Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/23/q/bon-sent-II-d23-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether, if the first parents had stood in the state of innocence, they could ever have been deceived.*

Secondly, it is asked about the knowledge of the first parents with respect to defect. And this is to ask whether, if they had stood in the state of innocence, they could ever have been deceived. And that they could, it seems.

1. Genesis 3: *The woman said: The serpent seduced me;* but it is established that the woman did not consent except because she judged that what the serpent said was true; but before consent she did not sin: therefore before she sinned, she was deceived.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Genesis according to the Letter,* and it is found above, in the twenty-second distinction: "Adam believed that both could come about, namely that he might both comply with his wife and obtain pardon through penance"; but it is established that this was false; and he believed this before he sinned, for otherwise he would not have sinned: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the Master above, in the twenty-first distinction, speaking of the woman and the serpent, says that "the woman did not shudder at the serpent, because, since she knew it to be a creature, she also supposed that it had received the office of speaking from God": but it is established that what she supposed was false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems to follow by reason. If Adam had stood, he would surely have slept and had other natural operations: therefore, since a dream arises from the natural motion of vapors and phantasms about the organ of imagination, Adam would have dreamed. But in a dream the likeness of a thing is taken for the truth, and wherever this is, there is deception: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it is natural that whatever is seen, is seen under an angle, and the farther off something is seen, the smaller the appearance it generates and the more acute the angle under which it is seen: therefore the sun would appear as small to Adam himself as it does to us: therefore, just as our sense is deceived in judging about the size of the sun, so it seems that Adam's sense would have been deceived.

6. Likewise, suppose that some man had sinned, Adam not knowing it, and asserted something false to him; either Adam would know that he was speaking falsely, or not. If so: then he would know the hidden things of another's heart; for I suppose that the man speaks to him about the secrets of his own heart, which to know in another is proper to God alone. If he did not know it to be false, then he would not know him to be a liar: therefore he would believe him to be truthful, or would judge ill of him. But if he believed him to be truthful, he would believe him to be speaking the truth: therefore he would necessarily be deceived.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine: "To approve the true for the false is not the nature of man as instituted, but the penalty of the damned"; but when someone is deceived, he approves the true for the false, or vice versa: therefore this would never have been in man, if he had persisted in the state of innocence.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the *Enchiridion,* chapter nineteen: "Error in itself, whether great in a great matter or small in a small matter, is nevertheless always an evil"; and wherever there is deception, there is some error, either great or small: therefore it cannot be in anyone without there being evil in him. But in Adam in the state of innocence there was neither the evil of fault nor the evil of penalty: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the *Enchiridion,* chapter seventeen: "Here men deceive and are deceived, and they are more wretched when they deceive by lying than when they are deceived by believing liars": therefore it seems that on both sides there is misery, though greater in deceiving: therefore if in the state of innocence there was no misery, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, in the state of innocence man would suffer or do nothing contrary to nature; but deception is contrary to the appetite of rational nature; whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: "To such a degree does the rational creature shun falsity and, as far as it can, avoid error, that even whoever loves to deceive is unwilling to be deceived." Adam therefore naturally refused this: therefore in the state of innocence he could not be deceived.

5. Likewise, in Adam all the lower powers were subject to the will, otherwise right order would not be preserved in man in the state of innocence: therefore if man did not wish to be deceived nor to assent to the false, it seems that there would never have been in his reason any deception or inclination to the false, as long as he remained in that first state.

6. Likewise, it is of greater unworthiness to *be deceived* in mind than to *suffer* in body — whence it was fitting for Christ to assume suffering in body, not deception in mind — but if Adam had stood, there would have been no bodily suffering: therefore there would have been no deception in him.

### Conclusion.

> If Adam had stood, there would have been no deception in him, neither from within nor from without, although there could have been in him some nescience.

**I respond:** To the aforesaid question one could easily reply, and the arguments could also be resolved by a certain easy distinction. For one could say thus, that one kind of deception is about knowable things, another about opinable things. Now I call "knowable" those things which can be comprehended by certain reasoning, such as are those which are the objects of the liberal sciences. But I call "opinable" those things which can be known only through a certain conjecture, such as the secrets of another's conscience and future contingents, which come about by chance and fortune, or by free will. — In the first, however, Adam could not be deceived, because he had knowledge of all of them. But in the second, it happens in two ways that someone is deceived: either such that he clings to it with firm belief, or such that he clings to it by some kind of estimation. And the first deception is properly called *error.* And this would not have been in the first man while standing. But the second can be called *opinion,* in which there is the acceptance of one part without full assent of belief, and this can be called a certain false estimation. And this would have been in Adam without fault and penalty, especially since from this estimation he would neither fall into sin nor incur loss. — And according to this distinction the arguments adduced for both sides can be resolved. For the arguments showing that deception could be in Adam nearly all proceed concerning deception insofar as it is called *any kind of estimation.* — But the arguments to the opposite proceed insofar as deception means firm belief, such that not only is someone deceived in *supposing* the false to be true, but also in *approving* the false to be true, or vice versa; and such is the deception which is *error.*

But although what has now been said seems probable enough, it nevertheless does not fully satisfy reason nor accord with the words of Augustine. For Augustine says in the *Enchiridion,* chapter seventeen: "Since to err is nothing other than to suppose *true* what is false, or *false* what is true, or to hold *certain* for uncertain, or *uncertain* for certain, whether it be false or true; and since this is as deformed and unseemly in the mind as it is beautiful and becoming, as we perceive, whether in speaking or in assenting, that *yea* be *yea, nay* be *nay*: assuredly for this very reason this life which we live is wretched, because for it now and then, lest it be lost, error is necessary." From this saying it is gathered that Augustine generally calls error every deception; and he calls it unseemly and unbecoming, and pertaining to the wretched life. And in the book *On the Usefulness of Believing* he expressly says, "that no error can be without vice."

Therefore it must be said that, even though in the state of innocence there would have been in man the imperfection of some nescience, as was shown above, in the immediately preceding distinction; nevertheless there would not have been deception in him. For deception adds, beyond nescience, a distortion of judgment; this would not have been in Adam in the state of innocence, just as neither would there have been in him bodily suffering.

And this can be understood thus. For just as it happens in two ways that someone suffers: either by intrinsic suffering, or by suffering inflicted from without, so it happens in two ways that someone is deceived: either that he himself misreasons within himself, or that he is misled by another; and neither of these would have been in Adam. For just as there would have been in him no intrinsic suffering, because the ruling power of the soul perfectly presided over his body and could preserve it;
so there would have been no deception coming from *within,* because the judgment of reason presided over all the sensitive powers; nor were these moved contrary to reason, but rather were sufficiently directed by it. — Just as also he could not suffer *by inflicted suffering,* either because no one in that time was there to inflict it, or because, if one were present, the divine power would protect him, as was determined above; so also in that state *there would be no one* to circumvent man or to mislead him — for *each one would speak the truth with his neighbor* — or if there *were* one, the revelation of divine inspiration, whether of itself or through an Angel, would come to his aid, lest he be deceived, just as virtue came to his aid, lest he be harmed. — And thus, Adam standing, there would have been in him no deception, neither from *within* nor from *without.* — Whence the arguments which prove this are to be conceded.

1, 2. But to that which is objected concerning the seduction of the woman and also of the man, it can be replied in two ways. In one way thus, that that seduction was a false belief, and even if the sin of disobedience and ambition preceded, the sin of presumption followed, by whose merit the eye of reason was blinded, so that he judged the false to be true. For immediately the woman, having heard the serpent's utterance, presumed concerning herself, and likewise the man, having heard the woman's suggestion; and therefore the woman supposed that through eating she could attain excellence, and the man supposed that he could find pardon for transgressing the commandment.

In another way it can be said that judgment is twofold. One is of *speculation*; and that is not a part of free will, nor does sin consist in it; and the error of this judgment is after sin, not before. There is also another judgment *in things to be done,* and in those things which pertain to the truth of life; and that judgment is of free will, and this is never without the will. And the error of this judgment can well be a fault, either of presumption, or of infidelity, or of something else. And this was the deception by which the woman was first deceived, and Adam himself; and in this deception he did not remain in the state of innocence, but rather fell. And by this the reply to the two authorities first adduced is clear.

3. To that which is objected thirdly concerning the authority of the Master, that the woman supposed the serpent to have the use of speech; it must be said that either he means that such supposing was in the woman after sin, or, if it was before, she did not suppose that it had this office determinately by a power naturally given to it, but by some latent power, divine providence permitting, which governed and ruled all things, as it had created them. Nor is it a wonder if she was not frightened, because there was not yet in the woman the passion of fear; whence the woman, looking at the serpent, did not approve the false for the true, but was ignorant of some latent power there.

4. To that which is objected concerning the dream, it must be said that in the state of innocence there would not have been a dream from the suffering of *phantasms after the manner of one in labor,* as is said in Ecclesiasticus 34. For this comes about because the lower powers are not subject to reason, and the body does not obey the spirit; but if there had been one, it would be because some visitation would be sent from the Most High, in which man would not be deceived, but rather illumined. — *Moreover,* granting that there were a dream there, it does not follow that on this account there would be *deception* there. For *deception* regards the use of reason; but in *dreams* the use of reason would not exist, or if it did exist, it would rather purge the deception of phantasy than consent to it; for reason would rather say in dreams to the dreaming man: you are dreaming, than say: what you see is the truth.

5. To that which is objected concerning sight, it must be said that there would be no deception, because Adam would well know that a thing appears smaller from a distance; and therefore he would not judge according to the appearance of the eye alone, but having weighed the distance of the medium; and therefore he would not be deceived, but would have right judgment.

6. To the last, the reply is already clear from the foregoing, because either Adam would detect by a manifest sign that this man had sinned — which seems probable enough, since a very great transformation was made in Adam's nature by the commission of fault — and then he would neither believe him nor disbelieve him, except insofar as he should otherwise see that he ought to be believed. Or if he did not detect him to be a sinner; where his own caution would not suffice, the most diligent care of divine providence would come to his aid, which would neither have permitted him to be harmed, nor permitted him to be deceived, if he had been willing to be obediently subject to its commands.