Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p1-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the division of the powers of the soul.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second point, namely concerning the division of the powers of the soul; and concerning this four things can be asked.

First, then, there is inquiry concerning that division of the powers of the soul which is by way of the cognitive and the affective, or by way of reason and will.

Second, there is inquiry concerning that which is by way of the superior and the inferior portion.

Third, there is inquiry concerning that which is by way of the deliberative and the natural.

Fourth and last, there is inquiry, for a fuller explanation, concerning that division which is by way of the possible and the agent.

### Question I. *Whether the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, differ essentially.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, are diverse powers by essence. And that they are not, seems [to be the case].

1. Augustine, in the tenth book *On the Trinity*, says that « these three, namely memory, understanding, and will, are one mind, one understanding, one life »; but this would not be so, if they were diverse by essence: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third book *On the Soul* says that « the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical »; but extension does not vary a power by essence: therefore by essence the speculative and the practical understanding are the same: therefore also the cognitive and the motive [power].

3. Likewise, « powers are distinguished by their objects », as the Philosopher says: if therefore the first ground of distinguishing is on the side of the objects, there is no greater distinction in the powers than in the objects: but the true under the aspect of the true is the object of the intellect, the good under the aspect of the good is the object of the affect: since therefore the substantial goodness and truth of a creature are by essence the same, therefore reason and will will be by essence the same.

4. Likewise, the image is more conformed to the supreme Trinity than the vestige is conformed; but in the supreme Trinity there is no essential difference, but only one according to relation: if therefore unity and truth and goodness differ in the creature only by relation, and not essentially, much more does it seem that reason and will are to be distinguished only by relation.

5. Likewise, to every delight sense necessarily concurs — « for delight is the conjunction of what is fitting with what is fitting and the sense of the same » — but it is constant that the will has [the capacity] to be delighted: therefore it has [the capacity] to know and sense the delightful: therefore it will itself be a sensitive power.

6. Likewise, to every habit of virtue love and the inspection of the mean necessarily concur. For as Augustine maintains, *On the Morals of the Church*, « every virtue is love »; and as the Philosopher maintains, virtue is the inspector of the mean. If therefore the virtues are in the will, then the act of the will is to inspect the mean and to love. But the first pertains to the cognitive power, the second to the affective: therefore the cognitive and the affective power are the same.

7. Likewise, to light and heat in bodies there correspond knowledge and love in spirits; but the sun by the same power illuminates and heats — for heating is generated from the multiplication of rays — therefore much more does it seem, if a spiritual substance is more powerful, that by the same power it knows and loves: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the best of any single thing can only be one; but the best in the soul is that whereby it is immediately joined to God, and this is the intellect and the affect, or reason and will: therefore they are not diverse powers, but one. If you say that among all the powers the will holds the principate, and it is the one that adheres most intimately; this is objected against: because « a united power can do more than a multiplied one »; if therefore the soul tended toward God by one power alone, it would be more perfectly united to him than if it tended by several: therefore if it was made in the best way for arriving at its end, it seems that reason and will are one single power according to essence.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the tenth book *On the Trinity* says that the soul is to the image with respect to the unity of essence and the trinity of powers: therefore if there is a true trinity there, there is a true distinction of powers there: therefore they are distinguished not only by relation, but also according to that which they are absolutely.

2. Likewise, if reason and will were by essence the same power, as one essence is in the Father and the Son: then just as the Father is said to understand not through the Son but also through himself; so the will would not only understand through the understanding, but also through itself. Augustine, then, would speak falsely in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, when he says that « we will nothing except through the will, we understand nothing except through the understanding ».

3. Likewise, more expressly Augustine in the ninth book *On the Trinity*, chapter four, speaking of reason and will, or of knowledge and love, says thus: « We are admonished, if we can in any way see, that these exist in the soul and are as it were unfolded out of their enfolded state, so that they may be sensed and numbered substantially, or so to speak, essentially ».

4. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]. For any one power it belongs to assign one first act; but the act embracing the whole understanding is to understand, while the act embracing the whole affective [power] is to be affected; therefore if the first and proper acts of these powers are essentially diverse, it seems by parity of reasoning that the powers themselves are too.

5. Likewise, in a creature the mere distinction of relations is not a distinction of things, but in the divine [persons] there is a true distinction of persons; therefore if in the soul there is no distinction of powers except only according to relation, the soul would not be an express likeness of that supreme Trinity, and so neither an image; but if this is false, the conclusion stands etc.

6. Likewise, it belongs to the nature of a creature that when the act of one power is strengthened, the act of another is lessened, on account of the fact that the powers are rooted in the same substance: therefore much more does the intense act of one power slacken another act of the same power. Therefore if reason and will were the same power, when knowledge was intensified, affection would be diminished: therefore the more clearly we saw God, the less we would love him; but if this is altogether false, the conclusion stands etc.

7. Likewise, wherever light and heat are formally, they differ essentially, as is clear in fire: therefore by parity of reasoning, wherever the power of knowing and of loving are found formally in a creature, they are distinguished essentially; but they are so found in the soul: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> Reason and will, or the intellect and the affect, are diverse powers, yet not diverse essences.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although the aforesaid question contains more of curiosity than of utility, on the ground that, whether one part be held or the other, no prejudice is generated either to faith or to morals; nevertheless, because the Saints and others who treat of the powers of the soul speak much of the distinction of the powers; and because also the settling of many questions depends on the settling of the aforesaid question: therefore it is fitting to apply oneself somewhat diligently to its determination.

It must be noted, then, that the determination of this question depends on the determination of that question in which inquiry is made concerning the comparison of the power to the substance of the soul; whence, according as that is variously settled by various [authors], so consequently is this one too.

For some have wished to say that a power of the soul is nothing other than the relation itself, or the soul itself as related to act; and these hold that all the powers of the soul are one by essence, nor is there any difference in them except only according to the relation to one act and another. And they strive to confirm this from Augustine, in the book *On the Soul and the Spirit*, where he seems expressly to say and hold this. And if you say that that book is not Augustine's, by this one does not escape, because he says this same thing in the book *On the Trinity* concerning the powers of the soul, that « they are one essence, one life ».

But others have wished to say that the powers of the soul do not only signify a mode or relation, but also signify properties inhering in the soul itself, which are of the genus of accidents, namely in the second species of quality, that is, natural potency and impotency. And these say that the powers in the soul differ essentially, just as diverse accidental forms exist in the same subject; and they strive to confirm this by a certain saying of Hugh in a certain little book which he wrote *On the Trinity*, where he says that « knowledge and love are not truly what the mind itself is, but as it were certain affections and forms of it, by which it does not belong to it to be *this something*, but only to be present to what is *this something* ».

There is a third group, who say that the powers of the soul are neither so much the same as the soul itself, since they are its intrinsic and essential principles, nor so diverse as to pass over into another genus, like accidents, but are in the genus of substance by reduction. And these say that, since the powers do not simply signify another essence than the substance of the soul, the powers themselves do not differ essentially in such a way that they are diverse essences. Again, since they are not altogether the same as the essence of the soul, they say that they are not altogether the same by essence; and therefore, as it were holding a middle position between the two opinions, they say that some powers of the soul differ from one another in such a way that they can in no way be called one power; yet they do not concede that they are simply diversified according to essence, so as to be called diverse essences, but [say] that they differ essentially within the genus of power, so as to be called diverse powers or diverse instruments of the same substance.

Now each of the said positions has its defenders; nor is it easy to disprove any one of them by compelling reasons. — Since, however, this last-stated position accords more with the common way and with the authorities of the writers, and is more sober and more consonant with reason; therefore, in accordance with this third position, it must be answered to the question proposed that the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, are not one power, but diverse. — And this our predecessors held; Augustine too seems to have held it, as expressly appears in the authorities cited above. All also, as many as divide the powers of the soul, in the first division divide them into the cognitive and the affective or motive. — Again, when someone returns to himself, wishing as it were by a certain experiment to learn the agreement and difference of the powers which he has in himself, he will find that in knowing and loving he has recourse to diverse instruments. Whence to one who attends to the use of the powers it will appear by manifest judgment that the difference of understanding to will is greater than that of understanding to memory, or even of the irascible to the concupiscible. For memory and understanding are occupied about the same thing, in such a way that the one acquires and the other conserves, or the one offers and the other judges. Likewise the concupiscible and the irascible are so related that the concupiscible acquires and the irascible defends; and because each of these is necessary for the perfection of the act of cognition and of affection; therefore memory and understanding are rather called diverse *forces* than diverse *powers*; likewise the irascible and concupiscible. — And there is an example: just as if someone had diverse instruments for diverse principal acts, such as an axe for cutting and a hammer for fabricating; he could nonetheless use the axe itself on one side for cutting, namely on the side of the edge, and on the other side for another act consonant with it. According to this material example, which is not similar in all respects, the matter can be understood in spiritual powers.

The reasons and authorities, therefore, that show reason and will to be diverse powers, must be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from Augustine, that they are one essence and one life; the answer must be that they are said to be one essence on this account, that they are rooted in one essence and adhere to it so intrinsically that they do not pass over into another genus; and therefore to express this blessed Augustine uses such a predication. And that this is not an exposition distorted from the understanding and sense of that saying, is gathered from the very words of blessed Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, where he says that God himself is three persons, but the creature having three powers is not those powers; and this is a certain dissimilitude between the created trinity and the uncreated Trinity. Since therefore in the same place he explains the words previously set down, as to how they are to be understood; from the very word of blessed Augustine it is gathered that when he said that memory, understanding, and will are one essence, he did not say it by way of complete identity, but by way of a certain intrinsic adherence. And it must be believed that the author of the book *On the Soul and the Spirit* had this manner of speaking, whether he was Augustine or another; since, if it were understood otherwise, he would seem to have spoken most improbably. For it would follow from his words that interior reason and exterior sense were one and the same thing; which is so contrary to reason that even hearing itself shrinks from it.

2. To that which is objected, that the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical; it must be said that the Philosopher, as is clear in the chapter *On the mover*, in the third book *On the Soul*, assigns a difference between the practical intellect and appetite, nor does he ever say that the intellect becomes appetite; but he rightly says that the speculative intellect becomes practical, because that same intellect and that same power which directs in considering, afterwards regulates in operating. But the will is not the practical intellect, but is the ratiocinative appetite; and therefore it does not follow from this that by extension alone reason becomes will, or that the intellect becomes affect.

3. To that which is objected, that powers differ by their objects; it must be said that powers are more immediately distinguished by their acts than by their objects. For the essential difference of powers a diversity of objects according to aspect suffices; and therefore, although the true and the good do not differ essentially, nonetheless, because to know and to love are without doubt different acts, the powers which are ordered to these acts have a diversity through themselves.

4. To that which is objected concerning the vestige, it must be said that that reason is rather for the opposite, if one rightly understands, than for the proposal. For since the image represents that supreme Trinity more than the vestige does, since in that supreme Trinity there is a true distinction in hypostases and persons; if the soul is the express image of God, it ought to have within itself a trinity in which there is a true distinction; otherwise it will not be an express likeness. But that difference which is in a creature purely according to disposition and relation does not signify a distinction except only as to mode. Therefore although such a distinction suffices in the character of a vestige, an ampler one ought to be in the character of an image; and therefore that reason does not conclude.

It can also be said otherwise, that the character of a vestige is taken from the comparison of the creature to the Creator, which is regarded according to the relation of the effect to the cause. And because that comparison, namely that of the creature to the Creator according to the threefold genus of cause, is in every way essential to the creature itself; therefore in the creature itself truth and goodness do not differ essentially. — But the character of an image is regarded in the creature insofar as it is compared to God under the aspect of an object. « For it is the image of God in that whereby it can be capable of him and a participant of him ». And because by the same powers the soul has [the capacity] to be borne into God and also into other things to be known; therefore reason and will are not so essential to the soul itself as the aforesaid [unity, truth, and goodness]; and therefore there need not be as great an agreement between understanding and will as there is between substantial truth and goodness.

5. To that which is objected, that sense concurs to delight; it must be said that it is true; but it is not necessary that that sense be of the will itself, which is delighted, but it suffices that it be of the reason that accompanies [it]. For just as the eye sees for itself and for the foot, and yet is a different organ than the foot; so reason sees for itself and for the will, and the will desires for itself and for the reason. And that this is true is clear from the authority of Augustine adduced earlier, by which he says that « we understand nothing except through the intellect, we will nothing except through the will ».

6. To that which is objected, that every virtue is love and an inspector of the mean; it must be said that to inspect the mean is twofold: either by way of consideration, or by way of inclination. In the first way, to inspect the mean does not belong to every virtue in itself, but by concomitance, because, just as reason sees for itself and for the other powers, so prudence and faith discern for themselves and for the other virtues. But if it is called an inspector of the mean in the second way, because by inclination it tends toward it, just as a stone tends downward, and a medicine is said to have a regard toward purging a particular humor; thus it belongs not only to cognition, but even to affection; and therefore from this it is not concluded that the affective and the cognitive power are the same.

7. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of light and heat, the response is already clear from the reason adduced to the contrary, because this is not true when they are in something *informatively*; but if it is true, this is only when they are in something *effectively*. — Moreover, many deny this, that the sun heats by the same power by which it illuminates; and it can be that they speak truly, as was shown above in the fourteenth distinction.

8. To that which is objected concerning the best of the soul, it must be said that there is a best with respect to *first being*, and a best with respect to *second being*. Although the best with respect to *first being* is one, namely the ultimately completing form; nevertheless with respect to *second being* it need not be one, unless it be understood to be one which is gathered from many, just as for some well-being many things concur. And thus, since the power of a creature is constricted, a creature could not have a perfect capacity unless there were in it a multitude of powers, from whose collection or union, one supplying the defect of another, there resulted one complete capacity; as can be manifestly observed in the organs of the human body, each of which needs to be helped by the power of another.

And if it be objected that the soul would be more powerful if its power were one, because then it would be more united; it must be said that, although that is true from the comparison of the power to one act, yet it is not true in comparison to diverse [acts]; or certainly, if it is true by comparing the power to the same [act], it is nevertheless not true by comparing it to diverse [acts]. For it is true that, if a man had one eye, he would see more powerfully than he now sees while he has a companion [eye]; yet he would never see as well alone as he and his companion [eye] would see. So too in the matter at hand it must be understood to be; and therefore the capacity of the soul gathered from many powers is more complete than if it were simply single, because one of the powers does not diminish another, but helps it. And on account of the mutual help and in a certain way the social service, the capacity of the soul is sometimes said to be one, or even the habits existing in the soul to be one, not because this is said according to the proper character and special nature of the powers and habits themselves, but because this is said by a certain collection. For to the perfect capacity of the soul all the powers concur, and to perfect aptitude all the aptitudes of the virtues.

Whence if any authority be found which seems to posit a unity of the powers of the soul and of the virtues, it must be understood according to the manner prescribed, namely according to a certain collection. If again one be found which says that a power of the soul is the essence of the soul, it must be understood by reduction to the same genus.

For there are some things which are in *a genus per se*; and some by *reduction*. Those are *per se* in a genus which participate the complete essence of that genus, like species and individuals; but those are so by *reduction* which do not signify a complete essence, and these are contained under five members. Some are reduced as *principles*, some as *complements*, some as *ways*, some as *likenesses*, some as *privations*. — As *principles*, in two ways: either *essentiating* or *integrating*; as essentiating principles, thus are matter and form in the genus of substance; as integrating principles, thus the parts of a substance are in the genus of substance by reduction. — But if they are reduced as *complements*, this can be in two ways: for either it is a complement by way of *act*, and thus it is a first act, which is reduced to the same genus as the substance whose act it is, as *to live* and *to be* [are reduced] to the genus of substance; or by way of *aptitude*, and thus the completive differences are reduced to the same genus along with the species. — But if they are reduced as *ways*, this can be in two ways: either as *ways to things*, and thus motions and changes, as generation is reduced to substance; or as *ways from things*, and thus the powers have to be reduced to the genus of substance. For the first power of acting, which is said to have its issuing from the substance itself, is reduced to the same genus, since it is not

so far removed from the substance itself as to signify another complete essence. — But if they are *likenesses*, thus they are in a genus by reduction and are reduced to the same genus under which are contained those things of which they are likenesses, as is clear in the likeness of whiteness and color, which indeed is not whiteness, but as it were whiteness; is not color, but as it were color. — Finally, since privations have no essence except through a habit, they have being in the same genus in which the habit too [has being], by reduction. — And thus the response to everything asked is clear.