Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p1-a1-q2
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### Article I. *On the aid bestowed on man, by which he could resist.*
### Question II. *Whether man was given a natural aid by which he could resist temptation without grace.*

Secondly it is asked whether man was given a natural aid by which he could resist temptation without any grace. And that he could, it seems.

1. « Free choice, as Anselm says, is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake »; but free choice is a natural power: therefore by a natural power, without added grace, man was able to preserve rectitude or justice. But by preserving rectitude he would not consent to temptation, but rather would resist it and overcome it: therefore etc. — For it is preserved — for whoever is upright cannot be crooked, so long as he wills to be upright — but « nothing is so much in our will as the will itself », nothing is easier for an upright man than to will rectitude: if therefore the free choice of man, as far as concerns its primary condition, was upright; without any superadded grace it was able to preserve rectitude, and thus to resist the adversary and overcome temptation.

2. Likewise, let man be posited in his purely natural state; then either he could resist the devil who urges him, or he could not. If he could not; and no one sins in that which he cannot avoid: therefore if he consented to the devil's temptation, he would not sin; which is impossible. If he could: therefore by a natural aid, without superadded grace, he was able to overcome the adversary.

3. Likewise, nature gives being to nothing without also giving it some power of enduring, since it does not fail in necessities; whence just as something is naturally propagated, so too it is preserved in being by a natural power. If therefore the free choice given to man by his own nature was innocent and immune from fault: therefore by his own nature, without any grace, he was able to endure in his innocence: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the rectitude of the will is preserved by the act of the will alone.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine, *On the Innocence of Human Nature*: « Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was created, would yet in no way have preserved itself, the Creator not aiding it »: therefore however much man had free choice, in order that he might endure, the help of divine grace was necessary to him.

2. Likewise, if then he was able by the power of nature to resist temptation; and the natural endowments are the same in us and in him: therefore to resist temptation would be possible for us by nature: therefore in vain would we frequently say the Lord's Prayer, asking: *And lead us not into temptation*. But if it is absurd to say this, it is clear etc.

3. Likewise, if by his own power man could resist temptation without any grace, he could also have obtained victory over the enemy; but to victory corresponds the crown: therefore without any grace he could have merited and arrived at glory; but since this is plainly false, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, to resist temptation is a work praiseworthy in itself; but one who does a praiseworthy work cannot fail to make progress: therefore if by his own power he had that whereby he could stand, by his own power he had that whereby he could make progress; which is against the Master in the text, who says that he had that whereby he could stand, but did not have that whereby he could make progress.

### Conclusion

> The first man, by a natural aid together with the continuation of the divine influence, was able to resist temptation without the addition of new grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that for someone to be able by his own power to resist the devil's temptation without any grace can be understood in two ways: either so that the *continuation of the divine influence* is excluded, or so that the *addition of new grace* is excluded. The first is simply impossible; for free choice would never resist an evil suggestion unless God by the continual influence of his goodness preserved it in the good. In the second way it holds true for the state of innocence. For as the Master says in the text, there was in the first man a great « immunity of free choice from every stain and corruption, and a soundness and liveliness of the natural powers of the soul », and by this he was able to avoid and repel the devil's suggestion; nor did he need new grace to be added to him for this, since with respect to this there was no difficulty in him, as the Master says in the text, and the reasons show, which are brought forward for the first part; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the objections:**
1. To that text of Augustine *On the Innocence of Human Nature*, the response is now clear. For he says that no rational creature can be preserved without divine aid, not because grace is necessary for it to resist sin, so long as it is in innocence, but because, in whatever state it is, the influence of the divine goodness is necessary to it.

2. To that which is objected, that the natural endowments are the same in us and in the first man; it must be said that although they are the same according to substance, yet they are weakened and wounded and made worse; and therefore it does not follow that they have as much *power* as they had, when nature was first established.

3. To that which is objected, that to resist temptation is to obtain victory; it must be said that to *overcome* the adversary is more than to *resist* him. For in order that someone *overcome* the adversary, it is fitting that he attain the opposite of that to which the adversary intended to draw him; but this comes about only when man not only resists the adversary *voluntarily*, but also *meritoriously*. For then is the devil rightly conquered, when from the vexation of temptation, by which he intended to *bend man toward demerit*, man *advances toward merit*. But this free choice cannot do except through the aid of grace, although by itself it could flee sin. For if without grace it fled sin, it would not be meritorious for it, and yet it would resist temptation.

4. And by this the response to what follows is clear, namely that the Master does not speak of any progress whatever, but of progress in merit, in which man does not always make progress when he does a good work with moral goodness, unless the grace of the Holy Spirit be present, as will appear better below.