Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p1-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the help conferred upon man, by which he might be able to resist.*
### Question I. *Whether free choice unbendable by nature could be given to man.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that there could be given to man a help, that is, a free choice unbendable by nature, that is, apart from superadded grace:

1. *First, from a similitude.* For it happens that one finds a corporeal light which it is impossible by nature to be darkened in itself, such as the light of the empyrean, or the light of the sun. If therefore spiritual light is far more permanent than corporeal, it seems that the human soul could have been made in the perfection of so great a light by nature, such that it could in no way be obscured, neither through ignorance nor through fault.

2. Likewise, it happens that one finds some corporeal substance unchangeable as to its *substance* and as to its *properties*, such as the outermost body, namely the empyrean; and this it has not only through grace, but also through nature. Therefore by parity of reasoning it is possible that a spiritual substance be made by nature in such great stability that it can in no way be turned away from *natural rectitude*; for if this is found in a corporeal substance, much more strongly can it be found in a more dignified substance.

3. Likewise, grace is the perfection of nature, and a perfection is conformed to its perfectible subject: if therefore the grace of confirmation renders nature wholly incapable of sinning, it seems that the human soul is naturally capable of such stability and unbendableness.

*If you say* that it is not capable of such unbendableness except by the mediation of grace; *it is objected against this* that such bendability toward evil is either *essential* to the nature itself, or *not*. If it *is essential*: then it seems that it cannot be removed through grace. If it is *not* essential: then it seems that without such bendability toward evil the rational nature could be made, its own nature preserved and with no superadded grace. — On this account there is a question, since both the *free choice* of man and *grace* are something created, as will be made clear below: why can unbendableness toward evil be given to grace, and yet cannot be given to the *rational creature*? For it seems by a like reasoning that if it can be given to one, it can be given to the other.

4. Likewise, although every creature is in itself bendable in its nature, yet some are so created from their origin that it is impossible for them to be corrupted: and this they have without anything added to their natural endowments, as is clear in the case of simple substances. Hence the Angels and souls are by nature immortal: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that some souls can be created by nature unbendable toward evil: it seems therefore to have been possible for such a help to be conferred by God, by which one could not be bent toward evil by nature.

**On the contrary:** 1. These two are convertible, as Damascene and also Augustine hold, namely *to be creatable* and *to be bendable*. So therefore in every creature there must be some bendability; but in a spiritual substance there is no bendability according to substance: therefore there must be bendability according to choice: therefore it is impossible for a created substance to have free choice unbendable by nature.

2. Likewise, the affective power is not by nature more constrained than the intellect; but the intellect, by the very fact that it is intellect, is by its own nature born to understand all things: therefore by parity of reasoning the affective power is by its own nature able to desire this or that, and therefore to pass from one of two opposites into the other: therefore every created affective power, as far as concerns its own nature, can will and prefer not only the good *simply*, but also the *apparent* good, not only the good that is *permitted*, but also that which is *forbidden*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, created free choice, by the very fact that it is *free*, is master of its own act; by the very fact that it is *created*, it has been made to owe something to its Creator, namely honor: therefore if it is master of its own act, it can fail to render what it owes; but this is sin: therefore it is necessary that free choice, as far as concerns its own nature, be made bendable toward sin.

4. Likewise, if free choice were by its own nature unbendable toward evil, then to stand in the good and to do good would be *natural* to it: therefore every work proceeding from free choice would be in the genus of a *natural work*, and none would be in the genus of *moral conduct*: therefore, if this is true, none would be meritorious, none would be praiseworthy, and free choice would be ordainable to glory through no work that it might do. But this is contrary to the natural institution of free choice: therefore it is impossible for free choice unbendable by nature to be given to any creature.

### Conclusio.

> Both on the side of the *initial principle* and on the side of the *final term* it is repugnant that any rational creature should have, by nature, free choice unbendable toward evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that it was impossible for man or any rational creature to have, by nature, free choice unbendable toward evil. For this is repugnant to the nature of the rational creature itself both on the side of the *initial principle* and on the side of the *final term*; and this is clear thus.

For if the free choice of the rational creature were to become naturally unbendable toward evil, this would be either on account of its *constraint toward the good*, or on account of its *determination*. If on account of *constraint*, so that it would do good as a stone tends downward; then surely free choice would neither be free, nor would its work be worthy of praise; and thus it would be unsuited *to the end* for which it was made, namely to the attaining of the reward of praise and glory. — But if it were unbendable toward evil on account of *determination*, because it would be so capable through its own nature with regard to the good that it could not fall into evil, as is the case with the divine free choice, which is determined to goods alone; then such free choice would lack mutability by its own nature: therefore it would no longer be a creature nor produced from nothing, since every *creature is subject to vanity*; and thus this would be contrary to the nature of the *initial principle*, as to that which we say, that the rational creature was produced from nothing. — Since therefore the nature of the rational creature is repugnant both on the side of the *initial principle* and on the side of the *final term*, it was impossible for man, or any other rational creature, to have free choice unbendable toward evil by nature. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected *first* concerning corporeal light, it must be said that it is not similar, both on account of the fact that the source of corporeal light can be found within the genus of creature, whereas the source of spiritual light is not found within the genus of creature, but is the Creator himself, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter one: *The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high*; and also because corporeal light has a constraint with respect to the act of shining, so much so that its shining is not praiseworthy, but purely natural. It is not so with the rectitude and operation of the rational creature, that is, of the deliberative will.

2. To that which is objected, that some corporeal substance is by nature unchangeable, etc.; the response is now clear from this, that it is not fitting or proper that a spiritual creature be so constrained to its work as a corporeal one; or also because it does not hold the highest place in the genus of spirit, as some corporeal creature holds the highest place in the genus of bodies. — Nevertheless it could be said that every body is changeable by some kind of change, as Augustine holds, either because it is changed in itself, or because some things are changed within it; and in this last way change could be in the empyrean.

3. To that which is objected concerning confirming grace, it must be said that grace is said to be the perfection of nature not only because it aids, but also because it excludes a defect of it. Hence in every nature of a rational creature there is some natural defect which is to be excluded through grace, however perfect that nature may be within the genus of creature. And therefore it does not follow that, if something belongs to a thing through grace, it belongs to it through nature. And if it is objected that God could have given to nature what he gave to grace; it must be said that nature was not born to receive it. For just as the nature of a moral work is one thing, and that of a natural work another, nor can a property of a moral work belong to a natural work unless the natural ceased to be natural — for praise and blame, which is a property of a moral work as such, cannot belong to a natural work as such — so too in the matter at hand it is to be understood to be the case.

4. To that which is objected concerning immortality, the response is now clear from what has been said. For that which is naturally immortal is on that account neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy; and thus, if free choice unbendable were created, it would be capable neither of praise nor of blame.