, it befitted to be made and to be established in a state of changeableness. But this belongs to no creature more than to man: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the universe is adorned from the opposition of evil to good "as it were by certain antitheses," as Augustine says, and Ecclesiasticus intimates in the thirty-third chapter: *Against evil, good* etc. If, then, God ought to have beautified and adorned the universe, it seems that He ought not to have taken away this adornment from the universe; but if He had made man unconquerable, this adornment would no longer be: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] in a fourth way, because God made the universe for the manifestation of Himself; and just as God is supremely powerful and wise, so He is supremely just and merciful: therefore He ought to have made such a universe, in which His supreme *justice* and supreme *mercy* would be manifested. But supreme *justice* is not manifested except in the severity of the punishment of the wicked; supreme *mercy* is not manifested perfectly except in the liberation of the wretched and the remission of sins; but these could not be, unless the rational creature had been made in a state in which it could sin and be conquered: therefore the divine justice and mercy demanded that man be made changeable and conquerable.

### Conclusion
> *For manifesting God's power, wisdom, mercy, and justice, it was fitting that man be created capable of sinning.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, although the divine operation itself needs no approval, for the reason that whatever God does, He does well and does rightly; nevertheless, to stir up devotion in the mind of the faithful, and to restrain the rage in the mouth of those who blaspheme and blame God in His works, a fourfold reason can be assigned why God made man such that he could be conquered by the adversary.

And the first is the manifestation of the divine *power*. For God willed to show man that, just as he had not been made without Him, so neither could he persist without Him. Therefore, that man might know that the divine *power* is not only the cause of all power, but also the conserver of all power, and that it alone is that which cannot fail nor be conquered: therefore it pleased Him to make the rational creature changeable and conquerable, and not to confirm it, until by experience it should learn that He alone is the one in whom *not-being-able* does not occur.

The second reason is the manifestation of the divine *wisdom*. For it is more indicative of a greater wisdom to know how to order good things together with evil ones and to draw forth good things from evil ones, than to order good things alone together with good ones; and therefore, since it did not befit God to make evils, He ought to make such a creature as could fail in acting and commit evil, that God, by ordering those evils, might declare His wisdom.

The third reason is taken from the manifestation of the divine *mercy*, which was most powerfully manifested when

He handed over His only-begotten Son for the liberation of the servant.

The fourth reason is taken from the manifestation of the divine *justice*, which is most powerfully manifested in this, that God repays each one according to his works, especially in the eternal punishment of the wicked. But this retribution and punishment, and also the aforesaid liberation of mercy, would not be, unless God had made the rational creature, and especially man, in a state of changeableness, and thus capable of being assailed and conquered. — And therefore it was fitting that God make man in such a state; and the reasons adduced for this are to be granted.

1. *To that* which is objected first, that God ought to have made man best; it must be said that there is what is best *simply*, and there is what is best *in [a given] order*. But when Dionysius says that it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things, he does not understand it *absolutely*, but *in [a given] order*; and therefore from this it does not follow that man ought to have been made in the best state *simply*, but in a state in which the order and beauty of the whole [of things] would best be preserved. And so he was made, when he was produced in a state of changeableness, so that by an ordered progression he might arrive from merit to reward, from the imperfect to the perfect, from the lower to the supreme.

2. *To that* which is objected concerning supreme liberality, it must be said that, although God is most liberal, nevertheless liberality does not bar the way of justice and wisdom. Therefore He distributes His gifts so liberally that nevertheless the right ordering of wisdom and the just retribution of justice are not excluded. Therefore He ought not immediately to beatify and confirm, but to await the merits of man.

3. *To that* which is objected, that it belongs to a greater wisdom to guard against evil beforehand, etc.; it must be said that this is false; rather, it belongs to a much greater wisdom to cure a disease well than to preserve nature from disease. Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: "God judged it better to make good things out of evils than to permit no evils." And it bears witness to a greater wisdom also, as has been said, so to order things that, from a supervening disorder also, they are not deformed, but their ordering is adorned.

4. *To that* which is objected concerning power, it must be said that, although in all the divine works the divine power is manifested, nevertheless those things which pertain to man's gratification and glorification are more for the manifestation of the divine mercy and justice than of power. Therefore there is greater fittingness in the proposed [course] than in the opposite. Nevertheless, as to a certain mode, from human infirmity and indigence itself the divine power becomes more known to man than if man had never beheld changeableness in a rational creature.