Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/23/q/bon-sent-II-d23-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the knowledge of the first parents.*

Next, with respect to the second proposal, the question is asked concerning the knowledge of the first parents, and here a question falls under three heads.

For *first* it must be asked concerning the knowledge of the first parents as regards *advancement*.

*Second*, however, it must be asked as regards *defect*.

*Third*, the question is asked concerning that knowledge itself as regards its *completion and state*.

### Question I. *Whether, if man had stood, he would have advanced in knowledge through intervals of time.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether, if man had stood, he would have advanced in knowledge through intervals of time. And that he would not, seems [to follow]:

1. *First*, from the word of Hugh in his book *On the Sacraments*: « That man received perfect knowledge of all the things which were made together with man and on account of man, ought to be doubted by no one »: if therefore he had perfect knowledge at once, then he could not advance further.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by a reason which Hugh himself makes. A name duly imposed is expressive of the nature of the thing; no one therefore can name all things, except him who has full knowledge of all things. But Adam imposed names on all things, nor are other more perfect names ever to be imposed on those things: it seems therefore that Adam knew perfectly all created things: therefore he would not have advanced in knowledge, if he had remained in the state of his condition.

3. Likewise, no one rightly rules and governs those things whose nature he is ignorant of; but all things had been committed to the rule and governance of Adam, according to what is said in Genesis and in the Psalm: *Thou hast subjected all things under his feet,* etc. From his primary condition, therefore, the first man had knowledge of things: therefore he would not have advanced to it through instruction through intervals of time.

4. Likewise, whatever a man learns, he learns by means of the way of sense, memory, and experience, and thus from the lower and from the exterior. If therefore man had learned in the state of innocence, he would have come to perfection through lower and exterior things; but such an order does not befit a nature instituted and well-ordered, but only a fallen one, since he was set over every creature: it seems therefore that he would have learned nothing of sensible things in that state.

**On the contrary:** 1. Adam in that state would have advanced to grace through intervals of time; otherwise his condition would be worse than ours, since we grow in grace by multiplying merits: therefore by parity of reasoning he would have advanced in the knowledge of things through intervals of time.

2. Likewise, either Adam *knew* the things that were to come, or *he did not know*. If *so*: then he foreknew his own fall, and what would come of it to his posterity; which plainly appears to be false. If he *did not know* future things; but the natures of things vary in time: therefore he began to know many things according to the variation of times: therefore he would have advanced in knowledge.

3. Likewise, Adam had neither seen all things nor heard all things. Grant therefore that he saw some thing which he had not seen before; since to see is to know, just as to understand [is]: it seems that, just as it necessarily follows that if he began to understand, he began to know, similarly, if he began to see, he began to know. If therefore he had seen many sensible things which he had not seen before, it seems that he would have learned many sensible things through intervals of time.

4. Likewise, if man had stood, either one man would know the will and thought of another, or [he would] not. If *so*: then they would engage in speech in vain. If *not*: then since he could be taught by another, it seems that in the state of innocence he could have learned many things.

### Conclusion

> Adam, if he had stood, in the knowledge of the things which come about by the natural course, would not have advanced as regards the acquisition of a new habit, but only as regards the mode of knowledge and as regards greater aptitude. Yet he could have advanced even by new knowledge with respect to voluntary and miraculous things.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the advancement of knowledge can be considered in a threefold way: either on the part of the *knowable things*, or on the part of the *modes of knowing*, or on the part of *greater aptitude* in knowing. — Speaking according to the first mode, it must be understood that there are certain things which come about by the *natural* course; certain ones which [come about] by the *miraculous* [course]; certain ones which come about by the *voluntary* course, according as Anselm determines.

In the knowledge therefore of those things which indeed come about by the *natural* course, Adam would not have advanced as regards the acquisition of a new habit. For he received, as Hugh says, and the Master in the text, « from the beginning the full knowledge of all things »; and this also the reasons which are adduced for the first part show. Yet he could have advanced as regards another mode of knowing, and as regards a greater habit of knowing. — As regards another mode he could advance, because what he knew by simple cognition he could know by experience; and what he knew by understanding he could know also by sense. — He could also advance as regards greater aptitude, because from the frequent consideration of those things which he knew, he would have been readier and more prepared to judge concerning those things, of which he had knowledge through an innate habit. For although the first man did not have the slowness of dullness through the burdening of the mortal body; yet his spirit had a certain lesser swiftness through the vegetation of the animal body. — And thus in the knowledge of natural things Adam would in a certain way have advanced, in a certain way not at all, if he had stood.

But in the knowledge of those things which come about by the *voluntary* and *miraculous* or supernatural course, he could have advanced absolutely, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also in acquiring *new knowledge*. Nor is this surprising, because for the purpose of knowing the divine mysteries, he needed supernal illumination; but for the purpose of knowing the secrets of another, he needed the disclosure of that person. Nor did such advancement detract from the state of innocence, since even the blessed Angels advance in the knowledge of divine mysteries and of human secrets; on account of which it is said to the Ephesians, chapter three: *That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers through the Church.*

And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. For the reasons adduced for the first part proceed concerning the knowledge of natural things, and thus Hugh understands [it]. For on those things Adam imposed names, and of those things the care was committed to him. Yet the last reason concerning perfection from the lower and the exterior does not compel, because, as Augustine says in the sixth book of the *Music*, « the exterior object does not act upon the soul nor perfect it; but the soul moves itself, on the occasion received from the exterior, and by informing itself it acts more upon the object than it is acted upon by it »; and this would have been in Adam much more strongly and nobly than it is after the fall. Hence that reason does not compel [the conclusion] that Adam could not, with respect to those things which he knew, acquire a new mode of knowledge; nor do the preceding reasons establish that Adam could not be more aptly disposed in knowing through frequency in considering.

But the reasons which are adduced for the opposite part show that Adam, if he had stood, could have advanced in knowledge with respect to those things which are *voluntary* and *miraculous*. But concerning the others, namely concerning those which come about naturally, they do not conclude that Adam would have acquired new knowledge. — Hence that first reason concerning the comparison of grace to knowledge is not valid, because the perfection of grace is not only from a gift, but also from merit. But the perfection of knowledge in Adam was from a gift; and if he had stood, not only in himself, but also in his posterity it is believed by many, not unlearnedly, to have been similar, at least as regards habit; and this I say on account of the age of infancy. — To the others the response is sufficiently plain through what has already been said.